

Ellie Shockley · Tess M.S. Neal  
Lisa M. PytlikZillig · Brian H. Bornstein  
*Editors*

# Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Trust

Towards Theoretical and Methodological  
Integration

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# Foreword

Some years ago, the German Police University in Münster invited me to lecture on trust and I thought I could win my audience over by reporting that the police had been the most trusted institution in Germany. According to survey results over many years, around 80 % of citizens say they trust the police. This fact did not have the intended effect on the young police inspectors studying towards entering the higher echelon of the German police. Instead one of them raised his hand in alarm: “Do you mean one out of five people out there do not trust me?” What looks like a rather flattering statistic for the institution as a whole may not instill the level of confidence required for day-to-day policing, because the rather abstract survey question and the specific issues that prompt interactions between police officers and citizens refer to different notions of trust. How exactly do they differ, though, and how may they still be connected?

These are fundamental questions which the editors Ellie Shockley, Tess Neal, Lisa PytlikZillig, and Brian Bornstein, and their admirable contributors to this volume are not afraid to address and which we discussed, among many related and more specific questions, at the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation and the National Science Foundation (NSF) Workshop on Institutional Trust at the University of Nebraska in April 2014. The notion of institutional trust might come across as unproblematic, but when we take a closer look it turns out to be a rather provocative idea with which to start. Trust seems to be an inherently psychological concept for understanding interpersonal relationships. Its dyadic character suggests there need to be two actors; one who trusts and one who is trusted, maybe reciprocally. But who or what is the actor at the other end, if we talk about institutional trust in the sense of trust in institutions?

It is important to note that institutional trust can have three related meanings. First, trust in institutions points to the institution as trustee. For example, citizens trust the courts. Second, however, institutions can support trust between trustors and a trustees, which is referred to as institution-based or institutional-based trust. Here, the institution is thought of as a third-party guarantor or enforcer which, crucially, has to be trusted by trustor and trustee in order to be able to fulfill this role. For example, presuming that the courts are trusted, citizens trust each other because

they can go to court in case of wrongdoing. Third, we can talk about institutionalized trust when trusting others is the norm in a social system and people rely on this. Referring to the example of the courts once more, trust is institutionalized when the possibility to go to court is very much in the background and people usually interact without considering or expecting that it might be necessary.

If we define institutions, provisionally, as abstract systems of taken-for-granted rules and practices, then it is tempting and sensible to point to the representatives of such systems as the ultimate recipients of institutional trust. However, these people cannot be reduced to their role as interchangeable office holders; they are involved as individuals even though they are restricted and empowered in what they do on behalf of the institution. Moreover, institutional trust seems to contain a kind of generalized trust towards typical system representatives which shapes trust in specific encounters without predetermining how the interaction unfolds. In return, repeated positive encounters build and confirm institutional trust so that trust in the institution as such emerges over and above any trust in its representatives.

The starting point just described has motivated many of the chapters in this volume in one way or another. The contributions are connected by the appreciation that institutional trust is a multi- and cross-level phenomenon which can be understood better if the scientific disciplines that have specialized in studying different levels and different institutional systems work together. Interdisciplinarity has been a great opportunity for trust research but one that has been difficult to seize and develop. This volume, clearly marked by its title, is fully committed to interdisciplinary perspectives and it is evidence for the richer and clearer picture this can produce.

The process of interdisciplinary inquiry, as documented in the chapters and as experienced by all participants of the NSF Trust Workshop at the University of Nebraska, can be tough, mind-blowing and frustrating, if only because we often have to go back to basics and at the same time open up to unfamiliar views on familiar topics. This may explain partly why interdisciplinary work is often called for but seldom accomplished in trust research just as in other fields. However, the outcomes of the Nebraska initiative prove that it is worthwhile—and even highly enjoyable, going by the collegial and friendly atmosphere at the Workshop—to actively connect knowledge on trust from different disciplines. For example, political scientists might have a tendency to black-box or simplify citizens' motivations whilst psychologists may underestimate the political forces that produce the incentives that citizens perceive. Together, as political psychology, these disciplines achieve more relevant insights, for example, on trust-related topics such as intergroup reconciliation.

The multilevel conceptualization of trust is one important tool for this edited volume which allows its editors and contributors to present trust as a coherent and at the same time differentiated phenomenon. Another tool is the discussion of different domains, notably trust in public administration, policing, state courts, medicine, and science. By comparing trust across these domains as well as the same domain in different cultural or political contexts, it is possible to identify what might be called the universal features of trust as well as domain-specific drivers, mechanisms, and patterns. Whilst there may be an emerging consensus that there is a universal core to the trust problem but not a universal process of dealing with it,

any research that provides specific insights into different domains is highly valuable and this edited volume makes an important contribution in this respect. Readers will appreciate how the different chapters display conceptual sophistication paired with a deep practical knowledge of domains such as police work and courts.

The topic of institutional trust is not only conceptually deep and complex but also very timely. Sticking to the example of the police and policing, I can only observe from far away the recent public debates, peaceful protests, and sometimes violent outbreaks triggered by altercations between citizens and police officers like in Ferguson, Missouri, in the USA. Amnesty International reports incidents of police brutality from around the world, including Germany. Whenever they take place, the question is always whether they are indeed just “incidents” that do not undermine the trustworthiness of the police as an institution, because they can be explained by the wrongdoing of individual police officers, or whether they are evidence of systematic institutional shortcomings and failure. The interdisciplinary perspective on institutional trust offered in this volume contributes to a more nuanced interpretation of such cases and, hopefully, to more effective institutional trust repair efforts, including any necessary reforms.

At the First International Network on Trust (FINT) Workshop in Coventry in the UK in November 2014, I shared my experience from lecturing at the German Police University, mentioned at the beginning of this foreword, with George Hamilton, Chief Constable of the Northern Ireland Police Service. He had presented unique insights into how, in his challenging context, institutional trust in the police was built up from an unfavorable base, compared to Germany, through active engagement with the community and especially with those citizens who find it difficult to trust the police. His account confirmed the importance of treating trust as an ongoing, dynamic process in which institutions and actions are entangled. I could not help but notice, though, that the Chief Constable was preoccupied with citizens’ trust in the police and spoke much less about how the police also have to trust citizens, which for institutional and historical reasons may not come naturally and has to be learned as well. This may be one of the avenues for further research and debate on institutional trust that can build upon the concepts and theories presented in this unique and remarkable interdisciplinary volume.

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# Inspiring and Advancing the Many-Disciplined Study of Institutional Trust

Tess M.S. Neal, Lisa M. PytlikZillig, Ellie Shockley, and Brian H. Bornstein

Trust in institutions is widely touted as critical to effective governance, successful business operations, efficient legal systems, and, in general, optimal functioning of institutions and social systems (e.g., Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015; Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2005; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Tyler & Fagan, 2008). It is, therefore, no wonder that trust and trust-related issues are investigated within disciplines ranging from psychology, sociology, and economics, to management, government, law, and policy studies. Indeed, contributors to this volume identify themselves as scholars from each of these disciplines, as well as political science, criminal justice, finance, business, public health, organizational behavior, developmental studies, environmental science, and public administration. Accordingly, a large number of both discipline-specific (e.g., *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *American Political Science Review*, *Academy of Management Review*) and general or multidisciplinary journals (e.g., *Science*, *American Behavioral Scientist*, *Law and Society Review*) publish research on institutional trust.

Most of the research on trust in institutions has been conducted within individual disciplines rather than integratively across research areas. Regarding disciplinaryity, philosopher of science Karl Popper (1963) wrote:

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Disciplines are distinguished partly for historical reasons and reasons of administrative convenience (such as the organization of teaching and of appointments), and partly because the theories which we construct to solve our problems have a tendency to grow into unified systems. But all this classification and distinction is a comparatively unimportant and superficial affair. We are not students of some subject matter but students of problems. And problems may cut across the borders of any subject matter or discipline. (pp. 66–67)

Research that bridges disciplinary boundaries can take different forms, each with implications for how problems are addressed. For example, the terms multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary have been distinguished by the extent to which different disciplines collaborate and come up with integrative products and solutions regarding a given topic or issue. *Disciplinary* research occurs within a single discipline. In *multidisciplinary* research, multiple disciplines focus on a topic or problem from their unique perspectives—often each focusing on a different aspect of the problem in a way that retains disciplinary separation. *Interdisciplinary* research is more collaborative and involves disciplines working together on the same foci. Successful programs of interdisciplinary research sometimes generate *transdisciplinary* perspectives in which concepts and theories from different disciplines are blended into an overarching framework and in which the salience of the original disciplinary boundaries is largely eliminated (adams & Light, 2014; Rosenfield, 1992). According to these distinctions, multidisciplinary work is additive across disciplines; interdisciplinary work is interactive; and transdisciplinary work is integrative—and potentially transformative (Ellis, 2008; Mitchell, 2005; Pennington, Simpson, McConnell, Fair, & Baker, 2013). “Many-disciplined” is a term used by Light and adams (in press) to refer simultaneously to all three of these variations of how disciplines might work together.

Benefits of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research include their potential to produce uniquely innovative and consequential science, both in terms of theoretical breakthroughs and long-term solutions to applied problems, as well as in cross-discipline citations, a sign of highly generative research programs (Brint, Marcey, & Shaw, 2008; Ellis, 2008; National Academy of Sciences, 2005; Rosenfield, 1992; Shi, Adamic, Tseng, & Clarkson, 2009). Transdisciplinary research may lead to new constructs, methods, frameworks, and practical applications. The aims of such integrative science are to more rapidly produce solutions to pressing public health and scientific issues (Boyack, Klavans, & Börner, 2005; Manton, Gu, Lowrimore, Ullian, & Tolley, 2009). Sometimes—as in the case of the merging of physics, chemistry, and biology into molecular biology—entire new fields of study are created and sustained (Sewell, 1989). Farming systems research is another example of successful transdisciplinarity. Such research sprang from the collaborative work of agronomists, anthropologists, and economists, and resulted in theoretical advances, provision of solutions to practical problems such as farming technology diffusion (or lack thereof), and eventually became institutionalized as a field of study in its own right (Rosenfield, 1992).

As Light and adams (in press) argue, interdisciplinarity is a dynamic—rather than static—state. To test their hypothesis, they conducted a bibliographic network study of HIV/AIDS research and found that some subtopics became increasingly

interdisciplinary (e.g., vaccine development), whereas others moved in the opposite direction and became increasingly segmented into disconnected disciplinary domains over time (e.g., drug resistance). They also described how some fields that began as a discipline became multi- or interdisciplinary (e.g., social sciences of religion), whereas other fields—such as demography, environmental studies, and American studies—evolved into their own disciplines after beginning as interdisciplinary topics of study. Thus, knowledge production crosses boundaries over time, may come from within or across disciplines, and can move from disciplinarity to various forms of many-disciplined production and vice versa over time. Based on theory and empirical findings, Light and Adams developed the Dynamic Multidimensional Model of Knowledge Production to reflect this dynamic state of how knowledge develops over time.

Although proponents of interdisciplinary research tend to argue that moving from modular disciplinary studies toward inter- and transdisciplinary research is almost invariably beneficial (Klein, 1990; National Academy of Sciences, 2005), recent theoretical contributions to the science of interdisciplinarity suggest that disciplinarity has strengths of its own (Adams & Light, 2014; Jacobs, 2014; Jacobs & Frickel, 2009; Light & Adams, *in press*). Those who defend the importance of disciplinary science argue that disciplines provide an effective social organization for knowledge production and that massively disrupting the structure of the scientific community might not live up to the lofty goals of interdisciplinarity (Light & Adams, *in press*). Shifting resources and reorganizing universities to prioritize interdisciplinarity may actually disrupt the efficient progress of knowledge production in some cases. That is, increasing interdisciplinarity may be beneficial in many cases, but in others, increasing modularity or disciplinarity may actually be more beneficial in terms of efficiently solving pressing societal problems. Thus, it may be useful to heed the suggestion issued by Light and Adams (*in press*) that an oversimplified focus on interdisciplinarity as a promising solution for solving big problems should be expanded to the more theoretically useful question of “What patterns of disciplinary boundary crossing allow for more efficient problem solving?” (p. 15). Perhaps someday sophisticated science will allow us to recognize when questions require interdisciplinarity versus focused disciplinary research to solve a given problem efficiently. In the meantime, encouraging simultaneous interdisciplinary and disciplinary research to address problems seems to be the most promising approach.

With this caveat in mind, the present volume considers whether successful interdisciplinary research on trust in institutions is necessary to do justice to the complexity of the topic and the issues relevant to institutional trust (Cheng, Henisz, Roth, & Swaminathan, 2009). For example, the transdisciplinary (and transnational) study of trust more generally might help us understand how to build public institutions that many different groups in the Middle East would see as legitimate and trustworthy in order to generate sustained peace (Ramsbotham & Wennmann, 2014). It might help us reduce the health and wealth disparities in the USA and many other countries (Boulware, Cooper, Ratner, LaVeist, & Powe, 2003; Dovidio et al., 2008; Halbert, Armstrong, Gandy, & Shaker, 2006; O’Malley, Sheppard,

Schwartz, & Mandelblatt, 2004; Thompson, Valdimarsdottir, Winkel, Jandorf, & Redd, 2004). And it might help us come up with new solutions for reducing crime and violence and bolstering well-being throughout the world (Messner, Baumer, & Rosenfeld, 2004; Putnam, 1995, 2000).

For those of us who see the potential value of interdisciplinarity in trust scholarship, and who want to try to do it, how should we do so? Some have noted that interesting and worthwhile problems like those listed above are necessary for inspiring transdisciplinary and transformative research (Pennington et al., 2013). Such meaningful problems may facilitate interdisciplinarity by attracting and inspiring individuals and groups of researchers to exhibit the patience that also is touted as essential for interdisciplinary success (Maton, Perkins, & Saegert, 2006; Rosenfeld, 1992). Patience is indeed required if Rosenfeld is correct that, for transdisciplinarity to emerge from interdisciplinarity, it requires more than just collaborations between scholars from different disciplines. According to Rosenfeld (1992),

Each team member needs to become sufficiently familiar with the concepts and approaches of his and her colleagues as to blur the disciplinary bounds and enable the team to focus on the problem as part of broader phenomena: as this happens, discipline authorization fades in importance, and the problem and its context guide an appropriately broader and deeper analysis. (p. 1344)

Some scholars propose that certain “design principles” may help to foster interdisciplinarity. Recommendations include creating a collaborative and diverse team with members of varied competencies and roles; developing a common language and joint understanding of the problem(s) under investigation, research questions, and criteria for success; designing a common methodological framework; engaging in continuous formative evaluation and adjustment; anticipating and mitigating conflict; and taking steps to enhance and support interests and capabilities needed to participate over time (Lang et al., 2012). Others suggest that transformative ideas coming from interdisciplinary research will be facilitated by encountering disorienting dilemmas that lead to critical reflection, reflective discourse, and, ultimately, new mental models (Pennington et al., 2013).

The present volume is the result of a workshop designed to explore the potential benefits of advancing the many-disciplined study of institutional trust. The contributors to this volume participated in a workshop designed to introduce their work to one another and generate collaborations between scholars studying institutional trust from different disciplines. Our hope was to facilitate efforts to transform the relatively disciplinary-specific studies of trust in institutions into an integrative field of study, and to advance a fuller and more comprehensive understanding of trust in institutions—or at least to begin exploring what patterns of disciplinary boundary crossing might be beneficial. We were especially interested in clarifying trust research by continuing and building on prior efforts to sort through what has been termed a “conceptual morass” (Barber, 1983, p. 1) and a “quagmire” (Metlay, 1999, p. 100) of past trust research. Thus, before discussing our Workshop methods in greater detail, we first give an overview of some prior integrative efforts that provided a starting point for our efforts.

## Prior Advances in the Many-Disciplined Study of Trust

Although there does not exist a great deal of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research on trust, ours is not the first attempt to integrate scholarship on trust or trust in institutions from across disciplines. For instance, in *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research*, Kramer and Tyler (1996) offered an important effort at bringing together a cross-disciplinary collection of scholars from the fields of psychology, economics, sociology, and organizational research. Their volume assembled cutting-edge conceptual perspectives and methodological approaches within trust scholarship. Authors tackled topics such as the antecedents of trust, the impact of social structures and organizations on trust, and the consequences of trust for organizational functioning.

Several many-disciplined efforts have been ambitious enough to generate books. For instance, in 1995 the Russell Sage Foundation launched a decade-long Trust Initiative (see <http://www.russellsage.org/research/trust>). This program sought to clarify the nature of trust across a variety of social relationships, including friendship, professional relationships, relationships between organizations, and the relationship citizens have with institutions. The Initiative asked for theoretical and methodological answers to questions about the sources of trust, what trust means for markets and democracy, to what extent trust between individuals resembles trust between an individual and an institution, and what determines when trust is harmful. The initiative also encouraged work discriminating between rival theories of trust. Scholars from the fields of political science and sociology led the Initiative, hosting conferences and bringing in additional scholars from philosophy, history, economics, and psychology. These efforts resulted in about two dozen books on trust across varying contexts and cultures.

Ostrom and Walker's (2003) book, for example, *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research*, resulted from the Russell Sage Foundation Trust Initiative. While this volume focused largely on experimental research and was situated in behavioral economics, authors included political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and an animal behaviorist as well. It leveraged these disciplinary perspectives to address deep social scientific questions, such as the seeming paradox of prosocial behavior. The book helped address questions such as why humans trust each other enough to become vulnerable and to make decisions that lead to better shared social outcomes, despite the vulnerability to exploitation inherent in prosocial choices.

Other efforts of integrating trust scholarship have been narrower in their scope. Namely, some efforts at integrating trust scholarship across multiple disciplines have focused specifically on trust conceptualizations, resulting in the cataloguing of the types of conceptualizations and definitions of trust used across disciplines, the illumination of their commonalities and differences, and the proposal of frameworks that might adequately capture and organize such commonality and variation in theoretically and empirically useful ways (e.g., Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Earle, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2007; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), as

discussed in more detail in Chap. 2 of this volume. Other efforts have focused on trust across contexts, or methodological approaches and issues. For example, focusing on situations in which trust occurs, Li (2014) delved into trust literatures and developed a generalized taxonomy of contexts to be applied across disciplines, and then applied the taxonomy to five articles by organizational, psychological, and political scholars in the same journal issue. Meanwhile, handbooks on methods have long brought together methods for the study of trust across disciplines, and they continue to be published, reflecting the best practices of the day (e.g., Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006, 2013; Lyon, Möllering, & Saunders, 2012, 2015).

## **A Multidisciplinary Symposium and an Interdisciplinary Workshop**

To build on these prior efforts, we gathered together leading junior and senior trust scholars, representing a variety of disciplines, in a single venue—a National Science Foundation (NSF)-funded meeting entitled “Institutional Trust and Confidence: An Interdisciplinary Workshop.” The Workshop was held at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln on April 26 and 27, 2014, in conjunction with the 62nd Annual Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (NSM), titled “Cooperation and Compliance with Authority: The Role of Institutional Trust,” held April 24 and 25, 2014 (Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015).

To encourage interdisciplinary thinking prior to the Workshop, we asked pre-registered Workshop participants to complete a pre-Workshop survey in which they rank-ordered a set of ten topics that could be discussed in breakout sessions, and to add new ideas for topics they thought were important to include in the Workshop discussions. These topics included the differences among multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinary research; defining and conceptualizing trust; differences and disagreements between theories and models; the importance of contexts, cultures, and domains; distinctions between “light and dark” (i.e., advantageous or positive versus disadvantageous or negative) aspects of trust; and questions for the future. The ranking task was rather informally constructed and primarily intended to (1) get participants thinking about useful directions for interdisciplinary work and (2) give those of us organizing the Workshop some idea of the interests of the participants.

Most Workshop participants joined us for the talks and discussions held as part of the motivation Symposium. On the first day of the Symposium, they were exposed to in-depth discussions of the relationships among legitimacy, procedural justice, trust, and cooperation from a faculty member in a sociology department (Hegtvedt, 2015), a faculty member in a criminology department (Jackson, 2015), a political scientist (Gibson, 2015), and a sociologist who studies these issues in court

settings (Rottman, 2015). On the second day, they heard about the impact of political polarization on institutional trust (Theiss-Morse, Barton, & Wagner, 2015), factors influencing trust in experts (MacCoun, 2015), when trust matters the most in management and organizational contexts (Li, 2015), and about disciplinary and contextual differences in the meanings and uses of trust (Schoorman, Wood, & Breuer, 2015).

During the 2 days of the NSF Workshop that followed the motivation Symposium, participants engaged in in-person discussions, presentations, panels, and debates about the topics they were asked to generate and rank-order prior to the Workshop. “Data /theory blitz” sessions featured short presentations on topics ranging from the development of trust and legal socialization of adolescents, the moral foundations of trust, and the relationship between trust and calculativeness to trust in healthcare and international financial institutions and issues surrounding the measurement and methods used in trust research. “Coffee klatsch” sessions provided informal opportunities for participants to discuss how their research disciplines overlapped, as well as mentoring opportunities for newer trust scholars interacting with established scholars (bringing relatively junior and more senior scholars together was a key goal of the Workshop).

Themed sessions featured presentations and discussions about topics such as trust in policy-relevant science, legitimacy of elected versus appointed officials, theories of procedural justice, and trust in healthcare contexts. In line with the idea of fostering interdisciplinarity through focus on “important and worthwhile” practical problems, a special 90-min themed session involved a panel discussion focused on real-world trust applications. The panelists included people in positions of institutional power in the real world who were interested in the practical applications of research on institutional trust. Panelists asked and answered questions from the trust researchers in the audience, and they shared their thoughts about what questions institutional trust researchers might consider studying. Panelists included the Mayor of the City of Lincoln and his Chief of Staff, the director of the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources, a Nebraska senatorial legislative aide, the Associate Chief of Medicine at the regional Veterans Administration Hospital, two sitting appellate judges from different state courts (Kansas Court of Appeals and the Nebraska Supreme Court), and a magistrate judge from the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (a trial-level, federal court).

In summary, throughout the Workshop, participants were encouraged to form collaborative cross-disciplinary relationships, synthesize cohesive and comprehensive interdisciplinary theories of trust, generate solutions for important theoretical and methodological questions facing trust scholars across disciplines, and answer overarching questions not specific to any particular domain of expertise. Next we describe the topics that came to the forefront during those discussions and that became part of this volume.

## Topics, Themes, and Chapters

A number of the topics that were ranked highly in the pre-Workshop survey became central themes of discussion during both the Symposium and the Workshop. Based on these discussions, the book is organized into three sections: Definitions and Conceptualizations, Domains and Contexts, and Light and Dark Aspects of Trust.

### *Definitions and Conceptualizations*

The topic receiving the highest average ranking in the pre-Workshop survey was definitions and conceptualizations. This topic included defining differences and similarities between trust and trust-related constructs, and discussion of “what barriers and remaining issues need to be resolved to achieve consensus on terminology and taxonomy? Is such a consensus even desirable? Do we need a single definition? How should we conceptualize and measure trust?” Building on points of discussion raised during both the Symposium (e.g., Li, 2015; Schoorman et al., 2015) and the Workshop, the current volume contains a number of chapters that give substantial attention to definitions and conceptualizations of trust.

For example, in Chap. 2, PytlikZillig and Kimbrough—researchers from the fields of social psychology and law<sup>1</sup>—review past work from numerous fields that has catalogued different trust conceptualizations and definitions, identified their commonalities and differences, and suggested integrative frameworks or models as solutions. They argue that “trust-as-process” approaches to conceptualizing and defining trust offer a number of benefits, including representing current usages of the term and retaining the multiplicity of constructs important to a full understanding of trust. They suggest that trust-as-process approaches to definitional issues could be furthered if future conceptual work focused in more depth on differences between definitions of other psychological constructs—such as dispositions, evaluations, expectations, intentions, and behaviors. In doing so, the field might further clarify a “set” of trust-relevant definitions that future researchers could use to help clarify and classify the part(s) of the trust process on which their own research focuses.

In Chap. 3, Jackson and Gau—researchers in criminology and criminal justice—define trust and differentiate it from legitimacy in the context of public attitudes toward police. Jackson and Gau assert that trust and legitimacy are related concepts and that the definitions of each are somewhat unclear and overlapping. They attempt to separate them by arguing that trust is the positive expectations that the public has

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<sup>1</sup> We provide each contributor’s field in order to demonstrate how this Workshop and volume integrated multiple disciplinary perspectives. We recognize that researchers’ scientific training, departmental affiliation, and personal identification might not always be in perfect alignment; for the sake of simplicity, we rely on contributors’ principal academic affiliation (though some have dual appointments).

about the way representatives of an institution (e.g., police officers) should behave, whereas legitimacy is about public recognition and justification of the rightful power of an institution. Institutional trust and legitimacy overlap when people judge the appropriateness of institutions of legal authority on the basis of the appropriate police use of power.

In Chap. 4, Uslander—a political scientist—focuses on the broadest definition of trust: what does trust really mean? What are the sources of trust, and is it stable over time? These questions lead him to consider important distinctions like trust in people we know versus trust in strangers, strategic versus moral considerations in trusting others, and interpersonal as opposed to institutional trust (especially trust in the government). He also discusses the relationships between trust and inequality and between trust and faith. Ultimately, he concludes that trust is worthy of attention precisely because its scope is so broad.

In Chap. 5, Hamm and Hoffman—representing psychology, statistics, criminal justice, and environmental science perspectives—focus on the conceptualization and measurement of trust. They consider how the overlapping nature of various related trust-like constructs has contributed to the “conceptual morass” of the study of trust. Although Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was developed as a tool to help clarify the relationships among related constructs, Hamm and Hoffman show how SEM can be difficult for trust researchers to use due to the covariance associated with highly correlated trust-relevant constructs. They describe the pros and cons of various strategies for using SEM to study such a difficult construct as trust, and they demonstrate with an example from a real study how trust researchers can best use SEM. Specifically, they recommend and demonstrate how research with strongly correlated latent constructs should test a higher-order factors alternative model to predict the covariance among the latent factors. Doing so, they conclude, addresses the problems that arise from working with excessive covariance while preserving the theoretical and statistical utility of the lower-order factors to test hypothesized relationships with various trust-relevant outcomes.

## *Domains and Contexts*

The second most highly ranked topic on the pre-Workshop survey was about whether and how trust differed across domains and contexts. Participants who discussed this topic in depth through various Workshop activities and beyond focused on differences between interpersonal and institutional trust, differences in trust across disciplinary domains, the nature of trust across cultural domains, and trust in policy-relevant science.

For example, in Chap. 6, Campos-Castillo, Woodson, Theiss-Morse, Sacks, Fleig-Palmer, and Peek focus in depth on the definition of “institutional” as it is used as part of the construct of “institutional trust.” These researchers span the fields of sociology, political science, management, and medicine. They point out that most of the trust literature focuses on interpersonal trust (i.e., trust between individuals),



and that although some research has focused on institutional trust, these latter studies have assumed a shared consensus exists for what constitutes an institution. Ultimately, persons comprise institutions. Their chapter examines the evidence concerning the reciprocal relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust by describing in detail how these relationships emerge in the political arena and in healthcare contexts. They point out that many of the studies of “institutional trust” actually seem to be about interpersonal trust regarding those people involved in the institutions, as the analyses revolve around interactions with these authorities. Studies of trust in which people are asked to focus on the institution rather than any interpersonal issues are less common—and therefore more needed, according to the authors of this chapter.

In Chap. 7, Herian and Neal—researchers from political science, psychology, and public policy—focus on trust as a multilevel phenomenon and present a three-level organizing framework for conceptualizing trust between trustors and trustees. The levels include person (one individual), group (relatively small set of identifiable people), and institution (formal or informal system, organization, or mechanism of social order). They provide a 3×3 matrix of the relationships between each of these levels to ground their discussion of trust at each level. Herian and Neal argue that the differences between each of these levels have implications for justifiable distinctions in methodological approaches across different settings and contexts. Dovetailing with the content covered by Campos-Castillo et al. (Chap. 6), Herian and Neal assert that much of the trust literature to date has been unclear about the level at which trust has been conceptualized and measured—partially due to the overlap and confusion between interpersonal and institutional trust. They suggest that trust research will be facilitated across disciplines if researchers are more careful about specifying and aligning their levels of conceptualization and measurement in future work.

In Chap. 8, Hamm, Lee, Trinkner, Wingrove, Leben, and Breuer—a group of researchers spanning the fields of criminal justice, psychology, law, organizational behavior, public administration, management, and environmental science—examine conceptualizations of trust in four domains: public administration, the police, the state courts, and medicine. They identify key words that are used to conceptualize trust in these institutions, finding commonalities and differences but concluding that trust is generally conceptualized as “willingness to be vulnerable” across these domains. In addition, most of the domains feature similar consequences of trust (e.g., compliance, cooperation). They note the largest differences between domains in antecedents, with performance especially important to trust in public administration, procedural justice to trust in the police, fairness to trust in the courts, and trustor factors (such as demographics and access to healthcare) to trust in medicine. Although the specific antecedents differ, they have in common that they decrease felt vulnerability or increase the acceptability of vulnerability.

In Chap. 9, Cole and Cohn—both social psychologists—address the importance of understanding linguistic, cultural, and colloquial definitions of trust within trust scholarship. Such understanding may help to address questions surrounding inconsistent and even contradictory findings within scholarship on institutional trust. In

their chapter, they examine the philosophical issues surrounding cross-cultural conceptualizations of trust, discuss intra-cultural and interdisciplinary divergence in conceptualizations of institutional trust, and detail past cross-national findings to illustrate some of the knowledge of trust across different cultures. They also examine data collected through a cross-national study conducted shortly after the democratic movement in Europe. In doing so, they compare Western European and Eastern European countries to understand the predictors of trusting the highest court in the country, illustrating the importance of cross-cultural research within trust scholarship.

### ***“Dark” and “Light” Aspects of Trust***

The third-ranked topic on the pre-Workshop survey was titled “dark and light sides of trust.” Discussions of this topic focused on the optimistically biased nature of the trust literature—that many researchers seem to assume that trust is a good thing. Conversely, conventional descriptions of lack of trust—distrust, mistrust—often seem to imply that an absence of trust is negative. But there are downsides to trust, as well as potential benefits to distrust.

Chapter 10 was written by Neal, Shockley, and Schilke—researchers from the fields of psychology, law, sociology, and management. They review theories and empirical research to reveal implications for a “dark side” of institutional trust, suggesting a “Goldilocks principle” of institutional trust where too little *and* too much trust can be problematic. Although trust researchers (especially institutional trust researchers) appear to focus on the positive aspects of trust, excessive trust can be problematic for people by leaving them susceptible to manipulation and exploitation. Neal et al. describe in depth different processes by which excessive trust may develop: external processes (actions taken by institutions that generate public trust), internal processes (intrapersonal factors that increase a trustor’s level of trust independent of the actions of the institution), and intersecting external–internal processes (when institutions leverage knowledge of how internal processes work to effect increases in trust). They draw upon research from organizational, legal, governmental, and political systems to demonstrate the dark side of too-high trust in various contexts. They conclude with a call for more research on these issues and for greater researcher sensitivity to the ethical nuances of studying institutional trust.

In Chap. 11, Shockley and Shepherd—from the fields of social psychology and marketing—discuss in depth one facet of an “internal process” of the dark side of individuals’ trust in institutions: compensatory institutional trust. They review and integrate major theories and evidence to describe how people’s trust in institutions can be generated to satisfy people’s internal needs for feeling safe and secure and for seeing the world as an orderly and predictable place. Specifically, when people experience a threat to their safety, security, sense of meaning, or understanding of the world, they may be motivated to increase their trust in external powerful

institutions. This process, independent of any trustworthy or even untrustworthy actions taken by the institutions, is theorized to reduce the anxiety associated with such internal threats. Shockley and Shepherd present specific examples from the literature showing how this “hydraulic” process works. They end the chapter by encouraging scholars of institutional trust to consider the relevance of compensatory trust processes to their work.

## ***Concluding Chapter***

The final chapter of the book written by Tom Tyler—one of the most wellknown scholars of institutional trust and related issues such as procedural justice and legitimacy—offers his perspectives on the contributions this volume makes to the interdisciplinary study of institutional trust.

## **Where Do We Go From Here?**

The refinement in conceptualizing trust achieved by this Workshop volume has important societal implications. In the context of policymaking and politics, the lack of trust in government has been lamented by all sides of all aisles, and elected and appointed officials are actively seeking to regain the public's trust in governmental institutions (without, as yet, much success; see Theiss-Morse et al., 2015). In business organizations, enhancing trust is viewed as a basis for productivity and corporate well-being. Trust-related research such as the study of procedural justice has been used regularly by law enforcement agencies and courts in the USA and beyond to inform and change structures and practices. As the chapters on the dark side of trust illustrate, blindly increasing trust is not always desirable. Nonetheless, in light of the steady decline in trust in others as well as in institutions (Twenge, Campbell, & Carter, 2014), the benefits of increasing trust, at least in the current time (2015) and place (US and potentially elsewhere), and doing so through substantive and legitimate means (rather than simply trying to increase perceptions of trust without actually behaving in more trustworthy ways) clearly seem to outweigh the costs.

The focus of the present volume has not been so much on how to increase trust, but on how best to conceptualize and study trust, especially trust in institutions. It is much more challenging to enhance trust when there is little agreement on its antecedents, meaning(s), and consequences. In terms of trust scholarship, then, what are the most pressing next steps? Where do we go from here?

The main answer to this question that arises from the present work, as well as much related scholarship on trust (e.g., Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015), is “more interdisciplinarity.” We generally agree with this answer, but an oversimplified focus on interdisciplinarity has limited utility (Light & Adams, [in press](#)). Interdisciplinary

research is not always necessary to do justice to a research field, even one as complex as institutional trust (Cheng et al., 2009). Rather, the situation is considerably more subtle and complex. It would be better to ask, “What patterns of disciplinary boundary crossing allow for more efficient, effective, and translatable trust research?” For those of us studying trust in institutions from a variety of disciplines, we need to think about when collaborating across disciplines makes sense and when specializing in depth on narrower questions with strong disciplinary tools, methods, and techniques makes sense in its own right.

Relatively well-developed areas, such as trust in the courts (e.g., Gibson, 2015; Rottman, 2015), trust in law enforcement (e.g., Jackson, 2015; Jackson & Gau, 2016), and trust in management and organizational settings (e.g., McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011), may be ripe candidates for interdisciplinary and even transdisciplinary research, whereas newer areas, such as public administration and e-commerce (e.g., Hamm et al., 2016; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002), might benefit more from first laying a strong disciplinary foundation. But then again, perhaps those more developed areas should become more deeply disciplinary in order to delve further into the specific nuances of their unique contexts and the newer applications of trust research should start with an inter- or transdisciplinary approach to have a relatively comprehensive map of trust to begin with, before getting more specific. Or perhaps both more established and newer research areas should proceed in both directions at once (toward more transdisciplinarity as well as more modular disciplinarity), with an attempt to stay informed with the developments in both directions in case they can build on one another. Further discussions of these issues will be useful for all varieties of institutional trust scholars. A better understanding of trust and its development, maintenance, and diminution has the potential to assist society in many different ways. The scholars involved in this volume have already influenced numerous organizations, through their scholarly and applied publications and through their consultancies with public and private organizations. Their contributions to this volume further elevate trust’s relevance and usefulness to individuals and organizations across a variety of contexts.

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# Consensus on Conceptualizations and Definitions of Trust: Are We There Yet?

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*A science without definitions of basic constructs would be chaotic. Definitions identify fields of inquiry by setting their boundaries and distinguishing their questions from questions that deal with other phenomena. Precise definitions also foster valid measurement. They provide a framework that enhances theory development and empirical research in a community of scientists.*

—Eagly and Chaiken (2007, p. 583)

To prepare for the 2014 Nebraska Symposium Workshop on Trust and Confidence, the organizers sent a list of ten topics to workshop participants and asked them to rank their top three choices of topics for breakout sessions. The topic receiving the highest average ranking was *definitions*, so perhaps it is no surprise that definitions were a major theme of both the workshop (e.g., see Hamm et al., 2016; Jackson & Gau, 2016) and the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation that preceded the workshop (see especially Li, 2015; Schoorman, Wood, & Breuer, 2015).

The above quote from Eagly and Chaiken (2007) suggests this attentiveness to definitions is warranted. Definitions facilitate advances in research by clarifying constructs, promoting the careful and precise use of terms, setting boundaries around what is and is not being studied, helping to avoid misunderstandings, and providing a guide for appropriate operationalization and measurement (e.g., Cao, 2015; Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Fink, Harms, & Möllering, 2010; Locke, 2003). Beyond such benefits, another reason workshop participants were likely interested in trust definitions is that consensus appears to be lacking: Complaints about the

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lack of an agreed upon definition or even conceptualization<sup>1</sup> of trust have been widespread, recurrent, and long standing (e.g., Andaleeb, 1992; Castaldo, Premazzi, & Zerbini, 2010; Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975; Hosmer, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Vigoda-Gadot & Mizrahi, 2014).

Of course, coming up with precise definitions is hard work—so hard, in fact, that people occasionally question whether the construct of “definition” even exists (Fodor, Garrett, Walker, & Parkes, 1980). This may account for similarly long-standing complaints about the lack of consensus around definitions of many common psychological constructs, such as norms (Cancian, 1975; Gibbs, 1965; Interis, 2011), attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Gawronski, 2007), motivation and goals (Elliot & Niesta, 2009; Hasan & Hynds, 2014; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981b; Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998), and emotion and affect (Izard, 2010; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981a; Russell, 2012; Russell & Barrett, 1999), as well as other constructs commonly referenced in trust definitions, such as vulnerability and risk (Aven, 2014; Haimes, 2006, 2009; Scholz, Blumer, & Brand, 2012; Schroeder & Gefenas, 2009). In our view, trust is not any worse off than these other constructs. In fact, a lot of work has already gone into attempting to clarify conceptualizations and definitions of trust, as reflected in the number of comprehensive and disciplinary or multidisciplinary reviews that have been conducted and will be discussed in this chapter (see also Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015).

In the present chapter, we began by asking “are we there yet?” when it comes to the field potentially agreeing on a conceptualization and definition of trust. Trust researchers are more commonly stating that a consensus may be emerging around trust as a psychological state of willingness to be vulnerable based on the trustor’s positive expectations of the trustee (see, e.g., Hamm et al., 2016; Möllering, 2005; Rousseau et al., 1998; Schoorman et al., 2015). To assess whether we, as a field, have achieved consensus, we sought to understand the consensus (or lack of consensus) based on the reasons researchers gave for differing definitions and conceptualizations. To that end, we reviewed a number of existing reviews of trust definitions and conceptualizations from different fields.

We describe the themes gleaned from our “review of reviews” and discuss the most common “essences” of trust conceptualizations, some of the disagreements that have occurred around the precise definitional boundaries delineating what is and is not trust, as well as the potential reasons for those disagreements. We also briefly review a number of proposed solutions to the “problem” of variability in trust conceptualizations and definitions. We then return to our original question: “Are we there yet?” when it comes to agreeing on the conceptualization and definition of trust. We argue that despite the disagreements we review, we think we might

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<sup>1</sup>Conceptualizations and definitions are not the same thing; however, they have similar purposes in that they both serve to help researchers consider what something is and is not. Therefore, in this chapter we are interested in both conceptualizations—the general ideas about the central “essence” of trust—as well as definitions—the specific and precise boundaries that delineate what is or is not trust. Because distinguishing between definitions and constructs is not the main point of this chapter, we use the terms relatively interchangeably.

be closer than the long-standing complaints make it seem—but that consensus is not quite complete. While there does seem to be considerable support for conceptualizing trust as a psychological state (e.g., as defined by Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998), there also exists an alternative consensus around the need for a “set” of trust definitions. Indeed, most proposed solutions to trust’s conceptual and definitional issues involve arguing that the field would benefit from considering trust as a process (trust-as-process) that encompasses multiple “trusting” concepts (e.g., trusting dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, expectations, intentions, choices, behaviors, and so on). We argue that whether or not the field eventually declares consensus around one definition of trust, the field would still benefit from greater attention to definitional distinctions between specific trust concepts that are part of trust-as-process.

## **Trust: Common Essences and Variable Boundaries**

If one peruses past complaints about the definition and conceptualization of trust, the most frequent complaints include lack of consensus and vagueness or imprecision. It has been frequently mentioned that “To date, we have had no universally accepted scholarly definition of trust” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 394) (see also, e.g., Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005, p. 261; McEvily, 2011, p. 1266). Regarding messy imprecision, Metlay (1999) notes, “...the notion of trust comes in so many flavors, packages, and subspecies that it seems to have been swallowed up in a conceptual quagmire” (p. 100; see also Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006, p. 558). Complaints about the “elusive notion of trust” (Gambetta, 1988a, p. ix) continue in contemporary work. For example, Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi (2014) write, “It is hard to find a generally accepted working definition of trust and its measurement” and, “trust is a concept that is widely used in the academic and popular discourse on politics, economics and society, but it is plagued by conceptual vagueness” (p. 3; see Li, 2015 for similar complaints).

In an attempt to understand, clarify, and potentially resolve disagreements about the nature and definition of trust, a number of reviews have been conducted within business, management, and organizational science (e.g., Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Burke, Sims, Lazzara, & Salas, 2007; Castaldo et al., 2010; Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Hosmer, 1995; Kramer, 1999; Lane, 1998; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Möllering, Bachmann, & Hee Lee, 2004); psychology and sociology (e.g., Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Frederiksen, 2012; Khodyakov, 2007; Lewis & Weigert, 2012); political science (e.g., Bouckaert, Van de Walle, Maddens, & Kampen, 2002; Hardin, 2006; Kong, 2014; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Nannestad, 2008) and economics (e.g., Bachmann, 2011; Williamson, 1993); other areas such as cognitive and computer science (e.g., Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; McKnight & Chervany, 2001a) and risk management (e.g., Earle, 2010); as well as from explicitly interdisciplinary perspectives (e.g., Cao, 2015; Earle, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2007; Gambetta, 1988b; Li, 2007;

**Table 1** Examples of “essences” of trust within a sampling of reviews of trust definitions and conceptualizations

Review	Actors: trustor/trustee interdependence	Context: trustor goals, vulnerability, risk	Experience: intrinsic volition/agency	Other essences: forms and bases
Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) (computational cognitive science)	Trust is relational and exists between a trustor and trustee	Trustor has a goal; there exists risk that the trustee will act inconsistent with goal	Behaviors and decisions are <i>intentional</i>	<i>Mental state</i> toward trustee is positive and forms the basis of trust as a <i>decision</i> , which is the basis for trust as <i>action</i>
Castaldo et al. (2010) (business relationships)	Trustor relies upon trustee	Trustor has objectives and context includes uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability	“...trustor... <i>voluntarily</i> puts himself in a vulnerable situation” (p. 663, emphases added)	Discusses the ‘conceptual nature of trust’ involving trust as “a <i>reliance</i> , a <i>belief</i> , a <i>willingness</i> , an <i>expectation</i> , a <i>confidence</i> , and an <i>attitude</i> ” (p. 663)
Dietz and Den Hartog (2006) (organizations and management)	Trust has a target, although the precise target and its measurement vary	Vulnerability is evoked while defining trust, and risk is required as part of the definition (p. 563)	“Genuine state” of trust requires <i>intention</i> to act (p. 559)	Forms include trust as <i>belief</i> , <i>decision</i> , and <i>action</i> ; the five sources/bases also include trustor <i>dispositions</i> and macro (e.g., institutional) factors
Fink et al. (2010) (business, organizations)	Both corridors of trust definitions involve an “interaction partner”	One “corridor” of trust definitions emphasizes risk and uncertainty as conditions for trust	Intrinsic volition is implied rather than explicated	One “corridor” of definitions emphasizes positive confident <i>expectations</i> as a mechanism; review also references <i>actions</i> , <i>attitudes</i>
Levi and Stoker (2000) (political science)	Trust is relational and involves a trustor and trustee	Trust involves vulnerability	Intrinsic volition is implied rather than explicated	Trust is a positive <i>judgment</i> that may be graded or dichotomous
Li (2007) (management)	Trust involves both a trustor and trustee in relationship; “trust is related only to the special risk of depending on others” (p. 426)	Trustor uncertainty and vulnerability are two of the quintessential dimensions in trust definitions and are conditions of trust	“Willingness” includes a <i>desire</i> or <i>intention</i> to place trust, and trust-as-choice is not due to extrinsic controls	Both positive expectation (attitude) and willingness/intention/choice are involved in trust as a process and are functions of trust

<p>Mayer et al. (1995) (organizations)</p>	<p>A trustor trusts a trustee, thus depends upon the trustee</p>	<p>Risk is part of the behavioral manifestation of trust</p>	<p>“Willingness” to be vulnerable implies intrinsic volition</p>	<p>Trust is a <i>psychological state</i> based on positive <i>expectations</i> of the trustee; there also exist <i>behavioral manifestations</i>; and <i>dispositional trust</i> is a source</p>
<p>McKnight and Chervany (1996) (computer science, online transactions)</p>	<p>Dependence is upon trustee, beliefs are about trustee; but trustee varies depending on type of trust (institutional, interpersonal, dispositional trust)</p>	<p>Trust is a general willingness to depend, rather than an action in a specific situation; but trust still acknowledges “negative consequences are possible” (p. 34)</p>	<p>“Willingness” to depend implies intrinsic volition</p>	<p>Trust has been defined as a disposition, structure, belief/expectancy, affect/attitude, intention, and behavior</p>
<p>Rousseau et al. (1998) (economics, psychology, sociology)</p>	<p>Conditions for trust to arise include interdependence of trustor and trustee</p>	<p>Conditions for trust to arise include a context of risk</p>	<p>Critical components of trust include “willingness” to be vulnerable</p>	<p>Critical components of trust include positive confident <i>expectations</i> as well as <i>willingness</i> to be vulnerable</p>

**Table 2** Variations in (sometimes conflicting) proposed “boundaries” on the essential essences of trust

Actors: trustor/trustee interdependence	Context: trustor goals, vulnerability, risk	Experience: intrinsic volition/agency	Other essences: forms and bases
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reciprocal trust is not required for the phenomenon to be “trust” (Schoorman et al., 2015)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Risk only applies to trust-as-behavior; there is no “risk” in trust-as-belief or even trust-as-willingness (Hardin, 2002; Mayer et al., 1995)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Volition and choice apply only to trust-as-behavior, not to trust-as-belief—you cannot choose how the evidence compels you (Hardin, 2002)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trust should be conceptualized as an underlying psychological construct (e.g., willingness, evaluations, expectations, knowledge, beliefs, intentions) (Hardin, 2002; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reciprocal trust is inherent to “trust building” (Li, 2015), or trust is inherently reciprocal (Lewis &amp; Weigert, 1985)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Risk must be consciously perceived and other options considered or the phenomenon is not trust (it is confidence) (Giddens, 1996; Luhmann, 1988; Mayer et al., 1995)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The trustor must experience an internally generated (intrinsic) sense of “willingness” to rely upon the trustee, or it is not trust (see Table 1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trust should be conceptualized as an overt choice, action, or behavior (Hassell, 2005; Li, 2015)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shallow interdependence that involves “deterrence-based” or completely “calculative” trust does not really involve trust (Dietz &amp; Den Hartog, 2006; Li, 2015)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Risk must exist in the situation at some minimum level, or reliance on the trustor is not trust. At the very least, risk must be in the situation prior to or separate from any reductions in risk due to characteristics of the trustee and reliance upon the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The trustee must be perceived by the trustor as acting volitionally; otherwise, the trustor is trusting external constraints, <i>not</i> the so-called trustee (Rousseau et al., 1998; Sitkin &amp; Roth, 1993)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trust is primarily or solely cognitive (Hardin, 2006)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluation of a target’s general characteristics (e.g., ability, integrity) is not relationship specific and thus not relational enough (Li, 2015)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decreasing risk is not the same as increasing trust. Decreasing risk simply removes the need for trust (Schoorman et al., 2015)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“Trust should be reframed as a leap of hope to enhance transaction value by taking advantage of vulnerability,” which makes trust an active, two-way, opportunity, rather than a passive, one-way mechanism for reducing vulnerability (Li, 2015)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trust is sometimes or always affective or emotional (McAllister, 1995; Möllering, 2006)</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If trust requires knowing the trustee to have character, moral commitment, or to encapsulate one's interests, then institutions like government are not really trusted (Hardin, 2013)</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust must be conceptualized as <i>more than or "beyond"</i> the outcome of considerations of trustee trustworthiness and calculative considerations of potential risks and benefits. For example, it may be based on opportunities for enhanced relationships or transactions or leap of faith or hope (Li, 2015; Möllering, 2001)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Targets of trust must be specific and consistent. Measures must not mix targets (Dietz &amp; Den Hartog, 2006)</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust must be based on (caused by, stem from) <i>positive expectations</i> of the trusted entity (trustee) (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998)</li> </ul>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust is based on assessments of morality and shared values and expectations about the future, not examination of past performance and assessments of competence (the latter is confidence) (Earle &amp; Stegrist, 2006)</li> </ul>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trust may also be based on institutional factors (Bachmann, 2011), reputation, and trustor propensities and attitudes (Dietz &amp; Den Hartog, 2006)</li> </ul>

Möllering, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). While not all of these reviews are solely focused on definitions of trust, all have grappled with the variety of definitions in the literature—typically by looking for evidence of a consensus-based “essence” of trust (e.g., Castaldo et al., 2010; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Earle et al., 2007; Rousseau et al., 1998) and/or outlining and organizing the variability of trust definitions and conceptualizations (e.g., Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Fink et al., 2010).

Examination of consensus-seeking portions of reviews suggests a number of common themes. As shown in Table 1, many or most reviews converge on the idea that trust involves a trustor (subject) and trustee (object) that are somehow interdependent; involves a situation containing risks for the trustor (which also implies the trustor has goals); is experienced by the trustor as voluntary (implying a sense of autonomy, agency, and intrinsic motivation); and includes (or excludes) different types, forms, or sources of trust concepts, some of which may form the bases of others and many of which involve or relate to positive evaluations or expectations. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 2, within each of these common themes are instances of variability and disagreement over what should represent the “boundaries” of trust. In the following sections, we discuss each of these themes, including their “common essences” and the variations and disagreements about boundaries around those essences, in more detail.

### ***Actors: The Trustor, Trustee, and Their Interdependence***

*Common essence: Subject, object, and relationship.* Just as attitudes always have an object that is evaluated (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007), it is usually explicitly or implicitly noted that trust also requires an object or set of objects to evaluate, form expectations toward, or to be willing to rely upon (e.g., Hardin, 2006). The importance of a trustor having a target *to* trust is illustrated by the frequency with which most definitions include reference to “another,” “target,” “somebody,” “actor,” and so on, when defining trust. For example, Castaldo et al. (2010) examined unique definitions of trust in research on marketing relationships and found that the most frequently mentioned terms showed “a recurring focus on the subjects that trust links within a relationship, namely the trustor and trustee” (p. 659). Similarly, many researchers take pains to point out in their definition of trust that trust involves one person relying on another entity (e.g., Bachmann, 2011; Frederiksen, 2012), and/or that evaluations and expectations are directed toward a potential trustee (e.g., Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Fink et al., 2010; Khodyakov, 2007; Rousseau et al., 1998). Even when one is talking about a generalized, dispositional, or propensity to trust, it is presumed that others (e.g., other people or institutions) are targets of trust (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006), even if trust in them is generalized across “social and relationship-specific information” (Frazier, Johnson, & Fainshmidt, 2013, p. 77).

In addition to the requirement that trust has both a trustor and trustee, it is nearly ubiquitous for researchers to argue that trust requires the trustor and trustee have some form of interdependence or relationship (e.g., Lane, 1998; Rousseau et al.,

1998). As Levi and Stoker (2000) note, “trust is relational” (p. 476). Although there have been complaints that the relational aspects of trust are not explicated well enough (e.g., Li, 2015), dependence or interdependence between the trustor and trustee is usually at least implied or assumed. In some cases, the relational aspect of trust is explicated by mentioning “dependence” (Hosmer, 1995; Lane, 1998); describing the trustor as being willing to rely upon, give control to, support, or otherwise “be vulnerable to” the trustee (Bachmann, 2011; Schoorman et al., 2015); or describing the “reciprocal” (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Li, 2015) or “reflexive” (Möllering, 2006) nature of trust.

### ***Variations and Disagreements***

*What is the required extent and type of dependence or interdependence?* While there is general agreement that trust involves a trustor and target who share some form of relationship, different perspectives exist regarding the types of dependence or interdependence forming the basis of trust that may be acceptable when considering something as in the realm of “trust.” For example, Schoorman et al. (2015) explicitly argue that while trust is relational, it need not be reciprocal. In other words, trustor A’s trust in B can be independent of B’s trust in A. Conversely, Li (2015) argues that reciprocity plays a central role in dynamic trust-building processes that involve what he calls trust-as-choice. Trust-building processes may not be successful if A and B do not reciprocate each other’s trust. Others, too, argue for an inherently reciprocal or interactive and reflexive nature of trust (e.g., Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Möllering, 2006).

In a different vein, Sheppard and Sherman (1998) describe how different types of relationships—ranging from more detached and shallow to deeper, more personal, and interdependent relationships—can impact the forms and levels of risk and trust (see also Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Frederiksen, 2012). To the extent that shallow and detached relationships primarily or solely involve either “deterrence-based” trust that relies upon external sanctions, or “calculative” trust that is fully determined by a weighing of the potential evidence, some have argued that the relationships do not really involve trust because they do not involve a “leap of hope/faith” (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Li, 2015; Möllering, 2001, 2006; Williamson, 1993). In addition, Frederiksen’s (2012) observation of a certain type of trust in certain close family relationships, in which trusting behavior sometimes is seemingly devoid of positive expectations and occurs *in spite of* expected *untrustworthiness*, does not seem to meet certain definitions of trust based on positive expectations (cf. Dietz, 2011). Also relating to variation in the relational aspects of trust, Li (2015) argues that “trust-as-attitude” conceptualizations are not relational enough because they typically focus on evaluating characteristics of the trustee that are not relationship specific (e.g., referencing the trustee’s general benevolence across contexts and relationships, rather than the trustee’s benevolence toward the trustor specifically).



The struggles over whether “real” trust must be relational in the sense of being reciprocal and reflexive, relational beyond calculation, or relationship specific seem to stem from opposing tensions between desires to conceptualize trust in a way that makes its boundaries clear and its study manageable and desires to capture both what is most interesting about trust and what it is about trust that requires a need for a construct of trust separate from calculativeness (Möllering, 2014; Williamson, 1993). Both are worthwhile goals. For example, by measuring and studying trust as a psychological state located within the trustor and separable from the psychological state of the trustee, you can choose to focus on the trustor’s trust in the trustee and vice versa, *as well as* the relationship between the two. This approach also does not preclude an empirical study of the pros and cons of, for example, asking the trustor whether he/she views the trustee as benevolent in general versus benevolent to the trustor specifically (Li, 2015), and how these potentially different precursors impact trust when it is defined as willingness to be vulnerable. Such an approach also does not preclude investigation of non-calculative reasons (e.g., moral or relational reasons; Korczynski, 2000) for one’s trust in another. Indeed, McEvily (2011) has argued that the field should be open to “hybrid” forms of trust rather than taking an either/or approach.

*What targets (trustees) are acceptable?* What constitutes an appropriate target of trust has also provided some disagreement among trust researchers. For example, Hardin (2013) argues that one cannot really trust an institution because one cannot really know institutions and institutions cannot truly “care” or “intend”—only the persons within institutions can do that. Drawing from writings by Hardin (1998), Luhmann (1988), and Seligman (1997), Cao (2015) asserts that confidence is about system trust, suggesting that one has *trust* in one’s banker but *confidence* in one’s bank. Note that here system trust (a.k.a., confidence)—which is also sometimes called institutional or institution-based trust—is distinguished by the target of the trust being a system or institution rather than a person (see also Campos-Castillo et al., 2016).<sup>2</sup> Finally, Dietz and Den Hartog (2006) also point out that some measures inappropriately vary the targets of trust. Some measures focus very generally on trust in or between groups of people, describe vague targets that leave one unsure of the precise referent, or vary the targets of trust assessed within the same measure. If, as they and others argue (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 2015), trust requires clear, specific, unchanging targets, then these measures do not adequately operationalize and assess trust.

The field is still ambivalent about the appropriateness of institutions as targets of trust. If trust and confidence are distinct constructs rather than points along a con-

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<sup>2</sup>This is not always the case. The terms system trust and institutional trust (or institution-based or institutional-based trust) have also been used to refer to the nature of the *context* of trustor–trustee relationships. That is, sometimes institutional or system trust refers to institutional factors (e.g., safeguards, policies, cultures) that provide a context in which trustors are more likely (than in other contexts) to trust persons who are trustees, rather than distinguishing persons or institutions as targets of the trust (Bachmann, 2011; Pennington, Wilcox, & Grover, 2003; Rousseau et al., 1998). Unfortunately, the boundary between institutions being the object of trust and institutions providing a context of trust is also blurry (e.g., McKnight & Chervany, 2001b; Möllering, 2006).

tinuum, and if the target should determine which construct is relevant, then system trust should be called system confidence, and the companion to the present volume (Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015) should have referenced the role of “institutional confidence” rather than the role of “institutional trust.” The debates over the appropriate targets of trust appear to be related to debates over the relational nature of trust. If trust must involve certain relational features such as reciprocity or non-calculative moral and relational “reasons” (or bases), then trust arguably would only apply to relationships that can include those relational features. This may result in exclusion of “trust” in institutions, by definition. On the other hand, to the extent that trust is psychological, then one should consider, from a psychological point of view, that people have a powerful tendency to anthropomorphize (Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). This may result in remarkably similar psychological experiences across trustee targets, whether those targets are actual people or institutions—making purely definitional exclusions not terribly useful. Indeed, similar dimensions of trustworthiness have been applied whether the target is a person, institution, or even a piece of technology (Campos-Castillo, 2010; Li, Hess, & Valacich, 2008; Smith, 2011). Thus, many (including our team) have chosen to use the term trust for what is viewed as a common phenomenon (or set of phenomena) directed toward persons (interpersonal trust) or institutions (institutional trust).

### ***Context: Risk, Goals, and Vulnerability***

*Common essence: Potential negative outcome and uncertainty.* In addition to an object that must be evaluated, most conceptualizations of trust require some element of risk to the trustor (e.g., Castaldo et al., 2010; Rousseau et al., 1998).<sup>3</sup> Risk—or “the probability and severity of adverse effects” (Aven, 2011, p. 511)—includes both a potential negative outcome and some amount of uncertainty inherent in the imperfect probability of its occurrence. Further, inherent in the potential negative outcome component of risk is the idea of desired and undesired goal states. The goals of the trustor are not always or even often explicitly labeled as such, but are implied by the potential for a negative outcome from the perspective of the trustor (for an exception see Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010). That is, if the trustor has no desires (goals) in the situation, then there could be no risk of a negative outcome. Along with goals, vulnerability also influences the potential negative outcome and its uncertainty. Here, we define *vulnerability* as a “state” of the trustor “that can be exploited to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) that [trustor]” (Haimes, 2006, p. 293). Thus, vulnerability is a component of risk (Haimes, 2006, 2009); it is

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<sup>3</sup> Occasionally, but not often, writers will also require that the trustee takes risks. For example, Cao (2015) states that “The declaration that I trust a person means that the individual in question is aware of my needs and is willing to take some risk regarding his/her own welfare to protect my interests” (pp. 241–242). This characterization again suggests that trust is only relevant to certain relationships and not others.

the combination of the trustor's vulnerability with external threats that could lead to some level of adverse effects that gives rise to and comprises "risk" (i.e., the probability and severity of the adverse effects).<sup>4</sup>

## *Disagreements and Variations*

*Is risk inherent to all trust concepts (conceptualizations)?* While risk is commonly associated with and said to be required for trust to exist, some have proposed more nuanced views. For example, Möllering (2006) notes that trust fits with definitions of "risky" only generally—because, while you can assign a probability to risk, trust situations are uncertain in the sense that "neither the alternatives nor the probabilities are known by the actor" (p. 8). It is also common to point out that there is no "risk" in trusting attitudes, or in the mere "willingness" to trustingly rely upon another. Rather, some argue that risk only pertains to trusting behaviors and actions (Hardin, 2001; Li, 2015; Mayer et al., 1995). Consistent with our definition of vulnerability as comprising a component of risk, the idea behind this argument is that the trustor does not truly experience the risk(s) associated with trust until he or she acts upon his/her trusting attitude or willingness and actually takes on a vulnerable state. However, it is important to note that one could also argue that even "attitudinal" trust (i.e., trust characterized by evaluations of the trustee rather than by action) implies potentially attending to threats and adverse outcomes, and imagining the risks that would occur when making one's self vulnerable (Cao, 2015). Thus, it could be argued that risk is not irrelevant to trust attitudes and willingness—the psychological experience of the perception, imagining, or evaluating of risk can be (as discussed below, some say it *must* be) part of the psychological aspect of trust.

Also related to risk and vulnerability, some authors note a "trust paradox" (James, 2002; Li, 2008; Möllering, 2006)—that is, that the so-called antecedents of trust may decrease the very vulnerability and/or risk that make trust necessary.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Vulnerability is not always defined this way. As Mishra (1996) observes, past trust research has commonly "defined being vulnerable as taking action where the potential for loss exceeds the potential for gain (Deutsch, 1962, 1973; Luhmann, 1979; Zand, 1972)" (p. 265). This definition, however, does not seem to clearly fit with definitions from the risk analysis literature (e.g., see the review by Adger, 2006; Alwang, Siegel, & Jørgensen, 2001). We rely upon a definition from the risk literature because that literature seems to have given more attention to definitional issues surrounding vulnerability, resulting in a clearer and more explicit definition. Our choice, of course, has significant impact on our analysis of trust definitions that use the term vulnerability and risk (i.e., almost all definitions).

<sup>5</sup>It also seems a bit paradoxical (or contradictory) to say trusting behavior is necessary to create risk (making trust a precondition for risk) as we do here, while also saying risk makes trust necessary, or that trust is a means of coping with risk (making risk preexisting to trust) (e.g., Lane, 1998). Perhaps this seeming paradox, however, is due to loose use of terms. Rather than saying risk makes trust necessary, maybe a more precise description of this perspective would be to say that behavioral trust (action allowing one's state of vulnerability) is simply a potentially relatively

Many have noted that feeling “secure” and “not vulnerable” is actually evidence of and part of the experience of trust (e.g., Cao, 2015; Li, 2015; Pennington et al., 2003). Mayer et al. (1995) describe this as a paradox because trust as “willingness to be vulnerable”—or, perhaps alternatively, “willingness to assume risk” (p. 98)—implies that vulnerability and risk should *remain constant* while willingness to accept that vulnerability and risk (at whatever constant level it exists) should increase as trust increases. Meanwhile, alterations to the trusting situation (i.e., the situation inclusive of the trustor, trustee, their relationship, and all contextual aspects impacting risks) that increase trust as a feeling of “security” or being “not vulnerable” seem to imply that vulnerability and risk, at least subjectively and perhaps also objectively, *decrease* as trust increases. There are two parts to this paradox that relate to other disagreements in the literature: one that is subjective and one that is objective.

*Subjective risk: Must risk be consciously perceived?* With regard to the subjective “feeling” (or perceiving) of safety versus risk, some have argued that trust requires explicit, conscious consideration of risk and of other choices; otherwise, the phenomenon should be called “confidence” (Giddens, 1996; Luhmann, 1988; Mayer et al., 1995). Similarly, Cao (2015) concludes that, according to dictionary definitions, confidence refers to a certain degree to which trust is warranted, specifically, the degree of “full trust.” However, these approaches do not clearly and qualitatively distinguish trust from confidence so much as place them on the same continuum varying from zero to high conscious consideration, and/or zero to high assurance that trust is warranted. Such approaches also suggest a correlation between very high trust and the likelihood of achieving an unconscious and habitual “confidence,” or lack of subjective perception of risk. Furthermore, they suggest that, for the same object/target, there may be some people in states of confidence and some people in states of trust. Luhmann (1988) notes such complexities and describes situations in which trust can turn into confidence and vice versa, depending not only on changes in conscious consideration of risk but also on changes in whether or not one can do anything about that risk (or “danger”).

It may be because of these difficulties that many, including our own research team, have not distinguished trust and confidence in this manner. For example, we never attempt to find out if people are consciously aware of risk when we are assessing trust, although it does seem like extent of conscious awareness of risk would be an interesting variable to study in relation to trust or confidence experiences. Likewise, Möllering (2006) regards trust as a state of positive expectation of the trustee “irrespective of whether the trustor is conscious of this or whether it is

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lower-cost way to respond to threat (and threat is another component of risk, one that is external to the trustor; Haimes, 2006) compared to, for example, responding by ridding one’s self of all vulnerability (e.g., through careful monitoring and insurance plans). After all, the uncertainty in the situation not only means something bad *could* happen—it also means it might *not*. If the bad thing does not happen, the trustor has saved some resources by taking on rather than eliminating his/her vulnerable state.

directly observable by others in any way” (p. 7). On the other hand, it may be because of the emphasis on trust as a “volitional” construct (as discussed later in this chapter) that some (e.g., Luhmann, 1988) feel it is also important to restrict the domain of trust to consciously considered risks.

*Objective risk: Are risk reduction and increases in trust entirely separate?* Relating to the more objective existence of risk (regardless of whether it is consciously perceived), some have also argued that risk and trust are separate constructs, and that decreasing risk should not be equated with increasing trust. For example, Schoorman et al. (2015) argue that many strategies used to increase trust—such as providing external controls or money-back guarantees in online environments—reduce the actual risk in the situation and make trust less necessary, *rather than* increasing trust. The goal in making such distinctions is to allow researchers to separate trust and risk, so that both can be studied (and effects assigned to each) individually and in combination. Yet, such distinctions are not as easy as may at first appear. Consistent with the trust paradox, in many or most cases, it also seems like increases in “trustworthiness” are associated with increased “willingness” due in part or in whole to a decrease in subjective—and possibly also objective—risk. Trusting a highly competent surgeon over a less competent surgeon, for example, could reflect *increased* willingness due to *decreased* subjective and objective risk of something going wrong during the surgery.

Mayer et al. (1995) suggest that this paradox might be resolved by separating the sources of the total risk experienced by the trustor into factors directly related to the *specific trustee and the trustor’s relationship with the trustee*, from other factors that are part of the *external situation*. By categorizing the former sources of risk “trustworthiness,” and the latter sources as “risk,” it becomes possible to say that trustworthiness led to trust while all other external sources of risk remained the same. However, separating sources of risk in this way is not common, and many researchers see the risk that is most important to trust as—not external to—but rather inherently associated with the trustee. For example, Rousseau et al. (1998), explicitly connect risk to the trustee when they state that “Uncertainty regarding whether the other [i.e., the trustee] intends to and will act appropriately is the source of risk” (p. 395). Likewise, in describing his typology of trust, Li (2007) refers to a general consensus on the necessity of uncertain *trustee* dependability for trust to exist (see also numerous examples given by Bigley & Pearce, 1998).

*Is some minimum level of subjective and/or objective risk necessary?* Related to the separability of trust and risk, we might also ask whether or not trust ceases to exist when all risk is gone. The connection between uncertainty of a trustee’s actions and trust also seems paradoxical. On the one hand, the more benevolent, competent, and full of integrity that a trustee is, the more certain a trustor may be (not just *seem*, but *be*) that nothing bad will happen if he/she relies upon that trustee, *and* the more trust the trustor may have for the trustee. Yet, some argue that once full certainty (subjective and/or objective) is reached through trustee perfection, the trustor is no longer trusting because there is no longer an element of risk. This in spite of the fact

that the trustor probably thinks that he/she is feeling “trust”—specifically “full trust.” Is the trust that the trustor holds at this point of certainty zero? Perhaps, like dividing by zero, it has simply become undefined. Or, perhaps like temperature and “absolute zero,” such certainty can never be reached under normal conditions? For ease of research, it seems less discontinuous just to refer to certainty as high trust (e.g., “full trust”). Yet, the desire of some to keep trust-relevant risk inherently tied to uncertainty about the trustee seems to be motivated by a desire to confine trust to the realm of reality or interesting research. That is, some might argue that you simply never can be certain of another’s behavior, or that everything that is interesting and worth researching about trust happens when there is some uncertainty and risk. Alternatively, requiring that some risk be tied to the trustee could again be due to a requirement of volition—but this time the requirement that the trustee have volition. We discuss trustor and trustee volition next.

### ***Experience: Intrinsic Volition/Agency***

*Common essence: Intrinsic, uncoerced/voluntary, agency, willingness.* For most trust scholars, another key aspect of trust is that it is not externally coerced or inconsistent with the intrinsic will, desires, and agency of the trustor (e.g., Hassell, 2005). Terms such as “willingness,” “intention,” and “choice” are present in virtually all analyses of trust and imply that the trustor (and sometimes the trustee, too) is in a mode characterized by a sense of intrinsically generated volition and/or lack of reluctance. According to Deci and Ryan (1985), *intrinsic* requires that the source of trust is from within, stemming from internal desires and self-determined, autonomous evaluations. Thus, intrinsic motivation comes from internal states and still can be affected by external forces, but is not perceived as coercive or as against one’s will or being. Subjectively, this may feel like one is “willing” or “wants to,” but does not feel like one “should” or “must,” do something—as these latter terms describe more extrinsic motivational states (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). Thus, *willingness* implies an intrinsic motivational state and agency. It ceases to be if coercion is required. As discussed below, willingness may at times reflect a more passive form of agency, which does include passive and active components. Further, a theoretical analysis of the meaning of “agency” suggests that trust may represent just one way of demonstrating agency. That is, agency has been described as a construct comprising of past (habitual and iterative), future (imaginative and projective), and present (deliberative and evaluative) elements. The “present” element of agency includes judgments (which incorporate both past and future), decisions, and enactments (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). These are, of course, concepts that have similarly been used with the adjective “trusting” (e.g., trusting judgments, choices, acts) (Möllering, 2013a).

## *Disagreements and Variations*

*Isvolition/agency only relevant to trusting behavior and not to other trust concepts (e.g., trusting belief)?* Unlike the aspects previously discussed, there does not seem to be much debate centering on the intrinsic and volitional nature of trust. However, it is worth noting that, like risk, many claim that volition primarily pertains to trusting behaviors, not to psychological aspects of trust (e.g., trusting beliefs). Hardin (2002) notes that when it is considered as a belief, trust “just is” or is not, because it comes from our assessment of the situation and evidence which “compels” us in our beliefs (p. 58). Similar arguments might be made about perceptions and expectations that are formed about a trustee. Nonetheless, concepts such as beliefs, expectations, and perceptions are still intrinsic to the trustor, even if not chosen. Furthermore, “willingness” in particular seems like a psychological concept that crosses from intrinsic “being” to intrinsic “motivation.” That is, while perceptions, beliefs, and expectations may be intrinsic and “compelled” by the situation, our sense of being “willing” to do something reflects an aspect within us that is on the verge of a motive. If these aspects do not provide impetus for volitional choices, intentions, and behaviors, they at least pave the way. As previously noted, researcher preferences for viewing trust as volitional may impact the extent to which they see trust as behavioral (more volitional) versus evaluative (less volitional), or as needing to include conscious consideration of risk (as conscious reasoning is associated with perceptions of voluntary choice; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006).

*Must trust reflect active as well as passive volition/agency on the part of the trustor?* Relatedly, some have distinguished active versus passive forms of volition. Li (2007) describes trust-as-attitude as “a psychological state of passively accepting a given risk, rather than an initiative to take risk” (p. 435). In particular, “willingness to be vulnerable” often may not be an active motive like hunger—as Möllering (2006) notes, people are not seeking to be vulnerable per se. Willingness to be vulnerable—at least at times—may be a more passive and intrinsically oriented sense of lowered defenses, reflecting a state in which one is not protecting oneself from the risk that may arise from relying on a trustee. Indeed, some have distinguished *willingness* from *intention* by noting that not all behavior is purposefully and actively intentional and reasoned. Although willingness and intention can coincide, they do not always. Behavior due to willingness without intention is characterized as more accidental and influenced by factors that reflect more of a lack of defensiveness against doing the behavior than an active seeking to enact the behavior (Gerrard, Gibbons, Houlihan, Stock, & Pomery, 2008; Gibbons, 2006; van Lettow, de Vries, Burdorf, & van Empelen, 2014).

On the other hand, at times trust may be more active. People may seek to rely upon and give up control to a trustworthy trustee, especially if giving control to another reduces their sense of (or actual) risk, as discussed previously. They may also be inclined to actively and voluntarily give up control and offer trust to entities in a compensatory manner if they experience existential and epistemic needs (Shockley & Shepherd, 2016). Luhmann (1988), in addition to requiring that trust

involves explicit consideration of risk, ties the notion of trust to active volitional choice, noting that trust involves the perception of choice and the possibility of avoidance of risk as an alternative. If a person's choices cannot reduce risk, Luhmann suggests calling the potential negative "danger" (not "risk") and saying that the person has low confidence rather than low trust. Li (2007) further notes that, in contrast to trust-as-attitude, "trust-as-choice is proactive and an intrinsically motivated choice of relationship building commitment rather than a passive acceptance of risk" (p. 435). In his recent Nebraska Symposium chapter, Li (2015) argues that trust should be reframed as a leap of hope that takes advantage of vulnerability. Specifically, he argues that, in contrast to "trust-as-attitude," a conceptualization of "trust-as-choice" solves key problems in trust research by conceptualizing trust as an active, reciprocal, opportunity-laden (rather than vulnerability-laden) construct that allows mutual (rather than one-way) trust to grow between entities in a relationship.

*Is volition/agency required of both the trustor and trustee?* Finally, some have extended the necessity of volition and agency beyond the motivational state of the trustor, to the expected actions and motivations of the trustee. For example, Rousseau et al. (1998) noted that relying on a target cannot be considered trusting that target if the reason for positive expectations is that the target is being pressured or forced into the hoped-for behavior (see also Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Others go even further and say that if the trustee is simply being trusted to (predictably) act in his/her own best interests—which may just happen to coincide with the trustor's interests—this also is not trust (Chami & Fullenkamp, 2002). Likewise, Möllering (2005) notes, "the problem of trust [...] arises due to the other's principal *freedom to act* [emphasis added] in a way that benefits or harms the trustor" (p. 18). Or, as another colleague put it, what the trustor is vulnerable *to* is the agency of the trustee (Hamm, personal communication, April 7, 2015). Clearly, limiting trust to cases where the trustee must have agency, volition, and perhaps even choose to act in ways that go against his/her best interests would, at least currently, rule out talking about trusting systems (e.g., policies and technological systems) designed to reduce risk. Such systems reduce risk in an involuntary way and only because humans designed them to do so. Thus, as previously noted, the requirement for trust to involve a volitional and independent agent as a trustee has links to other limits researchers may place on the appropriate targets of trust, as well as the potential requirement of some level of trustee-linked risk.

### ***Other Essences: Forms and Sources of Trust***

*Other essences: Many forms, many sources.* A final theme within our review of reviews was wide-ranging discussion of forms and sources of trust. Within the "forms and sources" of trust theme, the primary agreement is that trust really does refer to many different "things," "forms" (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006), or "concepts" (Castaldo et al., 2010), including beliefs, attitudes, intentions, behaviors, and



so on (see last column of Table 1). In examining the “layered” nature of trust, Castaldo et al.’s (2010) content analysis of definitions found that the “conceptual” nature of trust (i.e., as a belief, evaluation, behavior, or other concept) is described within nearly all definitions of trust and frequently linked with other building blocks of definitions. Many definitions also stipulate appropriate and inappropriate sources or bases of trust. For example, when considering trust as a behavior, there is widespread agreement that certain behaviors like cooperation may or may not stem from or be indicative of trust, depending on their causes or reasons—coerced cooperation that is due to powerful external influences is not trust behavior, but cooperation based on uncertain but positive expectations of the trustor is (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Mayer et al., 1995).

### *Variations and Disagreements*

*Should trust be conceptualized as a psychological or behavioral construct?* Although researchers agree that trust has been used to refer to many different concepts or forms, they disagree on whether it should be used that way (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). Some—especially psychologically oriented researchers—would like to limit trust to being a psychological construct that stays “in the category of knowledge and belief rather than in the category of action and behavior” (Hardin, 2002, p. 59). Arguments for this view include that it is possible to have trust for someone without acting on it and to act in a way that makes you vulnerable to someone even without trusting him/her (Hardin, 2002); that trust is widely and perhaps most commonly defined in this way (Möllering, 2005; Rousseau et al., 1998); and that narrowing trust in this way allows researchers to keep trust separate from its antecedents and outcomes (Mayer et al., 1995; Schoorman et al., 2015).

Meanwhile, others—especially those taking an economic perspective or attempting to model trust in mathematical terms—would like trust to be conceptualized as an overt choice, action, or behavior. Arguments for the behavioral view conclude that “the only true evidence for trust is the act of trust” (Hassell, 2005, p. 132). To explain this point, Hassell states that if you are asked to fall backwards into the arms of a big, strong, honest, benevolent person, you may calculatively (or perhaps even heuristically; McEvily, 2011) determine that the person is trustworthy, but still have great difficulty allowing yourself to fall backwards. This hesitation might be due to activation of automatic fear centers indicating that, at some instinctual gut level, you do not really trust this person. As previously mentioned, Li (2015) also argues for the conceptualization of “trust-as-choice” defined “as a behavioural decision to accept, and even appreciate the vulnerability of relying on others so much so that trustor will choose to voluntarily increase his/her vulnerability” (p. 41). His arguments for this conceptualization include that trust-as-choice matters more than trust-as-attitude because only choice results in concrete behaviors; concrete actions are required for the dynamic processes of trust building, maintaining, and repairing

as well as for trust to function as a mode of governance; and trust-as-choice can “go beyond” affective and cognitive aspects of trust-as-attitude (see also Möllering, 2001).

*To what extent is trust affective in nature?* Some debate has also occurred around the question of psychological trust’s cognitive versus affective (or emotional) nature. Cognitive accounts of trust emphasize evaluations and judgments (e.g., is the trustee benevolent, competent, honest, and reliable?) (Hardin, 2006; Mayer et al., 1995). Thus, “trusting cognitions” include positive judgments on such dimensions. Hardin takes a particularly cognitive approach to trust, arguing that all major theories of trust (or trustworthiness) are cognitive in nature. Further, while acknowledging that “In some accounts, trust is held to be founded in emotions or in virtually hard-wired dispositions,” he calls these “idiosyncratic” accounts that “must strike almost everyone but their authors as odd” (Hardin, 2006, p. 25).

Others, however, suggest trust is or can be much more affective in nature. Miller (1974), for example, states that “Political trust can be thought of as a basic evaluative or affective orientation toward the government” (p. 952). In some cases, theorists separate cognitive versus affective trust, such that cognitive trust is based more upon assessments of reputation, competence, and integrity, while affective trust is based more upon assessment of factors more central to the specific trustor–trustee relationship, such as feelings of security within the relationship, extent of emotional investment, and mutual bonding (McAllister, 1995). Others allow the delineation of cognition and affect to bleed into one another, such that both are always aspects of trust. This is consistent with neurobiological research suggesting the difficulty of separating cognition and emotion (e.g., Gray, 1990). Thus, Möllering (2006) assumes all trust involves cognition and emotion, arguing that it is rational to allow our affective states to inform our trust judgments, and emotion is necessary for effective cognition and decision making. As De Sousa (2004) notes, affect/emotion directs what questions we care about and what evidence we consider in answering those questions, and many times what we call rationality is really rationalization (see Haidt, 2001, for similar arguments in the context of moral reasoning).

*Must trust stem from or include certain bases but not others?* Li’s (2015) perspective that trust-as-choice can (and trust in general should) “go beyond” both affective propensities to trust and cognitive assessments of trustworthiness is one example of differing perspectives about the necessary, appropriate, and possible “bases” of trust. A number of typologies have been constructed around potentially different sources of trust, resulting in terms such as process-based, characteristic-based, and institutional-based trust (Zucker, 1986); calculus-based, knowledge-based, and identification-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Saporito & Colwell, 2010); affective and cognitive trust (McAllister, 1995); history-based, category-based, role-based, and rule-based trust (Kramer, 1999); and more (Gabarro, 1978). As Schoorman et al. (2015) note, these distinctions between the *sources* of trust do not necessarily mean that *trust* itself (which they define as “willingness to be vulnerable”) differs.

Still, “source” does seem to matter—and certain theories can be distinguished by their preferred bases (Lane, 1998). Just as not all cooperation is reflective of behav-

ioral trust, most definitions place boundaries around appropriate and inappropriate sources of psychological trust. A long-standing argument in the trust literature is whether trust can be based on calculation or must be entirely non-calculative (McEvily, 2011; Möllering, 2014; Williamson, 1993). The requirement that trust be based on some causes but not others is also made explicit in definitions of trust including the willingness to be vulnerable or intention to accept vulnerability *based on* certain things. These specific things might include “positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395); “the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 85); or “a judgement of similarity of intentions or values” (Earle et al., 2007, p. 4). These three definitions of trust vary in the boundaries they draw around appropriate types of positive judgments and expectations that can form the basis of trust, but all three seem to require that trust has a basis in positive assessments of the trustee or one’s relationship with the trustee (consistent with findings from Castaldo et al., 2010). Restrictions on the bases of trust are also made explicit in Castelfranchi and Falcone’s (2010) model in which they conceptualize trusting attitudes as forming the basis for trusting decisions which form the basis for trusting actions. Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) also restrict trust to only certain states of “willingness to be vulnerable” but not others when they write:

there are a lot of states (including psychological states) and acts that share the same property of making oneself vulnerable to others; for example, *lack of attention and concentration, excess of focus and single-mindedness, tiredness, wrong beliefs about dangers* (e.g. concerning exposition to an enemy, being hated, inferiority, etc.), and so on. Moreover, some of these states and acts can be due to a decision of the subject: for example, the decision to elicit envy, or to provoke someone. In all these cases, the subject is deciding to make themselves vulnerable to someone or something else, and yet no trust is involved at all. (p. 20)

On the other hand, reliance on certain restricted definitions of trust has led a number of researchers to argue that current research is too limited to “trustworthiness” (evaluations of the trustor) as sources of trust (Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006; Möllering, 2013b). When Li (2015) argues that appropriate bases of or reasons for trust should “go beyond” both dispositional sources and trustworthiness assessments, he suggests that desires for enhanced relationships or trusting someone in order to inspire reciprocal trust comprise additional sources. Meanwhile, other researchers allow for trust to be based on institutional arrangements and other contextual factors (Bachmann, 2011). Dietz and Den Hartog (2006) review a number of “sources of evidence upon which the beliefs about the other party’s trustworthiness, and the decision to trust them, can properly be based” (p. 561), including characteristics of the trustor (e.g., the trustor’s predispositions and prior attitudes), of the trustee (e.g., the trustee’s traits and prior behaviors), the relationship between the trustor and trustee (e.g., relationship stability, stage, and closeness), and macro-level factors such as reputation or institutional frameworks that can impact trust in a trustor.

## Potential Solutions: Integrative Frameworks of “Trust-as-Process”

Against the just-reviewed backdrop of conceptual “essences” and more often conflicting definitional “boundaries” that have been suggested for restricting the concept of trust are a number of integrative models, typologies, thematic maps, and frameworks that have been proposed as solutions to trust’s conceptual and definitional issues. As shown by the sampling of solutions illustrated in Table 3, researchers have taken different approaches that vary in breadth. For example, McEvily (2011) focuses narrowly on cognitive sources of trust and argues that, rather than restricting trust to a discrete concept involving no calculation, trust should be viewed as “a mixed mode social judgment” that contains some mix of different forms of judgment, including calculation and heuristic forms, and perhaps others. Bigley and Pearce (1998) organize a typology around the questions that different definitions tend to answer, and Fink et al. (2010) identify two “corridors” of definitions, both which emphasize expectations and having an interaction partner, but one that emphasizes positive confidence (which they refer to as the mechanism of trust) and the other negative risk and uncertainty (which they refer to as conditions for trust relevance). Broader approaches include Mayer et al.’s (1995) well-known model connecting trusting dispositions, perceptions of trustworthiness and risk, trust as willingness to be vulnerable, behavioral “risk taking in relationship,” and outcomes of that behavior; as well as Dietz and Den Hartog (2006)’s identification of what they term trust-relevant inputs (e.g., the trustor’s and trustee’s characteristics and relationship, the situation, and domain), processes (trust beliefs and decisions), and outputs (e.g., trust-informed risk-taking behaviors). Similarly, McKnight and Chervany’s (2001a) interdisciplinary model of trust concepts identifies disposition to trust, institution-based trust, trusting intentions, and trust-related behaviors as important and relevant to understanding trust as a process.

Numerous other integrative models, frameworks, typologies, and thematic maps also exist (e.g., Burke et al., 2007; Castaldo, 2003; Castaldo et al., 2010; Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Li, 2007, 2008; Möllering, 2006). Although there are variations in these solutions, most seem to converge on the idea that a full understanding of trust requires inclusive attention to many different aspects, including the dispositions, perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, expectations, and intentions of the trustor; characteristics of the trustee; and features of the context or situation in which the trustor and trustee are embedded. Indeed, many have noted that the field of trust research need not and perhaps should not “struggle for one unitary definition of trust on which all researchers in the field will agree” (Fink et al., 2010, p. 104), but instead might see trust as “a family of constructs with analogous meanings and varied operationalizations” (Lewis & Weigert, 2012, p. 29). McKnight and Chervany (2001a) noted a “growing consensus that trust is not unitary, but is a multiplex of concepts” (p. 30) and offered definitions of “a cohesive set of conceptual and measurable constructs that captures the essence of trust and distrust definitions” (p. 27). Apparently, though, this growth in consensus is slow, as a decade later McEvily (2011) also notes “a growing consensus in the organizational literature that trust is not simply a single concept but rather a set of related concepts” (p. 1270).

**Table 3** Components of integrative models, maps (etc.) commonly distinguishing and relating trust or trust-relevant constructs

	Context, situation, structures	Disposition, propensity, trait	Affect, emotion	Evaluation, belief	Expectation	Willingness	Intention, decision	Behavior	Outcome, consequence after behavior
Citation Bigley and Pearce (1998)	Questions dealing with interactions among unfamiliar actors			Questions dealing with interactions among familiar actors and organization of economic transitions				Questions deal with unfamiliar actors	
Burke et al. (2007)	Team and organiz. factors	Predisposition of trustor	Affect (feeling secure)	Trustee ABI + reputation	Trust as willingness to be vulnerable based on positive expectations of intentions or behavior of trustee			Behavior	Distal outcomes
Castaldo et al. (2010)	Consistent perceived risk and vulnerability			Expectation (or a belief, a reliance, a confidence, and synonyms/aliases) that a subject distinguished by specific characteristics (honesty, benevolence, competencies, and other antecedents) will perform future actions					Positive results for the trustor
Fink et al. (2010)	Risk, uncertainty				Expectation, confident expectation				
Li (2008)	Institutional and relational bases; conditions of trust; uncertainty and vulnerability	Dispositional bases	Trust-as-attitude		Functions of trust: expectation and willingness			Trust-as-choice	

Mayer et al. (1995)	Perceived risk	Trustor's propensity	Perceived trustworthiness (ABI)	Trust as willingness to be vulnerable based on positive expectations of trustee action (behavior)	Risk taking in relationship	Outcome
McEvily (2011)		Calculative and heuristic information processing creating hybrid forms of trust				
McKnight and Chervany (2001a)	Institution-based trust; risky situation <sup>a</sup>	Disposition to trust	Felt security <sup>a</sup>	Trusting intentions (includes willing to depend and subjective probability of depending)	Trust-related behavior	

Note: As much as possible, we use these authors' own words and descriptions  
<sup>a</sup>These two aspects are "implicit in all the definitions" in the McKnight and Chervany (2001a) model

A second commonality between such solutions is that they tend to focus on trust concepts within a process, or even “trust-as-process.” That is, the collections of trust concepts (i.e., trust beliefs, expectations, behaviors, and so on) are not simply organized in terms of similarities and differences, but often related to one another in terms of one construct leading to another and influencing each other over time. Building on theories of agency, Khodyakov (2007) suggests that trust-as-process refers to consideration of time-based constructs: for example, consideration of reputation based on the past and expectations of the future to make a decision to trust (e.g., to rely upon or not) in the present. As outlined by Möllering (2013a), the idea of trust-as-process includes recognizing that “trusting” involves both mental and social processes (i.e., both psychological and behavioral aspects), occurs and changes over time, involves information processing and learning (e.g., about trust-worthiness, risk, and contexts of trust), and also can result in—for the trustor and the trustee—changed personal identities and institutional structures and practices.

These trust-as-process views of trust have a number of benefits. First, they embrace the idea that *trust* as it is currently used both in everyday conversation and across research literatures references multiple constructs within an overarching process. The process of trusting in the moment or building trust over time includes “trust-as-attitude” and “trust-as-choice” (cf. Li, 2015) along with “trust-as-propensity” or numerous other “trusting” (cf., McKnight & Chervany, 2001a; Möllering, 2013a) or “trust-relevant” (cf. Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006) constructs. Thus, trust-as-process approaches represent, rather than fight against, the reality of contemporary discussions of trust as well as acknowledge the importance of multiple constructs in fully characterizing trust. In addition, trust-as-process approaches take the field past semantics (e.g., claims that you cannot call something trust because it is or is not a behavior), to focus on the arguably more important task of understanding how, why, when, and with what impacts, different aspects of trust-as-process (i.e., trusting beliefs, trusting behaviors, etc.) emerge, increase, decline, and/or are reinstated. Another benefit is that trust-as-process approaches partition rather than “stretch” trust. Bigley and Pearce (1998) note that stretching trust to cover all potential definitions risks “producing constructions that are either too elaborate for theoretical purposes or relatively meaningless in the realm of empirical observation” (p. 408). The field may stand a better chance of creating clear definitions for various “trusting constructs” than “trust” more generally.

### ***Furthering Trust-as-Process Approaches to Defining Trust Constructs***

Are we done then? Is the “growing consensus” around the idea that multiple constructs define and are part of “trust-as-process” complete? No, perhaps not. But given the prior work done to conceptualize and define trust, perhaps we are not as far off as common complaints make it seem. Regardless of whether we eventually come to consensus on a single definition of trust, there are three ways in which we

may move further in the direction of clarifying trust-as-process constructs. First, we can be more precise in our discussions. Researchers could explicitly and more precisely reference and define which trusting concept(s) they are investigating. Calls for such clarity in discussions have been issued before, including calls for researchers to indicate whether they mean trust as a disposition, a set of positive evaluations (more commonly titled trustworthiness) or expectations, or a willingness to be vulnerable (Fink et al., 2010; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Schoorman et al., 2015). Beyond these, we may find it clarifying to draw distinctions between other trust constructs, such as evaluations versus beliefs, or willingness versus intentions.

Second, we might draw upon other psychological literatures to provide more in-depth conceptualization and definitional work and further clarify the distinctions between trust constructs (e.g., motivations vs. behaviors vs. expectations), between the constructs used in definitions of trust (e.g., vulnerability vs. risk), and between descriptors such as “trusting” and “trust relevant.” Among the many reviews of trust constructs and many proposed solutions to definitional variability that we reviewed, it was surprising how little attention was given to distinguishing components variably described as being “trusting” (or trust related). Beyond the set of definitions proposed by McKnight and Chervany (2001a, 2001b) for trusting intentions, trust-related behavior, trusting beliefs, institution-based trust, and disposition to trust (and parallel definitions for distrust constructs), not much effort has gone into considering the implications of making distinctions between different trust-as-process constructs. Even McKnight and Chervany’s careful analysis gives more attention to what makes beliefs and intentions (for example) “trusting,” and what may be the subcomponents of other trust components, rather than to the differences between, for example, beliefs and intentions per se (see also Castaldo, 2003). Additional definitional analyses might help to reduce the different ways that trust concepts are used (e.g., Bigley & Pearce, 1998, list at least five distinct ways that vulnerability—or perhaps risk, if you use our definitions—has been related to trust). In addition, such definitional analyses could facilitate a third manner of clarifying trust-as-process constructs—that is, the development and use of correspondingly clear operationalizations of trust concepts (Lyon, Möllering, & Saunders, 2012, 2015; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011).

## *Conclusion*

The frequent complaints about the continued “elusive” nature of trust and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for trust are not entirely unfounded, but they also seem to be somewhat self-serving and misleading. That is, such claims may serve as rhetorical devices to underscore the importance and difficulty of one’s topic of study, while at the same time providing authors with full license to define trust however they like.<sup>6</sup> Such claims also seem to give short shrift to the large amount of prior

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<sup>6</sup>Thanks to Guido Möllering for this observation.



work devoted to conceptualizing and defining trust—work that instead might be drawn upon to guide researchers in more precisely and rigorously identifying and better justifying their definitions.

Because it has become more common to note that the most frequently cited definitions of trust are those offered by Mayer et al. (1995) and Rousseau et al. (1998), the field might achieve more consensus if more and more researchers would rally around one of these similar definitions. However, examination of the disagreements around definitional boundaries for trust suggests that such consensus may not be so easy. Reasons for differences in preferred boundaries often seem tied to desires to distinguish trust from other existing constructs (e.g., calculativeness), to simplify trust, and/or to retain what is most interesting about trust (which of course varies between researchers). This suggests it would be worthwhile to further develop a *set* of definitions to cover “trust-as-process” constructs. These definitions would require analyzing how various trust constructs differ (e.g., what makes trusting behavior different from trusting intention, and each of these different from willingness to trust) and are similar (e.g., what makes each “trusting”).

While it remains to be seen how many of the varied and disagreed upon definitional boundaries a “trust-as-process” definitional analysis might resolve, such an approach embraces the high likelihood that researchers across disciplines will continue to study their preferred parts of the trust process, while at the same time encouraging them to more clearly and precisely denote what part(s) they are studying. Such an approach seems especially reasonable given the stark lack of arguments for excluding various constructs as irrelevant to the trust process. Although researchers may vary in their focus, for example, on trusting behaviors versus evaluations versus a more motivational state of psychological “willingness” versus institutional trust-relevant contexts, no one seems to be arguing that the other concepts are not important for a full understanding of that which we commonly term “trust.”

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# Carving Up Concepts? Differentiating Between Trust and Legitimacy in Public Attitudes Towards Legal Authority

Jonathan Jackson and Jacinta M. Gau

The past two decades have seen a surge in research devoted to the role of legitimacy in governance. Much of the attention stems from the promise of legitimacy to solve the widely acknowledged “problem of regulation” (Tyler & Huo, 2002, p. 1) that arises whenever a government attempts to elicit certain types of behaviors from citizens and to suppress other types. The state depends upon citizen compliance in matters ranging from paying taxes to refraining from robbing banks. An orderly society requires that all citizens act in ways that are best for the group even when those actions are perhaps not in a given citizen’s individual self-interest. One way to secure compliance is through coercion and the threat of force; people will refrain from illegal behavior because they fear the potential consequences of offending.

Another way to secure compliance is through legitimacy and governance by consent. Proponents of this perspective insist that citizens will voluntarily submit to the authority of the government and its representatives when they believe it is the right thing to do. As Tyler and Jackson (2013) point out:

When people ascribe legitimacy to the system that governs them, they become willing subjects whose behavior is strongly influenced by official (and unofficial) doctrine. They also internalize a set of moral values that is consonant with the aims of the system. And—for better or for worse—they take on the ideological task of justifying the system and its particulars. (p. 88)

Out of all parts of government, justice institutions have uniquely urgent needs for legitimacy. As the most visible symbol of state-sponsored coercive control, the governmental agency most burdened by the constant need to obtain compliance is the police.

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Officers are frequently unable to provide people with their preferred outcomes, and often must deliver outcomes that are negative for those on the receiving end. Police, though intended to protect the public welfare, can “with very few exceptions, accomplish something for somebody only by proceeding against someone else” (Bittner, 1970, p. 8). For this reason, the police have a great need for legitimacy, a particularly difficult time earning and maintaining it, and an easier time losing it.

That legal authorities require legitimacy is clear. Their ability to function on a day-to-day basis depends upon widespread voluntary compliance with both the law in general and with specific orders and decisions rendered. When institutions of criminal justice demonstrate to citizens that they are just and proper, this encourages citizens to comply with the law, cooperate with legal actors, and accept the right of the state to monopolize the use of force in society (Jackson, Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2013; Tyler, 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2011a, 2011b; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). By motivating citizens to regulate themselves, institutions can also avoid the cost, danger, and alienation that are associated with policies based on external rules underpinned by deterrent threat (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Schulhofer, Tyler, & Huq, 2011; Tyler, 2009, 2011a).


Yet, despite broad agreement regarding the importance of legitimacy, researchers have not agreed upon a universally accepted definition. In the most influential definition (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a; Tyler, 2006a; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010), duty to obey and institutional trust are assumed to be integral elements of legitimacy as an attitude and subjective judgment. To find an authority legitimate is (a) to feel that it is one’s positive duty to obey the instructions of that authority (this is consent to power via the internalized acceptance of, and deference to, authority)– (b) to believe that the institution is appropriate (i.e., it has the requisite properties to justify its power possession) because law enforcement officials can be trusted to wield their power judiciously. On the one hand, duty to obey is captured empirically by agreement or disagreement with attitudinal statements like “I feel that I should accept the decisions made by police, even if I do not understand the reasons for their decisions” and “I should obey police decisions because that is the right and proper thing to do.” On the other hand, institutional trust is captured empirically by agreement or disagreement with attitudinal statements like “the police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for people in my neighborhood” and “people’s basic rights are well protected by the police in my neighborhood.” To this end, the word “trust” appears often in descriptions of legitimacy, reflecting what is assumed to be a normative justifiability of power in the eyes of citizens.

In this chapter, we consider the meaning and measurement of trust and legitimacy in the context of police. We make three contributions. The first is to draw conceptual distinctions between trust and legitimacy, while also clarifying the ground on which the two concepts overlap. The second is to review the content coverage of existing measures of police legitimacy. The third is to consider how trust and legitimacy may variously motivate law-related behavior. Throughout this essay we build on recent “conceptual stock-take” articles about the legitimacy of legal authority by Hawdon (2008), Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), and Tyler and Jackson (2013). We also add to ongoing discussion within criminology about the



measurement of trust and legitimacy (Gau, 2011, 2014; Hough, Jackson, & Bradford, 2013a, 2013b; Jackson et al., 2012; Jackson, Bradford, Stanko, & Hohl, 2012; Johnson, Maguire, & Kuhns, 2014; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Stoutland, 2001; Tankebe, 2013).

By way of orientation for the reader, Fig. 1 presents an organizing conceptual schema, illustrating areas of uniqueness and overlap between the concepts of trust and legitimacy (as well as some brief thoughts on the various different ways by which behavior may be motivated). Trust represents people’s expectations regarding police behavior—that is, trust can be defined as people’s predictions that individual officers will (and do) do things that they are tasked to do, i.e. fulfill their various functions. Legitimacy, by turn, is the property or quality of possessing rightful power and the subsequent acceptance of, and willing deference to, authority. The duty to obey is embedded within legitimacy because people who believe the police are entitled to their coercive authority feel, accordingly, that it is their legal duty to pay proper deference to that power. This duty to obey arises from a sense that the institution has the right to power and it is here—at the judgment of



**Fig. 1** A conceptual model of trust and legitimacy

the appropriateness of an institution—that we see a convergence between trust and legitimacy. It is insufficient for people to merely agree that the police are duly authorized to employ coercive authority; rather, true legitimacy also encapsulates the conviction that police can be trusted to use that authority judiciously and for the greater good. Institutional trust here refers to how officers are seen to wield their power. An alternative way of conceptualizing moral appropriateness is to consider legitimacy as a sense of normative alignment with the police. On this account, when people judge that officers act in normatively desirable ways, this activates a reciprocal commitment to societal norms that specify how they, as citizens, should behave.

How might these attitudes and judgments variously motivate behavior? Trust in its “cleanest conception” (i.e., a subjectively perceived probability of valued behaviors that do not directly reference the use of power) may motivate people to act through positive expectations about how an officer will behave if one initiated contact. For example, one might be more likely to report a crime to the police if one believes that the officers involved would respond professionally, efficiently, and fairly. By contrast, the belief that the police as an institution is moral, just, and proper might motivate through a sense of value congruence. One might be more likely to report a crime to the police if one believes that the institution is normatively appropriate to support its function is to act on one’s own sense of right and wrong regarding desirable conduct. Finally, felt obligation to obey the police will motivate through a sense of deference and legal duty. One might be more inclined to report a crime to the police if one believes that the institution has the right to dictate appropriate behavior and expect deferent behavior from citizens.

The chapter is organized as follows. In section “Defining “Trust” in the Context of Legal Authority”, we discuss conceptual and operational definitions of trust in the police. Sociological and social–psychological definitions of trust are brought on bear on the understanding of the public’s attitudes towards police. In section “Defining “Legitimacy” in the Context of Legal Authority”, we consider how police legitimacy has been defined and measured in criminological work. In sections “On the Motivating Power of Trust and Legitimacy” and “Final Words: Bringing Everything Together”, we highlight areas in which legitimacy and trust overlap conceptually. Throughout the chapter, we comment on the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches to measurement.

## **Defining “Trust” in the Context of Legal Authority**

As noted previously, scholars widely agree upon the importance of trust and legitimacy in the context of legal authorities. Yet, consensus has not been reached on the matter of defining these concepts vis-à-vis each other. What role trust plays, independently of and in conjunction with, legitimacy has not been fully explicated. This section visits this issue and attempts to elaborate upon the meaning of trust in the legal-authority context.

### *Trust as Subjective Probability of Valued Behavior*

Adopting a relatively straightforward definition at the outset, we define trust as the subjective judgment that a trustor makes about the likelihood of the trustee following through with an expected and valued action under conditions of uncertainty (Bauer, 2014; for variations on the theme, see Baier, 1986; Barber, 1983; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; for an excellent ‘review of reviews’ see PytlikZillig & Kimbrough, 2015). On this account, trust requires that three elements be present: a trustor, a trustee, and some behavior or outcome that the trustor wishes from the trustee.

Trust is subjective because the trustor generally does not know the true probability that the trustee will follow through with an expected action. This requires the trustor to pull from less tangible sources (e.g., past experiences with trust in other contexts, personal ties with the trustee, “gut” reactions) when deciding the level of (mis)trust to place in the trustee. Trust constitutes, to some degree, a leap of faith. It contains a substantial element of willingness to tolerate uncertainty (Möllering, 2001), and since it is probabilistic, trust exists because of the risks inherent in all interpersonal exchanges. When an action or event is guaranteed to occur, trust is irrelevant because the person expecting that action or event has zero probability of being disappointed. Thus, the only way for trust to become a component of a relationship or transaction is for there to be some measure of uncertainty present that creates a risk for the trustor. For trust to occur, the trustor must either disregard or voluntarily submit to the risk inherent in the probability judgment (McEvily, 2011; Schilke & Cook, 2013).

When applied to the police, such a definition of trust references people’s expectations regarding valued future behavior from officers under conditions of uncertainty. An individual citizen may never be certain whether officers would turn up promptly if called, or whether those officers would treat him or her with respect and dignity once they arrived. But that same individual may nevertheless form judgments about the intentions and capabilities of the officers to fulfil the valued functions defined by their social role. These judgments may powerfully shape that individual’s willingness to accept vulnerability by behaving in ways that would otherwise seem risky, like coming to the police with information about a crime.

Thus, perhaps the “cleanest” measures of trust would focus on an individual’s expectations about how a police officer would behave should one wish to rely upon that officer’s valued actions. In terms of valued actions, a key distinction in the criminological literature is between effectiveness and fairness. The police are tasked with achieving certain outcomes—catching criminals, responding quickly when called, resolving conflicts, and so on. But they are also expected to use their authority in measured, restrained, and professional ways, and this means being neutral when making decisions, being respectful and fair when interacting with citizens, and so forth. Indeed, this second requirement—evident in procedural justice, a subjective property of interactions between authorities and subordinates (Tyler, 1988, 1989, 1994)—may be particularly important. As a judgment about whether

the processes used to make and enforce a decision or rule are fair, just, and neutral (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), procedural justice covers both interpersonal treatment and decision making and has been shown to be more important than outcomes, effectiveness, and efficiency in predicting legitimacy, cooperation, and compliance (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

To measure whether people trust officers to treat them fairly, one might ask survey respondents: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the police would treat you with respect if you had contact with them for any reason (Jackson, Bradford, Stanko & Hohl, 2012). To measure the decision-making aspect we might ask: If the police stopped you while driving as part of a random breath test, how likely do you think it is that they would make decisions based on facts, not personal interest? Both of these example items ask people to predict police behavior; that is, the questions tap into citizens' expectations about whether officers would be respectful (or disrespectful) and neutral (or biased). In this way, these items represent a confluence of procedural justice with trust. While procedural justice has traditionally been measured as actual experiences with officers, adding the element of trust requires survey respondents to forecast police behavior. As such, measures like these can form a basis for measuring trust in the fairness of officers for analytic purposes.

Effectiveness shifts the focus to the achievement of certain key and specific goals regarding crime control and order maintenance. Measures of trust in police effectiveness would typically cover whether people think officers are competent and have the knowledge and skills to enforce the law, maintain high levels of safety, and so forth. One might, for instance, ask respondents:

1. If a violent crime... were to occur near to where you live and the police were called, do you think they would arrive at the scene quickly? (Jackson et al., 2011).
2. Imagine you were burgled. How likely do you think it is that the police would conduct a thorough investigation?

We should also note that criminological studies often address—in addition to effectiveness and procedural fairness—distributive fairness. For instance Reisig et al. (2007) asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: The police provide the same quality of service to all citizens. Another important element is what Stoutland (2001, p. 233) calls “shared priorities and motives.” In her words: “Can we trust the police to share our priorities? To care about our concerns as they plan and implement policies to control crime in our neighbourhood?” (p. 233). Some indicative measures of shared priorities can be found in Hohl, Bradford, and Stanko (2010): To what extent do you agree with these statements about the police in this area?

1. They can be relied on to be there when you need them.
2. They understand the issues that affect this community.
3. They are dealing with the things that matter to people in this community.
4. The police in this area listen to the concerns of local people.

Thus defined, trust in the police has a trustor (a citizen), a trustee (an officer), and some behavior or outcome that the trustor expects of the trustee (e.g., turning up quickly in an emergency). In the words of Hawdon (2008):

Trust is the belief that a person occupying a specific role will perform that role in a manner consistent with the socially defined normative expectations associated with that role ... an officer will be “trusted” when a resident believes he or she will behave in a manner consistent with the *actual role* of police officer. The public expects officers to behave like professional officers, which includes performing their duties “within a set of fair, public, and accountable guidelines” ... If the officer performs in such a manner, he or she will be “trusted” as an officer. Citizens do not simply grant officers trust; instead, officers *earn* trust through their behaviors. (p. 186)

And while trust attitudes are distinct from behaviors that display trust (McEvily, 2011), people may demonstrate their trust behaviorally in actions such as calling the police for help, reporting information about crimes and suspects, encouraging their children to have positive attitudes towards the legal system, and so on. Here, trust motivates such behavior because one holds positive expectations about how officers will behave when one comes to rely on their valued actions (Figure 1).

### ***Trust in the General Actions of Police Officers***

While the above definition of trust in the context of legal authority has conceptual clarity, the vast majority of criminological research has adopted a slightly different position. Survey respondents are typically not asked about their expectations regarding their own personal interactions with law enforcement officers, but rather about how they think the police generally behave. This has alternately been called confidence (e.g., Cao, Frank, & Cullen, 1996), satisfaction (e.g., Reisig & Parks, 2000), and trust (e.g., Flexon, Lurigio, & Greenleaf, 2009). Examples from these prior studies include:

1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that police treat citizens with respect (Reisig et al., 2007).
2. How often do the police make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with? (Tyler & Jackson, 2014).
3. When people call the police for help, how quickly do they respond? (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a).
4. If a violent crime or house burglary were to occur near to where you live and the police were called, how slowly or quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene? (Hough et al., 2013a).

Such questions reference expectations about the behavior of collective actors (the intentions and capabilities of officers) that may correlate quite strongly with the expectation about how the police would act *if one were to come into future contact*. But they may also diverge under some important circumstances. Of particular interest is whether the nature of police action and the object of police atten-

tion shifts citizens' expectations about how officers behave in different contexts. For example, an individual might believe that the police would treat him or her fairly, but also believe that the police would treat different groups in their community differently (along, for example, lines of the ethnicity or class).

Prior experience may be important here. In particular, the worse one's own past treatment has been, the more one may come to view police actions as heavily biased against certain segments of society and preferential towards others. A good deal of research shows that prior personal contact with officers shapes expectations about future behavior from the police (Bradford, Jackson, & Stanko, 2009; Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014; Skogan, 2006), with repeated negative encounters likely play a significant role in shaping trust and legitimacy (Tyler, Fagan, & Geller, 2014). But it may also be that as an individual has more and more direct negative experience with the police, his or her attitudes towards expected future treatment (to oneself) increasingly diverge from his or her attitudes towards the general behavior of the police (or to people of different social groups). The highly personalized and stigmatizing nature of repeated stops by the police on some community members may produce a specific set of trust attitudes (possibly pertaining to the officers that one regularly encounters) that powerfully influence other beliefs, attitudes, and motivations towards the police and law. In the context of ongoing discussion in the USA and other countries about the chronic effect of multiple unpleasant encounters with the police in some troubled communities, there is a need to better understand how personal experience colors one's views not only towards trust in future personal interactions but also towards beliefs about the general police role in society (Brunson, 2007; Brunson & Gau, 2014; Gau & Brunson, 2010; Geller, Fagan, Tyler, & Link, 2014; Justice & Meares, 2014; Meares, 2014).

## **Defining “Legitimacy” in the Context of Legal Authority**

In this section we compare trust in the police—which reflects a “leap of faith” about present and future performance from individual officers in light of normative expectations—to judgments of the legitimacy (the perceived right to power) of the police as an institution. In the words of Tyler (2006b): “Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just. Because of legitimacy, people feel that they ought to defer to decisions and rules, following them voluntarily out of obligation rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward” (p. 375).

In this section, we outline the concept of legitimacy—including its three constituent elements found in criminological research (obligation to obey, institutional trust, and normative alignment)—and summarize the common measurement approaches.

## *Legitimacy*

Legitimate authorities govern by the consent of the people. Referencing the relationship between power holders and subordinates, legitimacy has an inherently relational quality. While legal authorities possess a baseline amount of legitimacy via their allegiance to constitutional law, legislative mandates, and administrative and regulatory procedure, they also must interface with the public in a manner that evokes positive reactions from those with whom they have contact.

Quite often, legal authorities confront citizens whose needs are far removed from considerations of constitutional law or administrative procedure. Statutes, codes, and court rulings are remote to the person whose immediate concerns involve human conflicts, personal safety, or quality of life. Face-to-face interactions between legal authorities and the members of the public who come before them benefit greatly from consent. Police confront myriad situations that demand officers to simultaneously enforce the law and serve as mediators or calming presences, and legitimacy is critical in such situations.

Legitimacy is thus integral to an understanding of people's relationship to legal authorities because this context revolves around relationships characterized by power differentials. The police make claims to rightful authority and citizens respond to those claims (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). Trust between two persons of equal social and legal standing is different from the trust a subordinate individual (such as a citizen) places in the hands of a superordinate actor (such as a police officer or the policing institution as a whole). This section attempts to clarify the role of legitimacy in the understanding of trust, claims to rightful authority, and obligations between citizens and the police.

There are three main ways by which criminological work around the world has operationalized police legitimacy. They are:

- (a) Felt obligation to obey (a sense that one should defer to a legal authority out of a sense of duty and obligation)
- (b) Institutional trust (a sense that police officers wield their power in lawful and appropriate ways)
- (c) Normative alignment (a sense that police officers act in ways that accord with societal values about how their power should be exercised. When officers show to citizens that they act in ways that reflect appropriate standards of group conduct, this activates corresponding norms about how they, as citizens, should behave.)<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For the sake of brevity we do not discuss one or two additional subscales that are occasionally included in measures of legitimacy. For instance Tyler and Fagan (2008) added measures of identification with the police (e.g., Most of the police officers who work in your neighborhood would approve of how you live your life, and if you talked to most of the police officers who work in your neighborhood, you think you would find they have similar views to your own on many issues; see also Granot, Balcetis, Schneider, & Tyler, 2014). Piquero, Fagan, Mulvey, Steinberg, and Odgers (2005) included the following two measures: The police should be allowed to hold a person suspected of a serious crime until they get enough evidence to charge them, and the police should be allowed to stop people on the street and require them to identify themselves. Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, and Tyler (2013) added measures of negative orientations towards the police to the scale of legitimacy, such as: I personally don't think there is much the police can do to me to make me obey the law if I don't want to.

A common theme in these three domains is that, as Hawdon (2008) argues, “It is the institution that is viewed as legitimate or not, not the individual occupying the position” (pp. 185–186). In each section we discuss representative examples of measures, the domain of meaning that the empirical indicators seem to reference, and issues of dimensionality and scaling. We also note that there is some heterogeneity in the scales used to measure legitimacy with respect to the institution involved. Most often it is the police, but sometimes it is the law and law makers. We begin with duty to obey.

### *Measuring Duty to Obey*

From Bottoms and Tankebe’s (2012) viewpoint, police officers make claims that they have the right to give orders and the right to expect obedience, and people in turn respond positively to these claims if they accept the moral appropriateness of the institution and internalize a corresponding duty to obey. Echoing the old adage that power becomes authority when it is seen to be legitimate, if one recognizes the authority of the police, one will defer to the order even if one disagrees with the specific content (Tyler, 2003, 2004, 2009). The acknowledgement of officers’ right to issue and enforce commands leads to what Kelman and Hamilton (1989) call “automatic justification” and a contentless duty to obey because “normal moral principles become inoperative” (p. 16).

Two connected domains of meaning can be found in the various operational definitions of duty to obey found in the criminological literature. In order of importance (“importance” meaning the extent to which each domain tends to dominate the relevant scale or scales) these are:

- (a) One’s duty to obey the police, even if one disagrees with the content
- (b) One’s duty to obey the law, even if one disagrees with the substance

At the center of (a) is an affirmative sense of obligation to comply with police directives irrespective of the content of these orders. Some representative examples of attitudinal statements are: you should accept the decisions made by police, even if you think they are wrong (Wolfe, Nix, Kaminski, & Rojek, 2015a); to what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you even if you don’t understand or agree with the reasons? (Hough et al., 2013b); you should obey police decisions because that is the proper or right thing to do (Tankebe, 2013, p. 116); I feel that I should accept the decisions made by legal authorities (Kochel, Parks, & Mastrofski, 2013); it would be hard to justify disobeying a police officer (Gau, 2014); and I feel a moral obligation to obey the police (Antrobus, Bradford, Murphy, & Sargeant, 2015).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>There is some debate in the criminological literature as to whether these measures really do capture a sense of truly free consent (see Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Johnson et al., 2014; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2013). It is certainly important to define the concept clearly and phrase the survey questions appropriately. If one wanted to stress willing constraint one might try to avoid questions like Tankebe’s (2013): People like me have no choice but to obey the directives of the police and use instead questions like: I feel a moral obligation to obey the police (Bradford, Hohl, Jackson, & MacQueen, 2015).



This is legitimacy as authorization, constraint, and a sense of civic responsibility. If one believes that authorities have the right to dictate appropriate behavior, one feels a correspondingly positive duty to obey.

At the center of (b) is a positive sense of obligation to comply with the law. Some representative examples are: laws are made to be broken (Jackson, Bradford, Hough et al., 2012); and people should obey the law even it goes against what they think is right (Johnson et al., 2014). Note that some studies proclaim to be measuring police legitimacy but include measures of legal legitimacy (often without explaining exactly why). Note also that these items are sometimes referred to as capturing legal cynicism (e.g., “law or rules are not considered binding in the existential, present lives of [people],” (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998, p. 786) and sometimes referred to as capturing legal legitimacy (e.g., the internalization of the moral value that one should obey the law simply because it’s the law).

What about scaling? Let us assume for one moment that (a) duty to obey the police and (b) duty to obey the law represent two facets of one organizing psychological state (legitimacy as deference to external legal authority). Some researchers have combined *all* of the items into a single additive index, taking a formative approach to measurement that treats the measures as composite indicators (in the words of Bollen & Bauldry, 2011). Tyler and Jackson (2014), for example, defined duty to obey as a priori unidimensional and then measured it using the summed mean of people’s answers to questions about legal legitimacy, police legitimacy, and court legitimacy. The resulting formative index—fixed by the subscales used to determine it—references a positive duty to obey the law, the police, and the courts (again, along one single dimension).<sup>3</sup>

## ***Measuring Institutional Trust***

What about the second aspect of police legitimacy? One way of operationalizing the belief that an institution is “appropriate, proper, and just” is to ask citizens whether they believe officers can be trusted to wield their power in lawful and appropriate ways. Thus, expectations about police behavior may be seen to overlap with the belief that the institution’s power is rightfully held, where institutional trust reflects the belief that institutions have the right to power because police officers can be trusted to wield their authority appropriately. Looking across the literature, we find three connected domains of meaning regarding institutional trust. In order of importance, these are:

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<sup>3</sup>Other researchers have used a reflective approach to measurement, treating the measures as “causal indicators” reflecting one or more underlying latent construct. A reflective approach to measurement means that dimensionality becomes a particularly important empirical issue. For instance, Johnson et al. (2014) fitted a series of confirmatory factor analysis models to indicators of duty to obey. They found that the associations between the various indicators of duty to obey could be explained by the mutual dependence of the item responses on not one but two underlying latent constructs. Because of the content coverage of the relevant items, they labelled two unobserved latent constructs as “obligation to obey” and “cynicism about the law.”

- (a) The belief that officers use their power in restrained and appropriate ways
- (b) Confidence that the police are doing the right things for the community
- (c) The belief that people in power respect the rule of law

Some representative examples of (a) are: people's basic rights are well protected by the police (Reisig et al., 2007); when the police deal with people they almost always behave according to the law (Tyler & Jackson, 2014); and the police in your neighborhood are generally honest (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a). Some representative examples of (b) are: most [police] officers do their jobs well; the police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for your community (Reisig et al., 2007); the police care about the well-being of everyone they deal with (Tyler & Fagan, 2008); and the police try to find the best solution for people's problems (Jackson, Asif, Bradford, & Zakar, 2014). Finally, at the center of (c) is the belief that people in power do not abuse their position and that the legal system benefits and protects all. Some representative examples are: people in power use the law to try to control people like you (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a); the law represents the values of the people in power rather than the values of people like me (Johnson et al., 2014); and the justice system and the laws in society are not in the interests, nor in favor, of persons like me (Johnson et al., 2014). Note that these measures typically do not reference the police, but rather the legal system, people in power, and the law.

These survey questions can be assumed to measure the appropriateness of the institution because they reference the expectation that the police use their power in lawful and appropriate ways that benefit the community and society. To be sure, the second aspect (confidence in the police) overlaps perhaps a little too much with some of the measures reviewed in section "Defining "Trust" in the Context of Legal Authority". But the sentiments captured in many of the items do seem to accord with widely held expectations about how power holders should act if they are to demonstrate their rightful authority to citizens—i.e. to the belief that legal authorities adhere to widely held beliefs about the possession and use of authority (Beetham, 2013). We might thus reasonably assume that the institution is seen as desirable, proper, and appropriate by citizens when those citizens believe that officials who embody the institution wield their power in normatively acceptable ways (e.g., by respecting people's basic rights and acting within the law).

How are institutional trust items generally scaled? One common approach is to combine the institutional trust indicators with the duty to obey indicators to create one single formative index (see, e.g., Huq, Tyler, & Schulhofer, 2011a, 2011b; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003a; Tyler, 2006a; Tyler et al., 2010). Similarly, Jackson et al. (2013) and Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2012) used a single index of legitimacy that included measures of normative alignment and lawfulness, while Tyler et al. (2014) combined indicators of felt duty, institutional trust, and normative alignment into one additive index.<sup>4</sup> Other studies have taken a reflective approach

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<sup>4</sup>The exceptions have typically measured legitimacy using only institutional trust indicators. See for example Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013; Murphy, Tyler, & Curtis, 2009; Tankebe, 2009.

to measurement, examining the dimensionality of the data using latent variable modelling, with obligation and institutional trust typically loading on two different underlying factors (see, e.g., Gau, 2011; Jackson, Bradford, Kuha, & Hough, 2015; Johnson et al., 2014; Reisig et al., 2007).

### *Measuring Normative Alignment*

Another way of operationalizing the belief that the police have the right to exercise power is to focus on shared values.<sup>5</sup> At the center of the idea of normative alignment is the belief among citizens that police officers act in desirable, correct and expected ways, reflecting societal values regarding the appropriate exercise of power. Believing that officers act appropriately is assumed to activate a reciprocal sense among citizens that they, too, should act in normatively appropriate ways that support the role of the legal system and legal authorities in society.

In a series of European studies (e.g., Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b) and recent work from the UK (e.g., Jackson, Bradford, Hough et al., 2012, Jackson, Bradford, Stanko & Hohl, 2012), the USA (Tyler et al., 2014; Tyler & Jackson, 2014), and South Africa (Bradford, Huq, Jackson, & Roberts, 2014), survey respondents were asked to indicate personal agreement with statements like: the police usually act in ways that are consistent with your sense of right and wrong (Tyler, Jackson, & Mentovich, 2015); the police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do (Bradford, Huq et al., 2014); the police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for my community (Jackson, Bradford, Stanko & Hohl, 2012); and the police stand up for values that are important to you (Tyler & Jackson, 2014).<sup>6</sup>

As with institutional trust, the idea is that people judge the appropriateness of the police as an institution on the basis of the appropriateness of officers' behavior. But rather than the belief that officers act lawfully, normative alignment is about whether officers more generally act in ways that align with citizens' principles/normative expectations about appropriate and desirable behavior. An important advantage of this approach is that it becomes an empirical question exactly which values define normative expectations. For instance, acting lawfully may be

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<sup>5</sup>The idea that legitimacy is partly about shared values can be traced back by Beetham (1991). For further discussion, see Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), Bradford, Jackson, and Hough (2014), Jackson et al. (2011), Tankebe (2013), Tyler and Jackson (2013), and some of the chapters in Tankebe and Liebling (2013).

<sup>6</sup>The first studies to measure a sense of shared values between citizens and police (Jackson & Sunshine, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003b) addressed the idea that people look to the police to be prototypical representatives of a group's moral values. According to Sunshine and Tyler (2003b) moral solidarity with legal authorities is "the belief that the values and tenets of law enforcement authorities are consistent with one's personal beliefs about right and wrong, as well as with the group's normative values" (p. 156). To explore the idea that people look to the police to defend, represent, and typify group morals and values, Jackson and Sunshine (2007) used similar measures, albeit ones that focused exclusively on identification with police values, e.g., I imagine that the values of most of the police officers who work in my neighborhood are very similar to my own.

an especially important value in a given society, alongside fair interpersonal treatment and fair decision-making (Jackson, Asif, Bradford & Zakar, 2014). Treating institutional trust as legitimacy assumes that lawfulness is the key value, while treating normative alignment as legitimacy allows one to assess which values are central to the process of legitimation.

## On the Motivating Power of Trust and Legitimacy

Thus far we have reviewed conceptual and operational definitions of trust and legitimacy. We have argued that the two concepts can to some degree be seen as distinct. Trust is a subjective judgment formed at the micro-level (that is, between individual citizens and officers) while legitimacy is a property possessed at the institutional level (the citizenry’s belief that the police institution rightfully holds and exercises power over the public). Yet, they are interdependent in the context of legal authorities. A relationship defined by a power differential between a subordinate and a superordinate relies upon the simultaneous existence of both trust and legitimacy.

We turn in the rest of this chapter to In the rest of the chapter we turn to different ways in which trust and legitimacy may motivate behavior. Drawing on prior investigations into the nature of legitimacy as a psychological state (Jackson, 2015; Jackson, Bradford, Hough et al., 2012, Jackson, Bradford, Stanko & Hohl, 2012; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b) we consider some of the law-related behaviors that support the functioning of the justice system. These include cooperation with the police (reporting crimes, etc.) and compliance with the law. We consider trust first, legitimacy as normative justifiability of power second, and legitimacy as duty to obey third. Figure 2 provides an organizing conceptual schema capturing the claims that legal authorities make to citizens, and how public responses to such claims may variously motivate behavior.




Fig. 2 A conceptual model of public trust and institutional legitimacy in the context of the police

### ***On the Motivating Power of Trust***

In Fig. 2, we link institutional function to police claims that citizens be rely upon them to be effective, fair, and responsive. People respond to these claims through their subjective trust attitudes. When people believe that the police can be trusted to fulfil their various functions, they hold a set of positive expectations about how officers will act if one were to come into future contact (positive expectations about future behavior regarding oneself) as well as how officers generally act (positive expectations about current behavior regarding people in general). Trust may then motivate behavior via a sense that officers will “do their bit.” People may be more willing to report crime to the police when they have some faith that officers will investigate, be professional, be fair, treat one respectfully, and so forth. This may be faith with respect to “positive goods”: when one has positive expectations, one sees, for example, the point of calling the emergency number to report a crime because the call will be answered and action will be taken. Trust may also be seen as the *willingness to be vulnerable* because to trust is to assume that one will not receive bad treatment and bad outcomes if one puts oneself in a particular situation. When one has positive expectations, one will call the police in part because one assumes that officers will not be rude, disrespectful, biased, and so forth, so one is not putting oneself at risk.

### ***On the Motivating Power of Normative Justifiability of Power***

The first aspect of legitimacy y legitimacy is the judgment of appropriateness and normative justification of power. Prior studies have assumed that people believe that the police have the right to exercise power (an abstract judgment about the institution more broadly) when individual officers demonstrate to citizens that the institution is moral, right, and proper (the moral grounding of the actions of, and values that define normatively desirable behavior expressed by, police officers is something more tangible that people can see and experience). If one were to operationalize people’s sense of the moral grounding of police officers through the lens of institutional trust, one would ask people whether they believe that police officers can be trusted to use their power appropriately. If one were to operationalize people’s sense of police officers’ moral grounding through the lens of normative alignment, one would ask people whether they believe that police officers have an appropriate sense of right and generally act in appropriate and proper ways. Normative justifiability of power may motivate behavior through value congruence. A sense that the police act appropriate may lead to the corresponding internalization of societal expectations about how they, as citizens, should behave. These may include the desirability of cooperating with legal institutions and complying with the law.

## ***On the Motivating Power of Duty to Obey***

In terms of duty to obey, power holders make claims to rightful authority, and if people respond positively they feel a civic obligation to be deferent and limit their behavior in ways that are expected. Duty to obey motivates behavior not because people have positive expectations about how officers will behave in the future, nor solely because they believe the institution is itself moral, right, and proper, but instead because they have internalized a sense of willing constraint and deference. Take compliance with police directives. Requests for self-control are an important part of policing activities and tactics. If people feel a duty to obey the police, they will comply with these requests. Duty to obey is content-free because people authorize legal authorities to dictate appropriate behavior (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). Felt obligation to obey shapes compliance through the internalization of the overarching moral value that one should obey external authority (Tyler, 1997, 2011a, 2011b).

## **Final Words: Bringing Everything Together**

In this chapter, we have reviewed conceptual and operational definitions of trust and legitimacy in the context of public attitudes towards policing. Building on prior reviews (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Hawdon, 2008; Tyler & Jackson, 2013) and prior methodological investigations (Gau, 2011, 2014; Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b; Jackson, Bradford, Hough et al., 2012; Jackson, Bradford, Stanko & Hohl, 2012; Johnson et al., 2014; Reisig et al., 2007; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Stoutland, 2001; Tankebe, 2013) we have tried to locate the points at which trust and legitimacy differ and the points at which they overlap. On the one hand, we have examined the claim that trust at its “cleanest” (in terms of conceptual clarity) is positive expectations about future behavior from individual officers, while legitimacy is about the rightfulness of institutional power. On the other hand, we have considered the idea that, because it is individual officers who wield institutional power, it is at this point that trust and legitimacy overlap, where legitimacy as moral endorsement and normative alignment relates, in part, to whether people believe that police officers have demonstrated their moral validity to citizens.

These predispositions are affected by police officer action. Legitimacy is won and lost in an ongoing dialogue between power holders and subordinates (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tyler, 1997). An important direction for future research in this area is to focus on different ways by which trust and legitimacy can motivate law-related behavior. Why do citizens act in ways that support a trustworthy and legitimate legal system? How can institutions encourage such behavior? We recommend studies that examine whether these different motivations are indeed evident and distinct, what behaviors are motivated by each, and under what conditions.

We also suggest a bit of “house cleaning” when it comes to measurement. From our review of the measures of institutional trust and legitimacy, it is clear that there

is some overlap. For instance, it may be helpful in future research if scales of institutional trust (when assumed to reference the normative justifiability of police power) focus only on the restrained use of power, and that measures of duty to obey avoid questions about the restrained use of power.

On a final note, we have enlisted key concepts from sociological, criminological, and social-psychological work to illustrate how these ideas, definitions, and measurement schemes might contribute to an improved understanding of trust, legitimacy, and the relationship between the two. These ideas, of course, are proposals rather than conclusions; our goal has been to continue the conversation about key concepts and appropriate measurement strategies. Such a line of inquiry may yield some important understandings of the role of trust and legitimacy in the relationship between legal authorities and those they govern.

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# Who Do You Trust?

Eric M. Uslaner

Trust has become an issue of concern across academic disciplines. When I began working on trust in the 1990s, there was only modest interest in it (at best) in the academic disciplines I know the best—political science, economics, and sociology. I found some interesting work in psychology and philosophy, but soon a literature began to develop in the fields I know. Much of the interest stemmed from Robert Putnam’s work on social capital. I began as a follower of his approach, but something was bothering me. The sort of trust that I found most interesting was trust in strangers, of people who are likely to be different from ourselves.

Putnam (1993) argues that social ties and group membership promote trust—and that trust in people like yourself can lead to trust in people who are quite different. When I heard him give a talk on the decline in dinner parties and picnics in American daily life, I wondered how this might lead to lower levels of trust in strangers. I had never invited a stranger to a dinner party or a picnic, so I found myself looking for a new way to look at trust. I developed some rough ideas that I presented at a conference at Georgetown University and found a kindred spirit, Jane Mansbridge, whose concept of “altruistic trust” shaped my ideas about “moralistic trust.”

There was something about trust that must go beyond our immediate experience, I reasoned. And I found that there was a bit in the literature in psychology that pointed in that direction—and help shaped my thinking. Most critical to my thoughts was Morris Rosenberg, who had moved to Maryland from Cornell. I met him a few times but, alas, well before I developed an interest in trust (and he had passed away). Putnam’s work spurred an interest in trust among many others—most of whom took

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a different path than Mansbridge or I did. People debated what trust means—and as more and more people started doing research on trust, controversies about what trust is and where it comes from have become pronounced.

I consider some of these controversies and present what I consider to be the best evidence for and against the most prominent positions. There are other issues that I cannot consider because of space limitations. Survey questions versus economists' "trust games" and measurement issues are among the most prominent (for a discussion of methodological and measurement issues, see chapters in Section 3, this volume). Nor can I consider the rather substantial cross-national work on trust in government (see Chap. 11 by Cohn and Cole) or the claim that watching too much television leads to lower trust (see Uslander, 1998 for a discussion and critique). Other outstanding issues are the heritability of trust: There is now considerable evidence that people's trust levels reflect where their ancestors were born (see Algan & Cahuc, 2010; Uslander, 2008). But there is less consensus as to whether trust levels ultimately reflect the values of their host country (Dinesen, 2012).

I do not believe that I can resolve all of the disputes related to trust in this essay. I hope to provide a roadmap for some of the key concerns and to survey much of the evidence on what has become a multifaceted topic.

I begin with a discussion of what we mean by trust. Traditionally, we think of trust in terms of interpersonal relations. Who do you trust is my first concern—the title of a game show in the 1950s on the ABC Network hosted by Johnny Carson (before he became host of the "Tonight" show on NBC). Can we trust people we don't know—and does trust in people we know lead us to have faith in people who are strangers? Then I consider what the sources of trust are—and whether trust is fragile or stable. I turn to whether trust in people is the same as trust in institutions—and to whether the state can create trust. Finally, I focus on the linkage between trust and inequality, which has been the central focus of my own work.

## What Is Trust?

The "standard" account of trust, what Toshio and Midori Yamagishi (1994) call "knowledge-based trust," presumes that trust depends on information and experience. Hardin (2004) argues: "...my trust of you must be grounded in expectations that are particular to you, not merely in generalized expectations" (p. 13). The question of trust is strategic and not at all moral (Hardin, 2004). What matters is not trust, but trustworthiness (Hardin, 2004). Do others act in a way that warrants your trust? Are they honest and straightforward? Do they keep their promises?

The decision to trust another person is essentially *strategic*. Consider two people, Jane and Bill. Bill asks Jane to lend him some money. Should Jane trust Bill? Dasgupta (1988) argues: "The problem of trust would ... not arise if we were all hopelessly moral, always doing what we said we would do in the circumstances in which we said we would do it" (p. 53). Trust helps us solve collective action problems by reducing transaction costs—the price of gaining the requisite information

that Bill and Jane need to place confidence in each other (Putnam, 1993). It is a recipe for telling us *when* we can tell whether other people are trustworthy (Luhmann, 1979). Trust is “essentially rational expectations grounded in the likely interests of the trusted” (Hardin, 2004, p. 6).

The grammar of strategic trust is “A trusts B to do X” (Hardin, 1992, p. 154). Strategic trust is based upon reciprocity. Putnam (2000) points to this generalized reciprocity, where we do things “without expecting anything specific back...in the confident expectation that someone else will do something for me down the road” (p. 21). We can express faith in others even without demanding that someone, sometime will reciprocate, even though we may expect that others will not let us down more generally (Silver, 1989).

Strategic trust is not predicated upon a negative view of the world, but rather upon uncertainty. Levi (1997) argues: “The opposite of trust is not distrust; it is the lack of trust” (p. 3). Strategic trust is all about reducing transaction costs by gaining additional information—be it positive or negative.

Strategic trust is fragile, since new experiences can change one’s view of another’s trustworthiness. Trust, Levi (1998) argues, may be “hard to construct and easy to destroy” (p. 81; cf. Dasgupta, 1988, p. 50).

## Moralistic Trust

We have tended to think of all trust as strategic. But there is also another type of faith in others: Moralistic trust is based upon the idea that trust has a moral dimension (Mansbridge, 1999, favors “altruistic trust”). Moralistic trust is a moral commandment to treat people *as if* they were trustworthy. It is a paraphrasing of the Golden Rule (or Kant’s “categorical imperative”)—which can easily be seen to demand trust.

The central idea behind moralistic trust is the belief that most people share your fundamental moral values. To put it another way, a wide range of people belong to your moral community. They need not share your views on policy issues or even your ideology. They may have different religious beliefs. Yet, despite these differences, we see deeper similarities. Fukuyama (1995) states the central idea behind moralistic trust: “...trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest behavior” (p. 153). When others share our basic premises, we face fewer risks when we seek agreement on collective action problems. Moralistic trust is based upon “some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other” (Seligman, 1997, p. 43).

Moralistic trust is *not* about trusting specific people. The etymology of moralistic trust is simply “A trusts.” Moralistic trust is a statement about how people *should* behave. *People ought to trust each other*. The Golden Rule (which is the foundation of moralistic trust) does *not* demand that you do unto others as they do unto you. Instead, you do unto others *as you would have them* do unto you.

Moralistic trust is predicated upon a view that the world is a benevolent place with good people (cf. Seligman, 1997, p. 47), that things are going to get better, and that you are the master of your own fate. The earliest treatments of generalized trust put it at the center of an upbeat world view (Rosenberg, 1956). People who believe that others can be trusted have an optimistic view of the world. They believe that things will get better *and that they can make the world better by their own actions* (Lane, 1959; Rosenberg, 1956).

Moralistic trust must have positive feelings at one pole and negative ones at the other. It would be strange to have a moral code with good juxtaposed against undecided. So we either trust most people or we distrust them.

Beyond the distinction between moralistic and generalized trust is the continuum from particularized to generalized trust. The difference between generalized and particularized trust is similar to the distinction Putnam (1993) drew between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital. We bond with our friends and people like ourselves. We form bridges with people who are different from ourselves. While Putnam argued that both can lead to trust, he held that bridging organizations would produce much more trust. But it is not the same distinction. Particularized trust is *only* trusting your in-group (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Generalized trust is the belief, reflected in the standard survey question, that “most people can be trusted.”

Moralistic trust is a value learned early in life—from one’s parents—and is stable over time and across generations, and it is not fragile. It is not based upon personal experience, nor does it depend upon reciprocity. Seligman (1997) makes a telling distinction: “...the unconditionality of trust is first and foremost an unconditionality in respect to alter’s response ... Were the trusting act to be dependent (i.e., conditional) upon the play of reciprocity (or rational expectation of such), it would not be an act of trust at all but an act predicated on [one’s expectations of how others will behave]” (p. 47; cf. Mansbridge, 1999). When people are confronted with negative interactions that might lead them to become less trusting, they treat these experiences as exceptions to their expectations—unless they become the rule, as in war-torn areas (Uslander, 2002).

Is there such a thing as moralistic trust? Hardin (2002) doubts that there is—and suggests that those who argue otherwise are confusing trust with optimism. Optimism is the foundation for moralistic trust. But these concepts are not the same. Uslander (2002) shows that they are distinct: Not all optimists are trustors. Some people who believe that the future looks bright do not see a common fate with others.

The standard question in surveys such as the General Social Survey, the American National Election Studies, and the World Values Surveys (among many others) is “Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?” This question has been criticized for a variety of reasons: We don’t know who “most people” are, “trusting” and “being careful” are not mutually exclusive, and a simple dichotomy may not capture the nuances of trust (Miller & Mitamura, 2003; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). But the question has far more advantages. It is highly stable over time (see below). And most critically, people understand the question in a manner that is more representative of moralistic

than strategic trust: In a “think aloud” experiment in the 2000 American National Election Study pilot survey, people were asked what they thought the question (as well as measures of fairness and helpfulness) mean: 72 % interpreted the question as general dispositions rather than experience-based trust (compared to 56 % for fairness and 39 % for helpfulness). So people do see and understand moralistic trust. And the high stability of their responses over time shows that moralistic trust is a value that does not change readily.

Finally, there is institutional trust—faith or confidence in governmental institutions. The early treatments of generalized trust put it at the center of an upbeat world view. Trust in people was just another form of faith in human nature and in politics (Almond & Verba, 1963; Lane, 1959; Rosenberg, 1956). Putnam’s (1993) initial statement of his thesis—about civic life in Italy—mixed indicators of social connectedness, civic engagement, and effective government institutions. Subsequently, John Brehm and Wendy Rahn (1997) argued that confidence in government is one of the most powerful determinants of generalized trust (for a general treatment of institutional trust, see Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015). Uslander (2002) argues that institutional trust and generalized trust rest upon different foundations and are weakly correlated at best. As a Norwegian friend once told me, “I love my fellow Norwegians, but I hate my government.”

## The Roots of Trust

In the literature on trust in political science, economics, and sociology, the most widely discussed conflicts center around the following questions: (1) Does trust in people you know lead to faith in strangers? (2) Does trust depend upon personal experiences such as friendship networks and group memberships? (3) How stable is trust over time and generations? and (4) Are trust in government and faith in other people related—and what, if anything, might the causal connections be? Can government policies lead to more generalized trust?

First, I ask: Is trust “transitive?” If you trust people you know, does this lead to a greater likelihood of trusting people you don’t know? Glanville, Andersson, and Paxton (2013) cite studies showing that “trust within more localized domains, such as family, neighbors, and coworkers, produces higher levels of trust in generalized others...” (p. 547).

Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse (2010) make a similar argument:

stronger intra-racial bonds and stronger interracial bridges can be positively, rather than negatively, correlated .... the same American or Brit who has more ties to others of their *own* racial and ethnic group is actually *more* likely, not less likely, to have more social bridges to other racial or ethnic groups....American whites who trust whites more tend also to trust Latinos more, not less than whites who distrust whites. (pp. 142–143)

Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse focus primarily on trust in one’s neighbors rather than generalized trust. The two forms of trust are only modestly correlated—and for whites and blacks in the USA, and whites, all blacks, people of African or South



Asian heritage, and Muslims in the UK, the modal pattern for each group is to trust people of your own background and to trust your neighbors, but *not to trust people in general*.

Simply arguing that there is a positive correlation between trust in people you know and trust in strangers pays little heed to how trust is developed and “expands.” If I trust people who are very different from myself, I will surely trust my wife, my son, and my close friends. But if I trust my wife, this says nothing about trust in people who are different from myself (Uslander, 2002). People who trust out-groups will certainly have faith in people like themselves, but there is little reason to believe that the converse necessarily holds.

Trust is unlikely to extend from our in-group to strangers because there is little reason to believe that these experiences will be similar. We choose friends and join groups whose members are people like ourselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). As Allport (1958) argued: “People mate with their own kind. They eat, play, reside in homogeneous clusters. They visit with their own kind, and prefer to worship together. We don’t play bridge with the janitor” (pp. 17–18). Most people, especially from the majority white population, don’t have many friends of different races/ethnicities in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Uslander, 2012a). A recent survey of Americans shows that 93 % of whites’ friends are white and 83 % of African-Americans’ friends are black (Ingraham, 2014).

Uslander (2002) finds that Americans who have strong faith in people they know are *not* more likely to trust people more generally. In Japan, trust spreads from one’s immediate family to the school to the workplace—and then, it stops: “[w]hen Japanese people are taken out of...settings” (Eisenstadt, 2000, p. 145) where trust has developed because of personal ties, “they tend often to behave in highly aggressive and exploitative ways” (p. 147).

A strong sense of group identity can lead to more collective action within a group, but less cooperation with outsiders, as Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1990) report in experimental results of collective action games. Wuthnow (1998) makes this same argument: “When trust consists of having a “common framework” (p. 182) based on long-term association, members may come to trust one another but have no reason to trust outsiders” (p. 182). Socializing with antisocial groups such as racists and outlaw bikers might lead to the spread of mistrust, not trust (Levi, 1996; Wilkstrom, 1998).

## Trust and Experience

Does trust depend upon personal experiences? A central argument in Putnam’s (2000) thesis is that we can develop trust by interacting with friends and members of other voluntary associations, but he also recognized that trusting people are more likely to have extensive friendship networks and to join such groups:

The causal arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti... People who have active and trusting connections to others—whether family members, friends, or fellow bowlers—develop or maintain character

traits that are good for the rest of society. Joiners become more tolerant, less cynical, and more empathetic to the misfortunes of others. (p. 288)

There is some support for this argument. Brehm and Rahn (1997) find that voluntary association membership is a strong predictor of generalized trust. Glanville et al. (2013) show that *changes in social ties* over time lead to *changes in generalized trust*.

Others are more skeptical. Stolle (1998) investigates group members of voluntary associations in the USA, Germany, and Sweden—and finds that long-term membership builds trust, but *only in other group members and not in people more generally*. She argues that any extension of trust from your own group to the larger society would occur through “mechanisms not yet clearly understood” (p. 500). Rosenblum (1998) calls the purported link “an airy ‘liberal expectancy’” that remains “unexplained”:

...there is the tendency to adopt a simplistic “transmission belt” model of civil society, which says that the beneficial formative effects of association spill over from one sphere to another....The “transmission belt” model is simplistic as a general dynamic. It is one thing to say that within face-to-face rotating credit associations “social networks allow trust to become transitive and spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you,” and quite another thing to show that habits of trust cultivated in one social sphere are exhibited in incongruent groups in separate spheres. (pp. 45–48)

Uslaner (2002) found no relationship between trust and a variety of informal ties ranging from going to bars, playing bingo or cards, visiting friends, talking to neighbors, joining sports teams, going to parades, or participating in choral societies or drama groups (see also Claibourne & Martin, 2002). Bjørnskov and Sønderskov (2013) find that trust and social ties form different dimensions in cross-national surveys.

Glanville et al. (2013) argue that changes in social ties lead to changes in trust over the 2006–2008 panel in the General Social Survey (GSS). The two measures that they use are the frequency of socializing with friends and neighbors. Over the 4-year GSS panel (2006–2008–2010) a third of respondents gave the same response to the frequency of socializing with either friends or neighbors on the seven-point scale; 68 % were within a single point in visiting friends and 59 % for visiting neighbors. Our social ties don’t change that much either. Very few social butterflies were recently stay-at-home isolates. So it should not be so easy to predict change in a dependent variable (trust) that barely moves with independent variables (social ties to friends and neighbors) that are largely constant.

## The Stability of Trust

Strategic trust is fragile. Personal relationships depend upon how people treat each other. But generalized trust is *not* about having faith in particular people. It is not about reciprocity. Trust matters for the sorts of things that bond us to others without

expectations of reciprocity—giving to charity, volunteering time, tolerance of minorities, and promoting policies that redistribute resources from the rich to the poor.

In the 1996 Giving and Volunteering Survey of the INDEPENDENT SECTOR, respondents were asked if they had been helped by someone else when they were young, whether their family had helped someone, or whether someone they admired had helped someone. If trust depends upon reciprocity and experience, then being helped or seeing someone close to you assist others should matter mightily for your own views. But they don't: 38.5 % of people who had been helped by someone when they were young believe that most people can be trusted compared to 38.3 % who were not the beneficiaries of beneficence; 38.7 % of people whose family helped someone when they were young trust others, compared to 37.8 % of people whose family provided no assistance. And marginally fewer people who saw someone they admire provide aid place their faith in others (38.5 % compared to 38.8 %) (Uslander, 2002).

Generalized trust is a stable value. As a value, it does not depend upon recent experiences; trust doesn't change much over time. Across the 1972–1974–1976 American National Election Studies (ANES) panel, about three quarters of people gave consistent responses to the trust question over time, making trust the fourth most stable question of 17 issues repeated over the three waves of the panel. Across the 1965–1973–1982 panel study of high school students and their parents conducted by Richard Niemi and M. Kent Jennings, 72 % of parents and 64 % of students gave consistent responses over the 17 years—so trust ranked as tied for fourth in stability among 17 questions (Uslander, 2002). In the 2006 ANES Pilot survey, 75 % of respondents gave the same response as they did 2 years earlier (Uslander, 2012b). And in the General Social Survey (GSS) 2006–2008 panel, 80 % of respondents gave the same response in both years. This strong stability over time is evidence for the claim that trust is a deeply entrenched value.

Trust is learned at an early age, from one's parents, and remains stable. In the Niemi–Jennings parent–child panel, how trusting your parents were in 1965 (when the children were high school students) was one of the strongest determinants of trust when the children became young adults in 1982 as well as during their youth (Uslander, 2002).

There is also strong evidence for the persistence of trust over time. I estimated trust at the level of the American states from a variety of surveys for 1970, 1980, and 1990 (Uslander & Brown, 2005). Fairbrother and Martin (2013) estimated state level trust for the 2000 decade from the General Social Survey, and Neville (2012) provides estimates using a variety of surveys. Across these surveys, trust is highly stable: The state-level correlations vary from .733 for my 1970 and 1990 estimates to .933 for my 1980 estimates and Fairbrother and Martin's 2000 values.

## Trust and the State

Are institutional trust and generalized trust part of the same syndrome? Both the early discussions of trust and more recent treatments (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000) see these forms of trust as strongly related. The reasons are twofold: Trust is a generalized idea, not specific to people or to government, and governments can create trust.

Rothstein (2001) explains this linkage:

...if you think...that these...institutions [of law and order] do what they are supposed to do in a fair and effective manner, then you also have reason to believe that the chance people have of getting away with such treacherous behavior is small. If so, you will believe that people will have very good reason to refrain from acting in a treacherous manner, and you will therefore believe that “most people can be trusted”. (pp. 491–492)

Levi (1998) holds that “[t]he trustworthiness of the state influences its capacity to generate interpersonal (generalized) trust...” (p. 87). A state that assures fair treatment under the law for its citizens will lead to a public that has greater faith in others, Levi argues.

States may enforce compliance with the law, but this does not mean that they can “create” trust through the strong arm of the law. Courts can save us from rascals only if there are few rascals (cf. Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Law-abiding citizens, not rogue outlaws, create constitutions that work. We should be careful not to confuse the law-abiding people of Singapore, where trust is low but punishment is swift, with those of Sweden, where trust is high (Uslaner, 2002). Coercion, Gambetta (1988) argues, “falls short of being an adequate alternative to trust....It introduces an asymmetry which disposes of mutual trust and promotes instead power and resentment”. (p. 220)

Zmerli and Newton (2008) report moderate to high correlations between generalized trust and trust in government in a cross-national analysis. However, Uslaner (2002) finds small relationships in both American survey data and across nations. Institutional trust depends largely on government performance, especially on the economy. When people approve of the way the current administration is handling the economy—and when they have favorable impressions of their political leaders—they are likely to have confidence in government. Trust in other people depends upon perceptions of longer-term optimism, not upon the politics or economics of the day (Uslaner, 2002).

Over time generalized trust in the USA has fallen strongly ( $r^2 = .77$  from 1960 to 2012), while the relationship is weaker for trust in government ( $r^2 = .42$  from 1964 to 2012).<sup>1</sup> These data largely come from the American National Election Study and the General Social Study, augmented by other surveys and detailed by Uslaner

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<sup>1</sup> In other words, though both forms of trust have decreased from the early 1960s to the early 2010s, the passage of this time period accounts for 77 % of the variance in generalized trust but only 42 % of the variance in trust in government.

(2012c). Confidence in the government rose in the 1980s and the first years of the twenty-first century even as generalized trust continued to fall.

While there is at best weak evidence that the state or other institutions can “create” trust, the state is not a neutral actor. Across countries without a legacy of Communism, across the American states, and over time in the USA, the strongest predictor of generalized trust is the level of economic inequality (Uslander, 2002; Uslander & Brown, 2005). The relationship over time in the USA (from 1968 to 2012) is especially strong ( $r^2 = .68$ ).<sup>2</sup> Optimism for the future makes less sense when there is more economic inequality. People at the bottom of the income distribution will be less sanguine that they too share in society’s bounty. There are fewer trustors in American society today because there are fewer optimists.

The distribution of resources plays a key role in establishing the belief that people share a common destiny—and have similar fundamental values. When resources are distributed more equally, people are more likely to perceive a common stake with others. If there is a strong skew in wealth, people at each end may feel that they have little in common with others. In highly unequal societies, people will stick with their own kind and not trust people who are different from themselves.

The state, of course, shapes economic outcomes. The Nordic nations—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and, Finland—have (with the Netherlands) the highest levels of trust of any countries in the World Values Surveys. They also have the most equitable distributions of income. And the Nordic states have universalistic social welfare policies—where benefits are *not* means tested but available to everyone. Such policies lead to a greater sense of social solidarity among the public. It is not so easy to implement such policies. There is some evidence that a longer history of equality may be a key factor in shaping contemporary social policies (Rothstein & Uslander, 2005). So institutional fixes may not be so easy. The legacy of trust may be very long.

## Reprise

We are not likely to resolve the issues in the controversies over trust, although the present volume contributes to that effort. Much of the dispute revolves around whether one can simply trust—rather than trusting X to do Y. For some, such an argument makes no sense. For others, talking about trust *only* as contingent is too restrictive. If your view of trust is simply strategic, it has no moral component. There is nothing right or wrong in making judgments based upon performance. The question of how inequality shapes faith in other people might force us to reconsider a view of trust as exclusively strategic. How did citizens of some countries become more trusting? And why do they remain high in trust while others stay mired in low trust and high inequality?

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<sup>2</sup>Thus, inequality accounts for 68 % of the variance in generalized trust during this time period.

This question is what compels my interest in trust. If faith in others were only an issue of reciprocity between people over specific actions, it would be a far less compelling area of study. For me, trust must be something of broader scope—and that is why it is worthy of attention. Generalized trust—as trust that does not depend upon experience—rests upon a micro-foundation of optimism and a macro-foundation of equality. This gives us a rationale for understanding why trust is important to society rather than to disconnected individuals. It helps us understand why social cohesion depends upon the level of equality in a society—rather than simply the number of voluntary organizations one joins. Bowling leagues or choral societies, as Putnam (1993, 2000) argues, may bring much happiness to participants. But they are hardly sufficient to produce a larger sense of social cohesion.

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# Working with Covariance: Using Higher-Order Factors in Structural Equation Modeling with Trust Constructs

Joseph A. Hamm and Lesa Hoffman

*All models are wrong, but some are useful.*

—George E. P. Box

The trust literature has long been called a “conceptual morass” of related constructs (Barber, 1983, p. 1). Although a noteworthy portion of the relevant research utilizes direct measures of “trust” (e.g., “Do you trust X?”), many investigators focus on more specific constructs in their scholarship. Early accounts typically focused on two constructs of trust, *fiduciary responsibility* (a belief that the target is motivated out of care or responsibility for the trustor; also called *benevolence*) and *technical competence* (a belief that the target has the technical ability to do its job; Barber, 1983; also called *ability*), to which Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman’s (1995) classic model of trust added a third of *integrity* (a belief that the target is motivated by an acceptable internal code of conduct). Since then, numerous additional dimensions have been suggested across the relevant scholarship. Indeed, as many as 38 potentially distinct dimensions of trust have been identified in one of the most developed areas of trust research, organizational trust (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). The investigation of these constructs adds nuance to the study of trust by allowing researchers to focus specifically on theoretically relevant concerns and to test the relationships among them and their independent influence on outcomes of interest, a critical endeavor for bringing clarity to this “conceptual morass.”

Although some researchers use single-item measures of these constructs, more precision can often be elicited through multi-item measures. Measurement theory suggests that responses to well-crafted items are driven by the hypothesized underlying construct and error. With single-item measures, it is difficult to defensibly

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distinguish this “true score” from error variance but when multiple items are used, it becomes much more reasonable to distinguish the two by emphasizing shared variance and deemphasizing any variance that is particular to individual items. The assumption is that if a researcher administers a handful of items that measure the same construct, the variance that they share should be due to the hypothesized construct itself and any variance that is unshared should be due to other causes. The classic approach to using these multi-item scales is to add or average the items, thereby hopefully reducing the influence of unshared variance in favor of shared variance. Importantly, however, the generally accepted “gold standard” is the use of latent factors in Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) which allows researchers to empirically partition the shared variance from that which is unshared.

Recent computing advances have significantly increased the accessibility of SEM, creating an explosion of its use in the social sciences (Kline, 2011) and in the literature addressing trust specifically (e.g., Colquitt & Rodell, 2011; Frewer, Scholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Pirson & Malhotra, 2011; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2006; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Roth, 2000; Smith, Leahy, Anderson, & Davenport, 2013; Turel, Yuan, & Connelly, 2008; Van Slyke, Belanger, & Comunale, 2009). SEM can be used not only to evaluate the unique effects of a given set of model predictors on outcomes of interest (i.e., a multiple regression of latent factors) but also to provide a  $p$ -value test of how well hypothesized relationships among items and their underlying latent constructs “fit” to the data itself.

As suggested above, the hallmark of SEM is the model’s ability to distinguish shared variance (or covariance) in the responses to items (i.e., observed variables thought to measure the construct) from unique variance that is not shared among the items. This shared variance then becomes a latent variable (factor) that can serve as a predictor or outcome for other variables. Mathematically, the response to each item ( $i$ ) for each subject ( $s$ ) in a latent variable model can be predicted as follows:  $y_{is} = \mu_i + \lambda_i F_s + e_{is}$ . This equation states that each individual response of subject  $s$  to item  $i$  ( $y_{is}$ ) is predicted by the item’s intercept ( $\mu_i$ , the expected item response when a subject’s factor score is zero [ $F_s = 0$ ]), plus the subject’s factor score ( $F_s$ ) weighted by the item’s factor loading ( $\lambda_i$ , the expected change in the item response [ $y_{is}$ ] for a one-unit change in the subject’s factor score [ $F_s$ ]) and the item-specific and subject-specific residual ( $e_{is}$ ).

Conceptually, this means that the variability in items is hypothesized to come from two sources; namely, “true score,” which is the weighted contribution of the construct that was intended to be measured, and variance that is not due to this construct (“error”). Consider for example a four-item measure of *competence*. If the items are well crafted, participants’ perceptions of the competence of the target (“true score”) will, in part, drive their responses to the item. Inevitably, however, considerations distinct from their evaluation of the target’s competence (“error”) will also drive their responses. By taking only the variance which is shared among the four items (assumed to be “true score”), SEM allows the researcher to operate directly on variance which can be reasonably argued to be from the intended construct, thereby increasing the precision of the measurement by eliminating statistical “noise.”

While this variance partitioning is especially important from a measurement perspective, it can create some complications, especially in trust research where the constructs of interest often overlap conceptually. Because of the removal of statistical error from the item responses, the resulting error-corrected correlations among latent constructs like these can sometimes become exceedingly large. This can create problems in examining latent factors' unique effects in predicting other outcomes. Specifically, this statistical overlap can create situations in which models with predictors that are all significantly associated with an outcome in bivariate tests yield no significant independent regression coefficients, or worse, regression coefficients that are reversed as compared to the bivariate relationships (much like suppressor effects; see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). What is needed then is a strategy for addressing the excessive covariance among the factors that still permits researchers to test predictive hypotheses. Without such a strategy, some researchers may simply be unable to use SEM in these situations. This chapter discusses potential alternative model specifications that could assist researchers who find themselves with overly correlated factors in a structural equation model and, in so doing, outlines the problems with some of these approaches, and highlights the use of higher-order factors as a conceptually and statistically valid approach. The chapter then presents a limited example using real-world trust data collected by the authors (additional results for these data are reported elsewhere; Hamm, 2014).

## Alternative Model Specifications

One potential strategy for simplifying estimation of SEM with highly correlated latent factors is item-level aggregation. In this approach, multiple items are grouped (i.e., parceled) together to form fewer indicators of a latent factor (Bandalos, 2002). These parceling strategies range from partial (dis)aggregation models, in which items are combined to create fewer (but still more than one) indicators of each latent factor, to total aggregation models that combine all items into a single indicator, essentially creating an observed composite (Coffman & McCallum, 2005; Williams & O'Boyle, 2008).

For example, consider a researcher seeking to test the effect of three, four-item scales of *benevolence*, *competence*, and *integrity* on a four-item scale of *cooperation* with the target (a total of 16 items). Standard approaches to SEM require each of the items to have an independent loading on the latent construct they were hypothesized to indicate. Assume that, in this standard SEM model, the latent *benevolence* and *integrity* factors, both measures of the motivations of the target, were correlated at about  $r=0.9$  while *competence* was relatively less related to the other two predictor constructs, at  $r=0.7$ . This excessive covariance among the three constructs would complicate, if not preclude the evaluation of their independent influence on *cooperation*, especially for *benevolence* and *integrity* as their factors share approximately 80 % of their variance, leaving little possibility they could predict independent outcome variance. In a total item aggregation model, the four

items per construct would be statistically aggregated into a single variable (usually by averaging the scores) before they were entered into the model, thereby reducing the total number of predictor construct loadings from 12 to 3. Partial aggregation models operate similarly, but would involve aggregating the items into more than one parcel per construct, ideally, by parceling the most related items together.

These item-level aggregation approaches would likely decrease the covariance among the latent factors (primarily because they are less able to remove measurement error than nonaggregated models) and are sometimes recommended because of their parsimony and computational simplicity, especially with small samples (Bagozzi & Edwards, 1998). Problematically, however, any level of item aggregation (from partial to total) creates a “black box” in which only the aggregated variable is permitted to relate to the latent construct or other items. This assumes unidimensionality (i.e., that a single latent construct underlies the combined items) and Tau equivalence (i.e., that the combined items have equal relationships to the latent trait). If either of these assumptions is violated, the resulting misfit will be buried in the parcel’s “black box.” This means that the analyses will incorrectly suggest that the model fits better than it actually does and can mean that the researcher is now operating on a latent factor that is not what he or she believes it to be.

Some of these concerns with item-level aggregation can be avoided by using the original, nonaggregated items as indicators of fewer latent factors. Returning to the example above with the four-item measures of *benevolence*, *competence*, and *integrity*, this would involve maintaining the 12 items as distinct indicators of fewer latent factors (e.g., combining *benevolence* & *integrity*, resulting in two rather than three latent factors). Unlike the “black box” of item aggregation, these factor-level aggregation strategies allow for direct tests of individual item dimensionality and loadings (relationships with the factor). Also unlike item-level aggregation models, these permit researchers to empirically test the change in fit across models with fewer latent factors via nested model comparisons. Thus, the researcher in our above example could directly compare the fit of a three-factor solution (*benevolence*, *competence*, and *integrity*) to a two-factor solution in which the two especially highly correlated factors are combined into a single factor (*benevolence/integrity*) indicated by the eight items.

It is generally a good idea for researchers whose data contain highly correlated latent factors to test these factor-level aggregation models, as high correlations among latent factors may suggest that the items are driven by fewer, statistically distinct and theoretically defensible latent factors. Problematically, however, these factor-level aggregation strategies can create both conceptual and statistical issues. Conceptually, these factor-level aggregation strategies suggest that the constructs themselves are not importantly distinct, which may not be the case theoretically. Returning to our example, evaluations of *competence* involve consideration of the target’s ability, a very different concern than evaluations of the other two constructs. Regarding *benevolence* and *integrity*, it is easy to see how they would overlap as both are evaluations of the target’s motivations. Nonetheless, it certainly is possible for a target to care strongly about the trustor (*high benevolence*) and yet not adhere to any particular code of conduct (*low integrity*) and this distinction may be theoretic-

cally important for research. Factor-level aggregation strategies collapse across these theoretical distinctions in favor of a more statistically parsimonious model, precluding the researcher from testing the independent effects of the now aggregated constructs. Statistically, when these factor models include items that are carefully crafted to be measures of conceptually distinct constructs as indicators of fewer, aggregated latent factors, they are unlikely to exhibit good fit. In this situation, the models will instead reveal groupings of items that are more correlated with each other and less correlated with other indicators of the aggregated latent factor. These factor solutions will be no better (and may be much worse) statistical representations of the latent constructs than the overly correlated distinct factor models.

The approaches presented above provide potential strategies for addressing the problem of overly correlated factors by aggregating across items or by using the original, nonaggregated items as indicators of fewer latent factors. Although sometimes defensible (especially in the case of factor-level aggregation), these models necessarily lose some of the central benefits of SEM in their inability to test relationships among items (in the case of item aggregation) or to account for the conceptual distinctions among constructs (when aggregating factors). We therefore present another strategy—the inclusion of higher-order factors to predict the latent factor covariances.

Like lower-order factors, higher-order factors are latent variables that are hypothesized to cause the responses to their indicators. But whereas lower-order factors are indicated by observed items, higher-order factors are indicated by lower-order latent factors. This allows the lower-order latent factors to remain distinct, testable entities while explicitly representing the covariation among them. These higher-order factors can then be used to predict other constructs directly and even allow for testing the direct effects of the error variance in the lower-order factors (variance that is not shared by the higher-order factor, called a factor disturbance) on the outcome. Higher-order factor models are common in other literatures (e.g., Chen, West, & Sousa, 2006; Digman, 1997) but are not yet widely used in trust scholarship.

Returning to our previous example, testing this alternative model would mean that *benevolence*, *competence*, and *integrity* would again be modeled as distinct factors, each with four unique items as indicators, but in order to address the excessive covariation among the three latent predictor constructs, an additional factor would be fitted “above” them. Thus, just as the shared variance among their items becomes the *benevolence*, *competence*, and *integrity* factors, the shared variance among these factors becomes the higher-order factor. This permits the researcher to test the influence of the higher-order factor and, when three or more latent constructs are used as indicators of the latent factor,<sup>1</sup> the researcher can also speak to the relative importance of the lower-order factors via evaluation of their factor loadings and the direct effects of their factor disturbances on the outcome. In this case, because *competence*

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<sup>1</sup> The use of two indicators for any latent variable (higher or lower order) often creates problems for identification that require constraining their loadings to be equal. This would preclude the researcher from evaluating their relative loadings because they would have been set to be the same. See Rindskopf and Rose (1988) for a more in-depth treatment of these issues.


was less related to the other factors, it is likely that its loading on a higher-order factor would be noticeably smaller than that of *benevolence* or *integrity*. *Competence* is, therefore, likely to have some variance that is not shared with the other lower-order factors (its factor disturbance) and the direct effect of that variance on *cooperation* could also be tested.

## Data Example

The real-world data example that follows provides a concrete illustration of the problems created by excessive covariance in SEM and how the alternative models discussed above can be used to overcome them. The data reported here were collected as part of an investigation into the role of trust in predicting land owner cooperation with a natural resource institution. As in other contexts, researchers have found support for the importance of a number of trust constructs in this literature but six in particular are commonly argued to be especially critical. The first is *dispositional trust* which is an evaluation of the individual's willingness to trust others generally (Hamm et al., 2013). The second and third mirror Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman's (1995) constructs of *benevolence* and *ability* such that *care* is an evaluation that the target is motivated by concern for the trustor and *competence* is the belief that the target has the technical ability to accomplish its responsibilities. The fourth construct is *confidence*, which is a positive expectation about working with the target (Siegrist, 2010) while the fifth, *procedural fairness*, is a belief that the trustor would be treated fairly by the institution. The last construct, *salient values similarity*, is the trustor's perception that he or she shares important values with the target (Siegrist et al., 2000).

The data were collected from a random sample of 645 rural Nebraska land owners who were asked to report their trust in and willingness to cooperate with a state natural resource management institution (additional results reported in Hamm, 2014). The trust measure consisted of 19 items that were hypothesized indicators of six correlated latent factors (see Fig. 1): *dispositional trust* (items DTrust 1–3), *care* (items Care 1–3), *competence* (items Comp 1–3), *confidence* (items Conf 1–4), *procedural fairness* (items PFair 1–3), and *salient values similarity* (items Values 1–3).

The 19 responses per participant were initially analyzed using a confirmatory model with six correlated factors. The model fit well (i.e., the model-predicted covariance matrix approximated the actual data covariance matrix; CFI=0.96; TLI=0.96; RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.03) and confirmed that all items were significantly related to their latent constructs. The model also provided little evidence of local misfit via the standardized residual correlation matrices (these matrices report covariance not accounted for by the hypothesized model and are available in *Mplus* via the RESIDUALS option). Importantly, five of the latent factors (*care*, *competence*, *confidence*, *procedural fairness*, and *salient values similarity*) were correlated at roughly  $r=0.9$ , indicating that they shared approximately 80 % of their variance. *Dispositional trust*, however, was relatively more conceptually distinct from the




**Fig. 1** Six-factor conceptual diagram of latent factors. *Boxes* are observed indicators. *Circles* are latent constructs. *Unidirectional arrows* indicate factor loadings and *bidirectional arrows* indicate correlations. “e” is the variance in the item that is not related to the factor (item “error”)

other five constructs, as it is an evaluation of “people in general” instead of the institution specifically and this was corroborated by its relatively low correlations with the other factors ( $r_s < 0.2$ ).

As would be expected given the statistical overlap of the five related factors, a separate structural regression model revealed no significant unique prediction of cooperation even though all five of the excessively correlated latent factors were bivariately correlated with the outcome. Thus, we considered alternative models for predicting cooperation from these six latent factors. To avoid potentially masking multidimensionality, we did not aggregate the observed items into parcels. We also lacked justification for combining some of the five highly correlated latent constructs

into fewer latent factors so we instead tested an alternative model in which *dispositional trust* remained a separate latent factor, but the remaining 16 items were entered as indicators of a single latent factor (see Fig. 2). Conceptually, this model suggests that responses to each of the 16 items are driven by the same latent construct such that any distinctions among the five constructs are not relevant in predicting item responses. If this model fit well to the data, it would provide evidence that the conceptual distinctions among the constructs drawn by academics were not recognized by the participants whose responses were instead driven by a more unified evaluation of the institution. As discussed above, this factor-level aggregation would provide a relatively parsimonious factor solution but, if the



**Fig. 2** Two-factor conceptual diagram of latent factors. *Boxes* are observed indicators. *Circles* are latent constructs. *Unidirectional arrows* indicate factor loadings and *bidirectional arrows* indicate correlations. “e” is the variance in the item that is not related to the factor (item “error”)




constructs were actually more distinct, would result in a statistically and theoretically untenable model. This two-factor model had moderate fit, with two fit indices suggesting acceptable fit (RMSEA=0.06; SRMR=0.04) and two indicating poorer fit (CFI=0.94; TLI=0.93). A likelihood ratio test revealed that this two-factor model fit significantly worse than the highly correlated six-factor model,  $\Delta\chi^2(14)=129.92$ ;  $p<0.001$ . More importantly, the standardized residual covariances (i.e., indices of the discrepancy between the actual and model-predicted covariances among the items) suggested recombining many of the items into the original five latent factors. We therefore found this model to be a poor representation of the data.

It is worthy of note that, at this point, we could have applied model “band-aids” (error covariances) to account for the covariance among the item residuals (Brown, 2006). These error covariances allow the model to explicitly account for relationships between the errors of different items (the item variance that is not related to the factor). In some cases, especially those in which the model fit is close to good, error covariances can be a defensible way to improve model fit by allowing the model to explicitly account for the extra covariance among specific items, such as due to commonality in wording or content. A major concern with these post hoc model corrections, however, is their influence on interpretability. Latent factors are hypothesized to be the underlying source of covariance among their items, such that residuals should not share any variance. Therefore, to the extent that residual error covariances are necessary to achieve good fit, it becomes unclear what the latent factor is actually measuring. Here, in our two-factor model, many of the items that indicated the aggregated trust factor had substantial covariances with the other items that were unaccounted for, such that many shared error variance with other items. These results point to a model that is statistically untenable.

Given the problems with the two-factor solution, we tested a third model in which the five highly correlated latent factors were modeled as indicators of a single higher-order latent factor (see Fig. 3). In this model, *care*, *competence*, *confidence*, *procedural fairness*, and *salient values similarity* remained distinct latent constructs that were themselves predicted by a higher-order factor; potentially, a broader evaluation of the target institution. In this model, *dispositional trust* remained a separate factor that was correlated with, but did not load onto the higher-order factor. All four fit indices suggested that this model fit well to the data (CFI=0.96; TLI=0.95; RMSEA=0.05; SRMR=0.03) and the model fit was notably better than the two-factor model with considerably less evidence of local misfit. Although the higher-order model fit slightly worse than the six-factor model,  $\Delta\chi^2(9)=20.96$ ,  $p<0.05$ , the “statistically significant” decrease in model fit does not necessarily reflect a meaningful difference between the models given that  $\chi^2$  indices of model fit are especially susceptible to sample size and model complexity (Kline, 2011).

Most importantly, this “higher-order” factor model maintained the theoretical integrity of the original six constructs while still allowing the prediction of *cooperation*, which would have been impossible in the six-factor model due to the extreme covariance in the five latent constructs. In a separate analysis regressing the criterion on the predictors, *cooperation* was significantly predicted by the higher-order factor but not *dispositional trust*.



**Fig. 3** Higher-order factor conceptual diagram of latent constructs. *Boxes* are observed indicators. *Circles* are latent constructs. *Unidirectional arrows* indicate factor loadings and *bidirectional arrows* indicate correlations. “e” is the variance in the item that is not related to the factor (item “error”) while “d” is the variance of the lower-order factor that is not related to the higher-order factor (factor disturbance)

The model also allowed for investigation into the relative influence of the five lower-order constructs by evaluating the factor loadings and testing direct effects of the variance of the lower-order factors that was not shared by the higher-order factor (factor disturbances; “d” in Fig. 3) on the outcome. Although there was limited variability in the lower-order factor loadings (all >0.9) and none of the effects of the lower-order factor disturbances on *cooperation* were significant in our data, the fact that this higher-order factor approach allowed for examining the relative influence of the lower-order factors on the outcome is a valuable feature of this approach.

## Discussion

Decades after Barber's criticism of the scholarship of trust, the field, in many ways remains something of a "conceptual morass" of related constructs (Barber, 1983, p. 1). To be sure, considerable work has been done in many contexts, especially organizational trust, but even in such developed contexts, there remain a number of constructs whose relationships and relative influence on relevant outcomes are unsettled. Bringing clarity to this confusion is a critical task for the scholarship of trust and SEM is an important tool for this endeavor. Unfortunately, the problems caused by the conceptual overlap in many trust constructs are likely to be exacerbated by SEM's hallmark error partitioning, potentially leaving questions of the relative influence of the constructs untestable. This chapter presented three potential strategies for addressing these issues: item-level aggregation, factor-level aggregation, and higher-order factors.

Item-level aggregation was discussed first and, although sometimes recommended, we argue that because of the misfit it can mask, it is a poor option for trust and other researchers. This is especially true given that the simultaneous evaluation of the covariance among the items and the partitioning of error variance that are compromised by this approach are two of the primary reasons why SEM is used in the first place. Factor-level aggregation was presented next and is a much more defensible approach. In fact, because of their relative parsimony, we recommend that researchers test these factor-level aggregation models whenever they have highly correlated latent factors like those in the examples here. Importantly, however, these models can create theoretically and even statistically indefensible factor solutions because of the potentially important theoretical and statistical distinctions among constructs they ignore.

For these reasons, we also present higher-order factor models as an important alternative specification to be tested. Higher-order factors "sit above" lower-order factors and are essentially formed by the covariation among them. Like the item- and factor-level aggregation strategies, this approach allows the researcher to avoid suppressor-like problems that arise from regressing an outcome on highly correlated predictors. Unlike the aggregation strategies, however, higher-order factors allow the researcher to maintain the conceptual distinctiveness of the constructs in the model and even the ability to speak to their relative influence by evaluating the factor loadings and testing direct effects of factor disturbances.

In the data example above, we present an analysis of six conceptually distinct trust-related constructs, first using the standard approach to SEM. In this model, five of the latent constructs were especially highly correlated, precluding a regression of *cooperation* on them. To address this, we tested both a factor-level aggregation model and a higher-order factor model. Both models fit worse to the data than the standard, correlated factors model, but the decrease in fit for the higher-order factor model was much smaller than for the two-factor model. Additionally, the higher-order factor model, by accounting for the distinctions among constructs, returned considerably less evidence of local ill-fit than the factor-level aggregation model.

Given the sample size considerations involved in the model fit comparison, the objectively small decrease in model fit, and the fact that the higher-order factor model permitted testing the hypothesized effects of the constructs on *cooperation*, we argue that it is the best representation of our data.

## Conclusion

Considerable progress has been made in clarifying the “conceptual morass” of trust scholarship but important work remains to be done. Although SEM is an important tool for this endeavor, the often highly correlated nature of the relevant constructs can create problems for its use. Aggregation strategies (both item and factor level) are available, but the use of higher-order factors often provides a much needed statistically and theoretically valid alternative that permits the testing of theory-driven hypotheses that might not otherwise be possible.

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# Examining the Relationship Between Interpersonal and Institutional Trust in Political and Health Care Contexts

Celeste Campos-Castillo, Benjamin W. Woodson, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Tina Sacks, Michelle M. Fleig-Palmer, and Monica E. Peek

Scholars commonly portray institutional and interpersonal trust as instrumental for social order. Many depict institutional trust—trust in institutions, such as health care and government—as necessary for fostering interactions free from malfeasance (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Gilson, 2003; Zucker, 1986). Similarly, scholars portray interpersonal trust—trust in individuals who represent these institutions—as crucial for sustaining trust in institutions (Kramer, 1999; Maguire & Phillips, 2008; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Shamir & Lapidot, 2003). A relationship between individual and institutional trust is intuitive, yet scholars have rarely examined the existence of this relationship explicitly (e.g., Rousseau et al., 1998; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007).

For purposes of this chapter, we adopt Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman's (1995/2006) definition of trust as a willingness to be vulnerable to another party.

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Schoorman, Wood, and Breuer (2015) suggest that this definition of trust, although initially developed for the micro-level of analysis, is applicable to the macro-level of analysis as well. We also focus our discussion on situations where the trustor (trusting party) is an individual member of the public and the trustee (party being trusted) is an institution or an individual representing the institution. In our approach, we explore how different researchers have defined what constitutes the latter (an “institution”), which reveals unique insights into whether a relationship exists between interpersonal trust and institutional trust. Put differently, while others have approached the problem through discussing the definition of “trust,” we highlight that researchers have taken for granted that a shared consensus exists about what is an institution.

We examine the evidence concerning the reciprocal relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust. Our discussion focuses on two institutional contexts: the political arena and health care. Examining these two specific contexts permits a better understanding of the relationship between individual and institutional trust. First, we consider the differences in how research has conceptualized what constitutes an “institution.” Whereas there is a consensus that interpersonal trust occurs between two people, there is little agreement about where institutional trust is directed. These differences in what constitutes the “institution” carry importance in determining the type of relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust. Second, we examine a trustor’s individual-level characteristics and how these influence the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust. Specifically, we analyze how the trustor’s individual-level characteristics have an impact on the direction and strength of the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust. Further, evidence suggests that certain characteristics influence the level of trust directed at any trustee, but we elaborate on these findings by considering how researchers define an institution.

## **Defining the Institution**

Across the range of definitions for what is an institution, two patterns emerge. First, an institution is not only a brick-and-mortar organization, but can be a role or a specific type of person (e.g., physicians and judges). In each case, the institution is robust to the turnover of the individuals who compose it, indicating that the institution is persistent and stable. Second, researchers have examined institutions that range in their proximity to the trustor. We characterize a “local” institution as one where the trustor has direct contact with the individuals who are members of the institution and a “remote” institution where such direct contact is minimal or absent. By locating the institution under investigation in this range, we can better understand the nature of the relationship between interpersonal trust and institutional trust. Of course, a trustor can have frequent, mediated contact with an institution (e.g., following relevant news reports about the institution), but the absence of direct contact maintains the remoteness of the institution. Further, a trustor can have an

experience with an institutional artifact, such as its Web site, which can influence trust in the institution. These cases, however, are outside of our focus because they circumvent the role of interpersonal trust.

Because of our focus on the political and healthcare contexts as well as different levels of analysis, we define an institution, using Barley and Tolbert (1997), as “shared rules and typifications that identify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships” (p. 100). This definition permits us to consider an institution that is a brick-and-mortar organization as well as one that is a role or a specific group of persons. The notion of an institution also being viewed as a role is consistent with the Oxford English Dictionary (2015) definition of an institution as the “establishment in a charge or position.” Thus, our discussion of trust in institutions could address a specific institution such as the Supreme Court or a hospital or a specific group of people such as judges and physicians.

There are two characteristics of institutions that are pertinent to our discussion. First, regardless of the level of analysis, an institution should be robust to the turnover of its members, indicating that the institution is persistent and stable. Second, the spatial location of the institution in relationship to the trustor is an important consideration (Gössling, 2004). Geographic proximity will vary at the level of the trustor, depending on his/her personal circumstances. Local institutions are those in which the trustor has frequent contact directly with members of the institution. Remote institutions are those in which direct contact is minimal or absent. A trustor can have frequent, mediated contact with an institution (e.g., following relevant news reports about the institution), but the absence of direct contact maintains the remoteness of the institution. The permanence and the proximity of an institution will influence the nature of the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust.

## *Politics*

In the context of political institutions, interpersonal trust involves trust in those individuals who compose the institution—e.g., a member of Congress, a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, or the police officer walking the beat in a person’s neighborhood. Institutional trust involves the two aspects discussed above: trust in the institution regardless of the people involved (what we refer to as the “brick-and-mortar” institution, for lack of a better term) and trust in the institutional roles and types of individuals. When the institution is a brick-and-mortar organization, the literature is fairly straightforward—people can trust or distrust the U.S. Congress, U.S. Supreme Court, or federal government—because the boundaries of the institution (where it starts and ends) are straightforward. These institutions are persistent and stable, which results in trustors possessing political attitudes toward those institutions that differ from their attitudes toward members of those institutions. For example, people’s feelings about the members of Congress are usually much



different from how they feel about the U.S. Congress as an institution (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995).

Another line of research concerns institutions that are *roles*, or *specific types* of individual (Caldeira, 1986; Richardson, Houston, & Hadjiharalambous, 2001). The dividing line between interpersonal and institutional trust, in this case, is less clear. Nonetheless, because roles are persistent and stable even when the individuals occupying the role change, trust in the role (or type of individual) may be defined as institutional trust, while trust in specific individuals who occupy the role, such as Representative Alcee Hastings or Senator Susan Collins, is interpersonal trust. The *role* of being a member of Congress exists long after Hastings and Collins leave Congress.

The following discussion will lay out the current research that elucidates the relationship between these different levels of trust—trust in specific individuals, trust in roles or specific types of individuals, and trust in brick-and-mortar institutions—for the three major forms of political institutions: the judicial, legislative, and executive.

*Judicial.* For judicial institutions the relationship between trust in a specific judge and trust in a court depends on the type of court. For some courts—like a local criminal court—people interact directly with the individuals composing that court. Conversely, people rarely interact directly with the individuals who compose more remote courts like the U.S. Supreme Court. These differences change not only the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust, but also the nature of interpersonal trust. An interpersonal trust based on direct experiences will be much different from an interpersonal trust based on other, indirect information.

For institutions that are more local to the trustor, such as lower level courts, research consistently shows that interactions with the individuals composing that institution affect perceptions of the legitimacy of an institution, an attitude that contributes to trust (see Tyler, 2006a for a review). Tyler (2006b) found that when people perceive that judges are using a fair decision-making process, they are more likely to perceive the institution as legitimate and trust the institution. Crucially, the evidence from Tyler (2006b) involves people's perception of their direct interactions with the courts. Based on Tyler's work, we propose that this effect operates through interpersonal trust: people develop interpersonal trust through their interactions with an individual and their perceptions of a "proper process" being followed in an institution, and this interpersonal trust then affects their trust in the institution.

The relationship between interpersonal trust and trust in institutions that are more remote is less established. In the case of judicial institutions, the most salient remote institution is the U.S. Supreme Court. One reason for the lack of evidence on the nature of cross-level trust is that surveys rarely include questions about individual justices. Further, research has not (to our knowledge) tied attitudes toward specific individual justices to attitudes toward the institution. The closest approximation to a question about individual justices are the popular items that assess people's confidence in the "leaders" of the U.S. Supreme Court (without specifying the names of the specific occupiers of the bench) or that ask about the procedures and

process that justices generally use to make decisions (e.g., Casey, 1974; Gibson & Caldeira, 2011; Scheb & Lyons, 2000). However, aside from the fact that these items do not measure trust as we are defining it, they focus more on the institutional rather than the interpersonal because they ask about a person's perception of a role—U.S. Supreme Court justices—rather than a specific individual.

While this research cannot directly answer the question of the relationship between interpersonal trust in specific individual justices and institutional trust in the U.S. Supreme Court, a debate between Tyler and Rasinski (1991) and Gibson (1989, 1991) over the relationship between procedural fairness and institutional legitimacy perceptions provides some theoretical guidance. In this debate, Gibson (1991) made a distinction between remote institutions like the U.S. Supreme Court where people often rely on indirect information about how the institution actually functions and local institutions where people interact directly with the individuals who compose the institution. When people directly interact with a local institution, Gibson (1991) concedes that their experience with the individuals composing that institution affects their institutional trust, but for the remote institutions the opposite occurs—trust in the institution affects their views of how the institution operates because people have no direct experience with, and thus no direct information on, the decision-making process.<sup>1</sup> While Gibson (1991) examined procedural fairness perceptions rather than interpersonal trust, the same distinction likely applies to the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust for remote and local institutions. For local institutions, people interact with the individuals within the institution and develop a sense of interpersonal trust that can then affect institutional trust. Meanwhile for remote institutions, they never interact with the individuals and thus cannot develop a firm sense of interpersonal trust. Instead, their institutional trust affects their views of how the individuals operate and thus their interpersonal trust.

*Executive.* Distinguishing among the institution, the specific type of person, and an individual is less straightforward with the executive branch. Because of this difficulty, the Presidency would seem to be the prime case to find a strong relationship between interpersonal trust in the current president and institutional trust in the Presidency. However, in one study less than half (46 %) approved of the current president, despite near consensus of approval (96 %) of the presidential institution, suggesting that distrusting the individual occupying the office does not lead to distrusting the institution (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). Political scientists, however, rarely ask about the institution of the executive branch, focusing instead on the specific president or on the leadership of the executive branch. Associating the president with the executive branch makes sense since the president “is the embodiment of the executive branch to most people” (Moy & Pfau, 2000, p. 13), and approval of the president is significantly and positively related to trust in government, although the direction of causation has been debated (Citrin, 1974; Hetherington, 2005; Williams, 1985).

While some people will develop a sense of interpersonal trust with a salient and prominent person such as the president, the research suggests that whatever inter-

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<sup>1</sup> See Mondak (1993) for experimental evidence supporting Gibson's (1991) argument.

personal trust is developed does not affect institutional trust. However, we expect that much of the interpersonal trust developed toward the president is highly influenced by institutional trust. While the president is a part of the institution of the Presidency, the president is also a member of many other role-type institutions such as “politician” or, to be more specific in the case of the current president, Barack Obama, a “Democratic politician.” The fact that one of the largest predictors of any individual’s approval rating of a president is political party affiliation (Bond & Fleisher, 2001; Gilens, 1988) provides ample support that most of the interpersonal trust developed toward a president is a result of that president fulfilling the role of a “Democratic politician” or a “Republican politician” and actually has little to do with the individual himself.

Like the distinction between local courts and the Supreme Court, few people have direct or unmediated interactions with the president, but they do with individuals who work for the executive branch, such as their mail carriers and other federal workers. At the same time that people distrust the government and have negative views of the federal bureaucracy, they report positive experiences with federal employees (Rein & O’Keefe, 2010) and positive assessments of various bureaucratic agencies (Pew Research Center, 2013). People can trust their mail carrier to do a good job delivering the mail; yet, because they do not equate the United States Postal Service with the executive branch of government, this does not produce institutional trust. Consequently, in the case of the executive branch, it appears that trustors do not make the connection between interpersonal trust and institutional trust.

*Legislative.* The most explicit discussion of the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust occurs within research on Congress. People clearly make a distinction between their own member of Congress (an individual), members of Congress as a whole (a specific type of person), and the institution of Congress. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995), using approval rather than trust, found that almost 90 % of Americans approved of the institution of Congress (88 %), two-thirds approved of their own member of Congress (67 %), and less than a quarter approved of the members of Congress as a whole (24 %).

People are taught to appreciate the role of the institution of Congress in the constitutional design of the American government but are encouraged to distrust members of Congress in general. In other words, they trust the brick-and-mortar institution of Congress but do not trust Congress members as a specific type of person or role. Fenno (1975) provides perhaps the best explanation for the juxtaposition between trusting one’s own specific member of Congress and distrusting Congress members more generally. Individual members of Congress spend a great deal of time in their districts working to develop trust with their constituents. They do this through their self-presentations: by emphasizing their qualifications and their ability to get things done in Washington; identifying with their constituents; and displaying empathy, especially when constituents are experiencing difficulties. At the same time, they actively disparage Congress when they run for reelection. All of the negatives associated with Congress—such as special interest influence, unwarranted perquisites of office, inefficiency, corruption, and scandals—are due to the undifferentiated mass of other members, not to the representative himself or herself.

The distrust people have toward Congress members is also related to the institution of Congress. Congress is the most transparent institution in the federal government; all of its dirty laundry gets aired in public. In contrast, much of the work of the Supreme Court and the president is conducted behind closed doors. This distinction in transparency helps explain why trust of Congress members is low compared to the Supreme Court justices and the president and bureaucrats (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995).

## *Health Care*

Regardless of the referent, there are two common themes in definitions of trust in health care research: risk and vulnerability (e.g., Abelson, Miller, & Giacomini, 2009; Gilson, 2003, 2006; Hall, Dugan, Zheng, & Mishra, 2001; Mechanic, 1996). Patients who are ill are vulnerable because they do not have the knowledge or skills to cure themselves but must depend upon the expertise and good will residing in healthcare institutions (c.f., Gilson, 2003). The risk is that they will not be cured, or even may suffer further injury or harm.

Changes to the structure of health care delivery have altered the image that comes to mind when an individual thinks about a health care institution (for detailed discussions, see Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000; Mechanic, 1996; Rao & Hellander, 2014), making it more difficult than in the case of politics to define “institution.” In health care, research into institutional trust has examined various referents including health systems and medical institutions such as hospitals and clinics (e.g., Abelson et al., 2009; Cook & Stepanikova, 2008; Gilson, 2003, 2006; Hall et al., 2001). Therefore, for purposes of this chapter, we define a health care institution broadly as an organization established for the purpose of treating, managing, and preventing disease. Such organizations could be a hospital, an outpatient clinic, or a health plan (Cook & Stepanikova, 2008; Hall et al., 2001; Mechanic, 1996).

The question remains, however, whether interpersonal trust and institutional trust influence one another. The management of health care delivery has become more remote to the trustor (e.g., Swetz, Crowley, & Maines, 2013), yet individuals still have direct contact with their physicians and health care team. Exploring the framework that commonly informs trust in health care—Mayer and colleagues’ model—helps us understand institutional trust (Schoorman et al., 2015) and how interpersonal trust helps develop institutional trust (Schilke & Cook, 2013). Since many of the scales that measure institutional trust in health care have conceptual roots in this model, a reasonable working claim is that interpersonal trust and institutional trust can influence one another in health care. Researchers should exercise caution with our tentative claim, however, since those who constructed these trust models deliberately paid little attention to context in an effort to develop the most generalizable model; research will need to consider whether health care poses an interesting contingency in the extent that these models generalizes across settings.

Lastly, just as with politics we consider the existence of cross-level interaction when the institution is a role or a specific type of person. The existence of this relationship within health care is less clear than in politics. In one study, researchers modeled their measure of trust in the physician profession after a similar measure of trust in a specific physician (Hall, Camacho, Dugan, & Balkrishnan, 2002). Unlike the latter measure, the validated items that resulted in the former did not reflect a dimension of trust in confidentiality. The lack of isomorphism in the structure of the two measures raises the question of whether cross-level interaction can occur. Moreover, the study found that, while there was a significant correlation between trust in a specific physician and trust in the physician profession, the correlation was only moderate and was lower than correlations with the other measures they used to determine validity. Just as in the political arena, however, research finds that trust in a specific physician remains high even in the face of declining trust in the medical profession (Blendon & Benson, 2001; Hall, Camacho et al., 2002; Pescosolido, Tuch, & Martin, 2001).

In examining the role of physicians, trustors develop perceptions of physicians in general not only through interpersonal interactions but also through portrayals in books or the media (c.f., Hall, Camacho et al., 2002), thus the institution of physicians as a role is more remote because it is more impersonal. If we extrapolate this characterization to the role of medical professionals as more remote to the patient than a more specific health institution (e.g., a specific hospital or clinic), then we can develop preliminary claims as we did for the political context. As posited earlier, a relationship between interpersonal trust and institutional trust is more likely to occur as the institution becomes more local to the trustor. Indeed, research finds that patients' trust in a specific physician is associated with their trust in their local health care team (Kaiser et al., 2011) and insurance plan (Zheng, Hall, Dugan, Kidd, & Levine, 2002). A relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust in the cases where the institution is a role, however, is likely weaker because the institution is remote. Accordingly, we expect a weaker relationship between trust in one's physician and trust in medical professional roles than when the institution is more local.

## Trustors' Characteristics

### *Politics*

*Demographics.* One moderator that likely affects the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust is the trustor's demographics. Specifically, whenever a trustor shares demographic traits with the decision makers within an institution, the type of interpersonal trust developed through shared demographics can translate into greater institutional trust, but this only occurs when the institution as a whole is representative of the trustor's demographics. In political science this phenomenon

is known as descriptive representation. For example, a woman might feel greater trust in her female legislator than in her male legislator. Generalizing to the whole legislature, women might have greater trust in the legislature when it consists of a representative number of women (about 50 %) than when it is dominated by men. The cause of the descriptive representation phenomenon is complex. Both Mansbridge (1999) and Williams (1998) argue that, theoretically, the positives that come with being represented by someone who shares one's race or gender—including feeling better able to communicate with the representative and better represented in terms of their shared interests—contribute to more interpersonal trust between the representative and the constituent, and this subsequently leads to greater trust in the institution.

Empirical work provides a less clear picture than the theoretical argument. In terms of race and ethnicity, whites are more likely to respond favorably to same-race representatives than African Americans (Gay, 2002). Whites are more likely to remember what their legislators have accomplished, to approve of their job performance, and to view them as resources when their representatives are white. African Americans do not have the same positive responses to their African American representatives. Contrary to expectations, then, it is white constituents who react most positively to having a same-race representative. However, this deals with attitudes toward individual members of Congress rather than attitudes toward the institution. Approval of Congress as an institution is not related to descriptive representation (Gay, 2002). Support for the importance of descriptive representation increases when attention shifts from the federal to the local level. African Americans are more likely to trust their local government when they have an African American mayor than a white mayor (Abney & Hutcheson, 1981; Howell & Fagan, 1988). Latinos also feel less alienated from the political system when they are descriptively represented (Pantoja & Segura, 2003), likely because they feel less excluded from the political system (Abramson, 1972; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990).

The theoretical argument is better supported when the focus turns to women. As the proportion of female legislators increases, women view the legislature as more legitimate (Norris & Franklin, 1997). Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) find, in a cross-national study, that women's descriptive representation is significantly related to perceived legitimacy of the government. As with race and ethnicity, the descriptive representation of women has a more pronounced effect at the local rather than the national level. Focusing on people with a moderate amount of political awareness, Ulbig (2007) found that women living in municipalities with more female representation had significantly more trust in the municipal government than women who experienced more male representation. Interestingly, men reacted in the opposite way, becoming much less trusting the more women representatives there were in local government.

*Familiarity.* We conceive of familiarity with the political institution as political knowledge, which we expect to be a key moderator affecting whether interpersonal trust can affect institutional trust within politics. One requirement that must occur before interpersonal trust can affect institutional trust is knowing the people who compose the institution. In the case of political institutions, this basic requirement

is not met by much of the American public. Political science is rife with studies bemoaning Americans' lack of knowledge concerning politics (Gaziano, 1997; Gilens, Vavreck, & Cohen, 2007; Prior, 2005). In Delli Carpini and Keeter's (1993) highly influential study on political knowledge, only 29 % of the sample could name their own member of the House of Representatives. If someone cannot name his/her own House member, he/she probably also does not have a sense of interpersonal trust toward that member; lacking that, his/her interpersonal trust cannot affect institutional trust.

While a certain level of political knowledge is required for interpersonal trust to affect institutional trust, political knowledge may also provide a buffer that prevents interpersonal trust from affecting institutional trust. Those with more political knowledge should be better at separating their feelings concerning what Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) called the Constitutional and the Washington system, or alternatively what Easton (1965) called the regime and the current authorities. In both cases, the former involve political institutions while the latter involve the individuals who compose those institutions. Only those with an adequate understanding of the political system can separate the disagreeable actions of the current occupants of an institution from their feelings about the institution itself. Both McCloskey and Zaller (1984) and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993), for example, show that those with more political knowledge were more likely to support democratic values, a key component of which is supporting the political system even when they dislike the current political authorities. A survey by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) finds more direct evidence that *knowledgeable citizens* are more likely than the average citizen to separate their feelings about the people who compose an institution from the institution itself. In their survey, while all groups of people disliked members of Congress and liked Congress as an institution, political involvement, which often is a proxy for political knowledge, increased the disconnect between these two types of evaluations. Those who are more involved in politics are more likely to *disapprove* of members of Congress but also more likely to *approve* of the institution of Congress. Thus, it appears that knowing more about politics, and presumably more about the individual members composing an institution, does not necessarily lead to a greater relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust but instead may inhibit that relationship.

## Health Care

### *Demographics*

The focus within the health care literature has been primarily on trust in a specific physician, but this research sheds light on whether interpersonal and institutional trust influence one another in this context. Research documents that trust in one's own physician influences patient satisfaction, adherence to treatment, continuity with a provider, disclosure of medically relevant information, and seeking health-care services (Calnan & Rowe, 2006; Saha, Jacobs, Moore, & Beach, 2010). The

fact that trust has been found to vary based on individual-level patient factors including gender, race, and education has raised numerous questions about whether trust explains health and health care disparities.

Indeed, the literature suggests whites, women, and those with more education are generally more trusting than their counterparts. The evidence suggests African Americans and Latinos are less likely than whites to trust their physician, even after controlling for socioeconomic status, health status, and healthcare access (Armstrong, Ravenell, McMurphy, & Putt, 2007; Boulware, Cooper, Ratner, LaVeist, & Powe, 2003; Johnson, Saha, Arbelaez, Beach, & Cooper, 2004; LaVeist, Nickerson, & Bowie, 2000; Peek et al., 2013; Schnittker, 2004). With regard to gender, the evidence suggests men are less likely to trust their health care provider compared to women (Armstrong et al., 2007; Schnittker, 2004). Race moderates this relationship for women, in that black women generally report lower trust than white women (Armstrong et al., 2007). Lastly, studies have found people with less education, particularly less than a high school diploma, report lower trust than those with a high school diploma and/or a college degree (Schnittker, 2004).

The persistence of these findings speaks to the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust within health care. A confluence of factors predisposes certain subgroups not to trust in physicians or in health care more generally. Consider, for example, the residue of historic and contemporary racial discrimination in health care. Although the 1932 Tuskegee Syphilis Study is often the most well-known example of racial discrimination in medical research, experimentation and poor treatment occurred before and after this oft-cited historical event (Gamble, 1997). A significant body of literature documents more recent instances of experimentation and substandard medical care (Dittmer, 2009; Washington, 2006). All told, historical and contemporary social forces likely affect racial minorities' trust in the health care context (Gamble, 1997; Washington, 2006).

These issues are particularly relevant in the context of minority, female, and low-income patients who may be more likely to experience discrimination, both in general and in health care settings. For example, the literature suggests a lack of trust may not necessarily be focused on a single provider. Rather, negative experience with one provider may lead to lower trust of the health care sector in general (LaVeist, Isaac, & Williams, 2009; Peek, Sayad, & Markwardt, 2008). Consistent with this, other research finds that black women tend to have low trust in primary care providers, which is often associated with lower trust in their health care team (Kaiser et al., 2011). Based on extant research in the medical field, interpersonal and institutional trust are interdependent such that a person's assessment of one level or domain is likely to affect the other and demographic variables influence this relationship.

## ***Familiarity***

The persistence of demographic differences in trust raises the question of how familiarity contributes to the relationship between institutional and interpersonal trust in health care. Just as in politics, the lack of familiarity with a key institutional



representative—in this case, a specific health care professional—hinders the translation of interpersonal to institutional trust. Many studies document that utilization—i.e., experience with specific healthcare professionals—is positively associated with trust (O'Malley, Sheppard, Schwartz, & Mandelblatt, 2004; Whetten et al., 2006). In the case of racial and ethnic minorities, however, the issue is complex because racial and ethnic minorities may cite lower trust precisely because of their experience, and even with a lack of recent or regular experience with a physician. One study (Campos-Castillo, *in press*) finds that racial and ethnic differences in trust in health care professionals (the role, not a specific person who occupies the role) are equivalent between those who are more familiar (i.e., had a recent health care experience) and less familiar (i.e., did not have a recent health care experience). Thus, further research is needed.

## Discussion

Whether interpersonal trust and institutional trust influence one another is a common question raised within the literature. Whereas others have focused on defining “trust,” we considered how the definition of an “institution” impacts the answer to this question. Our definition supports the conceptualization of an institution as an organization of “bricks and mortar” or as a group of people in an identified role. Two characteristics of institutions, as we have defined them, are that they are robust to the turnover of individuals and that they vary with respect to proximity to a trustor. Whether an institution is local or remote to the trustor influences the type of relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust. In the context of these features, we also considered how the individual-level characteristics of the trustor, demographics and familiarity, factor into the relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust. A close examination of research questions that scholars have asked within the two illustrative institutional contexts—health care and the political arena—reveals many differences and agreements. While the approach to the problem has differed, there is much that each institutional context can learn from the other.

Many within health care, for example, lament that progress in understanding trust falls behind the progress in other fields (e.g., Gilson, 2003; Ozawa & Sripad, 2013). Indeed, even a cursory overview of the literature reveals stark differences. Whereas the literature in politics can easily be organized based on which specific institution is the focus, within health care it is very difficult to develop such clear organization. Part of this, as we stated earlier, has to do with the changes in the structure of healthcare delivery, which blur the boundaries of where an institution starts and ends. We noted, however, that in the few instances in which researchers have clearly defined what an “institution” is, respondents were able to differentiate among the numerous referents. Future research on institutional trust within health care should define carefully what comprises the referent.

One consistent trend across both domains is that racial minorities are less likely to trust institutions than whites. Reducing this gap may be easier for local than for

remote institutions. If the members of the local institution provide a positive experience for those interacting with them, the interpersonal trust developed will likely transfer into institutional trust. The same may not hold for remote institutions. Even if the people composing the remote institution provide positive experiences, the interpersonal trust may not transfer into institutional trust. This can make it difficult to bridge the racial trust gap for remote institutions. Even when traditionally disenfranchised groups perceive an individual within an institution providing beneficial services—whether as a representative in Congress or as a health care provider—they may separate that individual's actions from the institution. This dynamic can be seen in the impact of descriptive representation, which increases trust for local institutions but not for remote national institutions. Some other strategy besides individuals providing positive services may be required to increase trust in remote institutions.

In both contexts we noted a paucity of research that examined explicitly the direction of causality. We relied on peripheral but relevant research to develop a claim that the extent to which an institution is remote or local to the trustor impacts whether interpersonal trust affects institutional trust, or the reverse. Such causal claims are best examined through longitudinal research or controlled laboratory environments, methods rarely used by researchers in politics and health care to examine trust (for some exceptions, see Hall, Dugan, Balkrishnan, & Bradley, 2002; Pearson, Kleinman, Rusinak, & Levinson, 2006; Scherer & Curry, 2010). Given the heightened cynicism many Americans feel toward a variety of institutions and the individuals composing those institutions, determining whether interpersonal trust can increase institutional trust or vice versa is of the utmost importance.

Lastly, current changes in the health care and political arenas may potentially complicate the delineation of what constitutes an institution. For example, contemporary changes stemming from the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) stand to open the door for greater prominence of existing actors that the public traditionally does not consider to be members of the health care field (e.g., lawyers, drug courts) and of the rise of brand new actors (e.g., community health workers) needed to fill new roles (Kellogg, 2014; Peek et al., 2012). The recent push by the federal government to incentivize the adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) also complicates the field. A recent study, for example, found that patients' trust in government impacts their acceptance of federal involvement in the push for EHR adoption (Herian, Shank, & Abdel-Monem, 2014). These two institutional contexts—the political arena and health care—while examined separately thus far will increasingly need to be examined jointly by researchers.

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# Trust as a Multilevel Phenomenon Across Contexts: Implications for Improved Interdisciplinarity in Trust Research

Mitchel N. Herian and Tess M.S. Neal

As noted throughout this volume, trust is a critical concept across a wide array of domains. Within specific domains of research, prominent models of trust have been established. For example, in organizational scholarship a common method for the conceptualization and measurement of trust has been identified (the benevolence–integrity–ability model of trust; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). This model holds that the trustworthiness of an individual is dependent on his or her benevolence, integrity, and ability in the eyes of another. The model has been used in systematic reviews of the antecedents and outcomes of trust in organizational settings (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007). In the study of risk management, research has begun to converge on a singular conceptualization and measurement of trust (Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2010). And in law, criminal justice, and policing contexts, the highly trust-relevant *Legitimacy Theory* is dominant (e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2005; Tyler, 2006).

Cross-disciplinary approaches to the study of trust, however, have been limited by a lack of attention to the ways in which context impacts the nature of trusting relationships between individuals and groups. Specifically, research has failed to consider the ways in which the expectations of trustors and trustees differ as one moves from one domain of study to the next. Reflecting recognition of the importance of context, McEvily and Tortoriello (2011) advocated the development of “a generalizable theory of context that explains when and under which conditions different components of trust are more or less relevant” (p. 41). To be sure, previous

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research has examined impacts of contextual factors on trust. For example, Pirson and Malhotra (2011) examined trust from the perspective of a variety of stakeholders and demonstrated that the dimensions of perceived trustworthiness vary depending on the nature of the stakeholder group examined. Scholars also have conceptually examined the multilevel nature of trust and its impact on the measurement of trust to provide insights into the ways in which trust manifests when examined across multiple levels of analysis (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). Specifically, in their analysis and review of several studies within the business domain, Currall and Inkpen found that the level of theory and level of measurement were misaligned in several studies. That is, the level of theory was often the trust between firms, but the level of measurement was often between people and firms.

In this chapter, we recognize the multiple levels at which trust might be relevant. Table 1, to which we will refer throughout this chapter, illustrates the matrix of trustee–trustor relationships at three broad levels. However, we seek to further illuminate how trust at multiple levels might manifest, by also considering the contextual factors at each level. In particular, we consider trust at the individual, group, and institutional levels, and consider each of these levels in the public and private domains. For example, do the same antecedents of trust in private organizations (e.g., for-profit corporations) also apply to trust in public institutions (e.g., Congress)? Do trustors in private organizations such as corporations have the same expectations about the trustee as trustors who are making trust judgments about a governmental entity such as Congress? How are these dynamics impacted when multiple individuals make up a collective trustor? Or when multiple individuals comprise a collective trustee? Answering such questions will be critical if a multidisciplinary understanding of trust is to emerge. While this chapter is unable to examine all possible contexts in which trust plays a role, we hope that this overview will provide a conceptual foundation to inform future research.

## Trust Across Levels of Analysis

We begin with a commonly accepted cross-domain definition of trust put forth by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998): “A psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395). For further discussion of the applicability of this definition of trust across various domains, see Hamm et al. (2016). They analyze trust as a single construct vs. one that is fundamentally different across various domains, including public administration, policing, the courts, and healthcare. For the purposes of the present chapter, we proceed with this definition as relevant for the cross-domain study of trust.

Again, we assert that it is important to consider the cross-level implications of trust. That is, how might trust differ depending on whether the trustors and trustees are a collective rather than individuals? Therefore, rather than utilizing the specific domain (such as policing, healthcare, etc.) to illustrate our framework, we first focus



**Table 1** Trustee–trustor matrix at three levels


Institution as trustee (formal or informal organization, system, or mechanism of social order)	A person trusting an institution	A group trusting an institution	An institution trusting another institution
	<i>Examples:</i> People’s trust in courts; schools; banks; the media; a political party; the military; the education system; the prison system; insurance companies; different levels of government	<i>Examples:</i> An interest group’s trust in the legislative branch; a town’s elected officials’ trust in the National Guard; a group of company managers trusting the company for which they work	<i>Examples:</i> Corporations trusting banks; banks trusting the Federal Reserve; the executive branch recognizing the legitimacy of and authority of the legislature; the education system trusting in the courts
Group as trustee (relatively small set of identifiable people)	A person trusting a group	A group trusting another group	An institution trusting a group
	<i>Examples:</i> An individual’s trust in one’s colleagues; trust in one’s church leaders; trust in one’s family	<i>Examples:</i> An association of professionals trusting their leadership committee; the offensive line trusting the defensive line on a particular sports team; interfirm cooperation and collaboration	<i>Examples:</i> A health maintenance organization’s (HMO) trust in a group of healthcare providers; a company trusting its management team; the military trusting its commanders
Person as trustee (one individual)	A person trusting another person	A group trusting a person	An institution trusting a person
	<i>Examples:</i> A person trusting another to honor a contract; a husband trusting his spouse; an employee trusting his/her manager	<i>Examples:</i> A group of managers trusting their corporate attorney; a particular school’s parent–teacher association members trusting the school’s principal; an interest group trusting a particular politician	<i>Examples:</i> Governmental agencies trusting individuals to contribute to governmental decisions in the context of public participation; the Supreme Court trusting its chief justice; the executive branch trusting the president
	Person as trustor (one individual)	Group as trustor (relatively small set of identifiable people)	Institution as trustor (formal or informal organization, system, or mechanism of social order)

our attention on the level of analysis that is invariant across the numerous domains in which trust is applied in this volume. For instance, the person-to-person level of trust could occur in both the policing and healthcare contexts. Person-to-person trust can be illustrated by one police officer trusting another police officer, or with one physician trusting a nurse. Similarly, trust can be relevant in the group-to-group level by, for example, a particular unit of officers trusting a particular group of

police leaders. Institution-to-institution trust can be demonstrated in an interaction where a state-level executive agency interacts with a state-level appellate court. As noted above, previous research has considered such implications in the context of international joint ventures (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). There, the authors theorized about how to measure and conceptualize trust using a 3×3 matrix of individuals, small groups, and firms (see our Table 1 for a conceptually similar matrix—ours is not specific to business but rather is intended to be applicable in both public and private domains).

Research has demonstrated that there are differences in the nature of trust depending on the level in which it is measured. For example, interpersonal and interfirm trust differ in important ways in the buyer–seller context, each playing different roles in affecting negotiating processes and exchange performance (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). To use the benevolence-integrity-ability model to illustrate, negotiations between two individuals may be based on the benevolence and integrity of the trustee, while negotiations between firms may be based more strongly on the ability and integrity of the trustee firm. Further, even while interpersonal trust between individuals in two different firms might be strong, interfirm trust might be relatively weak (Barney & Hansen, 1994). These findings only begin to highlight the myriad relationships in which trust might be relevant and how trust might differ across different levels. Additionally, the results suggest a need to explore the ways in which individual- and group-level dynamics impact the conceptualization and measurement of trust.

The context in which individuals, groups, or organizations operate will dictate whether and how individuals, groups, and organizations trust one another. For example, in an organizational setting, employee trust in a supervisor may differ from employee trust in a small work group, or trust in the board of directors. In the realm of government, citizen trust in a particular elected official might differ substantially from citizen trust in the institution of which the elected official is a member. In the USA this phenomenon is nicely illustrated as public trust in individual members of Congress is consistently higher than trust in Congress at large, a phenomenon identified by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) and as discussed by Campos-Castillo et al. (2016). In this particular situation, it may be possible that interpersonal aspects of trust may be driving trust in individual legislators (i.e., the left-most, bottom box of Table 1: person-to-person trust) while something other than interpersonal trust is driving trust in the institution (i.e., one of the other eight boxes in Table 1). Studies suggest that measures of confidence in Congressional leaders as individuals or in Congress as an institution as a whole capture different attitudes; the former are better predicted by party identification and ideology, whereas the latter stem more from social status and institutional attachment (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). As another example of why these various levels may matter, consider that when multiple agencies collaborate to tackle public problems, trust between individuals within agencies (i.e., person-to-person, person-to-institution) may be high, while trust between small groups within each organization (i.e., group-to-group) may simultaneously be low.



**Fig. 1** Overlapping elements of multilevel trust

To illustrate the measurement implications of the multilevel perspective of trust, it may be worth considering a number of examples. The Person–Group–Institution distinctions represented in Table 1 are not necessarily mutually exclusive, thus adding another layer of complexity to the study of trust from a methodological perspective (see Fig. 1). This complexity may be evidenced in public opinion polls and surveys that assess trust. For instance, when survey administrators ask respondents about “trust in Congress,” some respondents might report their trust in Congress as an institution while others might respond based on their trust in a particular legislator. Likewise, in surveys of employees in organizational settings, assessments of trust may be driven strongly by assessments of supervisor trust for some individuals, but driven by assessments of trust in the larger workgroup or organization for others. Therefore, while a large amount of trust research focuses on elements of interpersonal trust (i.e., trust between individuals), our 3×3 matrix illustrates that *interpersonal* trust is not always relevant. Although aspects of interpersonal trust may be relevant for most of the levels, it is likely not relevant at the “institution-to-institution” level (i.e., the right-most upper box of Table 1, and the “institution” area of Fig. 1 that does not overlap with the “person” or “group” areas). Interpersonal trust is relevant when the trustee is a person trusting another person or

trusting a group, because groups are composed of identifiable people—but trust in groups may nevertheless have a different character than person-to-person trust. Interpersonal trust is similarly relevant when the trustee is a group trusting an individual person or another group. However, when an institution is the trustee or trustor, “interpersonal” trust does not fit well conceptually. Other trust-related constructs, such as perceptions of trustee legitimacy, competence, benevolence, shared values, and impartiality may be more important at this level.

Let us revisit Rousseau et al.’s (1998) cross-domain definition of trust with the 3×3 matrix of trustee–trustor relationships in mind. The “willingness to accept vulnerability” arguably makes sense for each of these levels, but in different ways. Trust may be best understood in terms of interpersonal vulnerability at the person level and to some degree at the group level. There is choice involved in the willingness to be vulnerable in interpersonal trust. But at the institutional level (where “interpersonal” trust seems ill-fitting), trust is about willingness to cooperate and comply in order to preserve social order. From a Lockean perspective, there is “choice” involved in an abstract sense in that citizens in democracies give tacit consent to be governed by the constitutional systems, policies, norms, and so forth that have been created over the years.<sup>1</sup> Once trust in such institutions has eroded to the point that citizens no longer feel their liberties are being protected by such institutions, individuals could simply relocate, or attempt to establish a new constitutional order. From a purely theoretical perspective, then, attempting to apply common conceptualizations of trust to the study of trust in public institutions may be problematic. In the next section, we consider some of the distinctions between public and private domains that may inform the conceptualization and measurement of trust.

## Trust Across Domains and in Private and Public Contexts

Much of the recent research on trust has originated out of the organizational behavior and management fields. Thus, much of what we know about the dimensions of trust, the impacts of trust on attitudes and behaviors, and the mediating role of trust between attitudes and behaviors has been developed by researchers working in organizational settings (e.g. Kramer, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995) where trustees and trustors are typically involved in an employee–employer relationship.

Trustor–trustee expectations in the employee–employer relationship may be shaped by the norms, customs, and policies that govern behaviors in various settings. For example, the development of trust between two employees who occupy similar places in the hierarchy of a manufacturing firm may be shaped by nature of their employment and the relationship between each other’s work. The development of

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<sup>1</sup> While the emphasis of this exercise is on democratic societies, we recognize that in many societies throughout the world vulnerability to an authority may be compulsory rather than voluntary.

trust between an employee and a supervisor in the same firm may be shaped by role differentials, which might manifest in expectations about the obligations of the employee to meet the needs of the supervisor. Further, employee trust in the “company” or organization may be shaped by the employee’s understanding of his or her place in the company hierarchy and shaped by previous experiences with the individuals who comprise the leadership of the firm. In each of these scenarios, the trustor and trustee understand the roles of each other in the particular workplace context. Moreover, each likely understands the broad legal framework guiding employment which shapes the expectations of individuals and groups across the organizational hierarchy. Simply put, in organizational settings where trustors and trustees are also the employee and employer, each individual and collective has specific rights and obligations that guide behavior.

However, it may be useful to distinguish employment in private settings to employment in public settings. In recent years, a robust literature on public service motivation has emerged (see Perry, 1996). Public service motivation theory holds that individuals pursue providing service in public settings as a result of a number of factors such as commitment to public interest, civic duty, social justice, self-sacrifice, and compassion (Perry, 1996). At the heart of this theory is a general understanding that individuals who seek employment in public agencies may have a unique set of motivations that are somewhat distinct from their counterparts who seek employment in private, for-profit organizations. In particular, public sector employees may have different reward motivations and may have higher levels of organizational commitment (Crewson, 1997). While relatively little research to date has examined the role of trust in shaping public service motivation, recent studies have suggested that trust may be an important factor of public service motivation. For instance, Chen, Hsieh, and Chen (2014) argue that interpersonal trust between colleagues is an important source of knowledge sharing in public settings, and that public employees’ trust in citizens can enhance opportunities for more citizen participation in governmental decision making. In sum, the lack of a profit motive and perhaps a greater emphasis on democratic norms may lead trust to play a slightly different role in public employment vs. private employment settings. Moreover, the unique aspects of public employment may introduce unique trust relationships (i.e., governmental employees trusting citizens) that are not necessarily found in private, for-profit enterprises. Consequently, the study of trust across public and private employment settings may prove to be a fruitful line of research by allowing scholars to test whether models of trust developed in one domain retain their predictive validity in other domains.

### ***Trust at Multiple Levels in Democratic Contexts***

Outside of workplace settings, many of the situational norms, customs, and policies associated with employment disappear, or are replaced by others. This is particularly true as we consider the public realm of democratic societies. Democratic societies provide for varying levels of public input into the decisions made by

public officials. To apply Rousseau et al.'s (1998) definition of trust to democratic societies, we can surely see that citizens do accept vulnerability to decision makers on a consistent basis. For example, unlike in many private contexts (e.g. employment, contractual relationships, etc.) in which the trustor may have limited voice—or even a limited expectation of voice—individuals in public settings are often entitled to make their voices heard. In general, citizens in democratic societies can make their voices heard through such methods as voting, participation in interest groups, direct contact of public officials, etc. Indeed, citizens in democratic societies have a wide array of avenues through which to impact the decision making of public officials. Therefore, while vulnerability to decision makers exists for citizens in a democratic society, the level and nature of the vulnerability that individuals or groups might feel is quite different from the vulnerability felt by individuals and groups engaged in at-will employment or business enterprises. In short, citizens in a democratic society have an opportunity to shape the behaviors of the public officials tasked with governing (though, of course, historical and political factors may lead to variation in the extent to which certain citizens believe they have the ability to impact the behaviors of officials).

It is important to recognize that the public sphere is not unidimensional. Within the public sphere there are multiple institutions, each of which may evoke varying expectations regarding the role between the citizen and the state. To again use the American context as an example, each federal governmental institution was specifically designed to produce different expectations from citizens. Theoretical perspectives put forth in the *Federalist Papers*, outline the ways in which the American founders *intended* governmental institutions and citizens to interact.<sup>2</sup> While we know that many intentions of the founders and the political system they developed were not actually implemented in practice, the *Federalist Papers* provide a useful way for beginning to understand how specific design features of the U.S. Constitution might affect expectations about government performance, much like the design features of a private firm might affect employee or investor expectations about performance.

Regarding the executive branch of the federal government, *Publius* indicates in *Federalist #68* that the presidency should be elected not by the average citizen but by members of the electoral college, a body of citizens separate from, and not beholden to, the general electorate (Hamilton, 1788). Subsequent papers make the case for a vigorous executive that has the power to act unilaterally in some instances, particularly in matters dealing with national security. With regard to federal courts, *Publius* favored an even greater distance between citizens and the government, arguing that judges should be appointed by the president—who is not to be directly

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<sup>2</sup>The *Federalist Papers* were a series of 85 essays written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in 1787 and 1788. The essays originally appeared anonymously in New York newspapers under the pen name “Publius.” The purpose of the papers was to urge the citizens of New York to ratify the new U.S. Constitution. They are considered a primary important source for understanding the original intent of the Constitution (Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/r/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html>).

elected by citizens—and should hold office while demonstrating good behavior. Even within the legislative branch—the branch closest to the people—*Publius* argued for a clear distinction between the Senate and the House of Representatives: Senators were to be elected by state legislatures while House members were to be directly elected by the public. Across the four most visible federal institutions, then, citizens were originally asked to put their faith in the individuals occupying and institutions governing the presidency, the courts, and the Senate, and were given little recourse in the event that trust was violated. Only the members of the House of Representatives would be threatened in the case of a breach of trust under the original laws of the U.S. Constitution which allowed for direct election of representatives. While Constitutional amendments and interpretations of laws have altered the original blueprint offered by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, it is clear that the difference in the nature of governmental entities may generate differences in the expectations of citizens across governmental branches.

To illustrate, consider governmental entities such as legislatures, where expectations about obligations to the institution may be nonexistent given that citizens in many democratic nations are not required to help select legislators, let alone pay attention to their activities. Rather, trust in the institution may be shaped by the democratic expectation that the legislature will more or less act in accordance with the public's will. Here, trust may be developed as citizens observe individual legislators address the needs of the people and perform at their job over time. If trust in legislators deteriorates enough over time, citizens have the ability to vote against the legislators in question; thus, there is a fairly strong incentive for legislators to develop citizens' trust.

Democratic institutions such as judicial and executive branches may foster the development of trust differently than legislative branches given the relative autonomy of these entities. Trial courts—those with which citizens come into contact most often—may have the effect of developing relational trust between citizens and representatives of the court since citizens are likely to have some sort of contact with these courts at some point in their lives (Tyler, 2006). Appellate courts—which are oftentimes appointed positions far removed from citizens—may not have the same impact upon relational aspects of trust, but may instead be judged based on citizens' judgments about past performance and future expectations. And the nation's highest court, the U.S. Supreme Court, is the furthest removed from citizens. Given this distance, considerations of trust in the U.S. Supreme Court is perhaps most usefully conceptualized as perceptions of "legitimacy" rather than interpersonal trust (see e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, & Baird, 1998).

In the USA and other nations with a federal form of government, the relationship between citizens and government is even more complex. Federal forms of government, where multiple layers of government have the authority to carry out specific functions, require that citizens must attend to a variety of governmental actors. In the USA, for example, this means that citizens have a unique relationship with a federal legislature (House of Representatives and the Senate), a state legislature (in most cases an upper and lower state house), and a local legislature (such as a city council). This multilayer situation also exists with relation to the executive

(e.g., president, governor, and mayor) and the judicial branches (e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court, a state court, and a local district court). To even further complicate matters, trust is implicated in the multitude of bureaucratic agencies such as departments of motor vehicles, environmental quality agencies, and health and human services—typically part of the executive branch of government—that citizens tend to actually interact with on a day-to-day basis.

All told, citizens in nations with a federal form of government will develop a unique trust relationship with each of these governmental entities, some of which they will come into contact and many others that they will not. The variety of governmental institutions in federal republics such as the USA dictate that scholars must fully understand the nature and purpose of each institution if true evaluations of trust in such institutions are to be assessed and measured. Furthermore, scholars must critically examine whether specific models of trust that are relevant in one context are general and flexible enough to be applied in other contexts.

### ***Trust at Multiple Levels in Other Nongovernmental Group Contexts***

In many democratic societies, voluntary associations provide another common way for individuals and groups to operate in the public sphere. Voluntary associations—be they professional (e.g., trade associations), civil (e.g. religious organizations), or political (e.g., lobbying groups)—play an integral role in public life. The prevalence and importance of such groups in the USA was noted very early in American history by de Tocqueville who traveled extensively throughout the USA in the early 1830s. In his view, voluntary associations were an essential part of American life that helped extend democracy in important ways (de Tocqueville, 1835/2012). Today, while participation in voluntary associations has declined to a degree (Putnam, 2000), they still play an important role in promoting democratic ideals, providing support for individuals, and pressuring government to adopt certain policies.

In many pluralistic societies, voluntary associations are private in nature, but serve in quasi-public roles. In the USA, for example, voluntary associations such as the Sierra Club<sup>3</sup> are operated as private, nonprofit entities that enjoy preferred government status via the tax code. Such organizations operate as a typical private organization with a hierarchical leadership structure. Consequently, the trust relationship within nonprofit organizations is likely to mirror that of many of other private, for-profit entities, where there are typically employee–employer relationships. But the Sierra Club and other nonprofits are unique in that they typically have a donor or member network that is not employed by the organization but that provides support by way of financial and other resources. As noted by Olson (1965),

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<sup>3</sup>An environmental protection group dedicated to conserving and protecting wilderness areas, improving air and water quality, energy conservation, and protecting endangered species, <http://www.sierraclub.org/about>.



interest groups offer selective benefits to members to encourage them to stay active in the organization and to continue to offer support. The presence of donors and outside contributors to nonprofits introduces a novel trust relationship between individual donors and the organization as a collective. In general, organizations trust individual members to continue to donate resources, while individual members trust the organization to provide meaningful networking and recreational opportunities. The exchange of selective benefits for the promise of donations serves as a contractual aspect to the relationship.

In addition to serving as an expressive outlet for members, interest groups engage in lobbying activities to pressure government regulators to adopt policies that are beneficial to the environment, in the views of the organization. Again, individual members trust the organization to lobby governments and pursue policies that are consistent with the aims and goals of the organization and its members. In pressuring the government to take particular actions and by helping to develop public policy, the Sierra Club, for example, takes part in an advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988) of multiple lobbying groups that are interested in environmental issues including industry and trade groups, governmental actors, and the media. As such, the lobbying efforts implicate many aspects of trust that are studied in strategic management, particularly in interfirm cooperation (Schilke & Cook, 2015). Coalitions of interest groups pursuing the same policy goals must cooperate at the individual and organizational levels, and key individuals within co-aligned organizations must have some level of interpersonal trust in order to coordinate activities. Further, the broader organizations (that take the form of a collective of individuals) must have some level of trust in order to pursue common policy goals. The same is true of trade and lobbying groups that work closely with government. In order to develop policy, trade and lobbying organizations must also work together to meet goals and objectives. Again, this implicates various facets of interpersonal and interorganizational trust between for-profit organizations, nonprofit organizations, and various levels and branches of government.

## Discussion

Thus far, we have outlined the multilevel and contextual factors that impact the study of trust in various settings. While the examples provided here touch on only a few of the myriad settings and situations in which trust is an important factor in interpersonal and interorganizational relations, the examples illustrate the many considerations that researchers must make when taking a cross-contextual and multilevel view of trust.

Previous research has shown that the dynamics of interpersonal trust and interorganizational or group-level trust are related but distinct constructs (e.g., Barney & Hansen, 1994; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). Similarly, recent neuroscience research has demonstrated that the neural correlates of judgments about companies are somewhat different from those that underlie interpersonal

judgments about people (Plitt, Savjani, & Eagleman, 2015). Despite the fledgling literature about the potentially important distinctions between the nature of trust at these different levels of analysis, Currall and Inkpen (2002) found that many studies of trust poorly theorize about and account for level of analysis in their measurements. The published studies they reviewed often theorized about the nature of trust in intergroup or inter-institutional levels, but measured trust at interpersonal levels. Although this finding might be cause for concern, other research suggests that separating perceptions of an institution from the individuals in the institution may not be very easy to do or even desirable as they may overlap considerably (see e.g., Colquitt et al., 2013).

Let's consider a simple example of how a cross-level understanding of trust is important. If the different levels of trust are important to the study of trust, the pronouns or instructions used to measure trust may matter. If trustors are asked to rate their trust in an institution with unclear pronouns or instructions, they may consider the entity itself *or* they may consider the people that comprise the institution—thus, the resulting measurements might not be consistently conceptualized by the respondents with an associated increase in measurement error. As one particular demonstration, people might be asked to rate how “caring” an institution is, such as the Federal Reserve. It might make a difference if people consider how the institution balances shareholder earnings vs. low interest rates to help the average consumer (i.e., an institution-level performance indicator of “care”) compared to if the trustors instead considered how warm and caring vs. cold and uncaring they found the new head of the reserve, Janet Yellen (i.e., more of an interpersonal-level indicator of trust) in making their rating. If the pronouns used in the measurement items or if the instructions were clear about the level the respondent should rate (entity vs. person), the error associated with the measurement might decrease.

Additionally, the theoretical and empirical models used to measure trust must be carefully scrutinized before being used to conceptualize and measure trust across various settings. For instance, the benevolence–integrity–ability model of trust (Mayer et al., 1995) has been shown to have predictive ability in a variety of organizational settings (Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Bhattacharjee, 2002). The benevolence–integrity–ability model of trust may also have utility in developing models of trust in governmental institutions. However, before applying such a model of trust to the study of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, researchers should consider the theoretical rationale for the organization of the Supreme Court, the resulting organizational features of the court, as well as the public's understanding of the court that results from political socialization. Such a consideration may reveal that the benevolence–integrity–ability model may not be appropriate, or that specific factors of the model—such as the integrity of the Supreme Court—are relevant to the study of the Supreme Court, while the others are not.

Given these discrepant empirical findings in the literature about the similarities vs. differences in trust at these different levels (interpersonal, intergroup, inter-institutional) reviewed above, combined with the *theoretically* meaningful differences, we end this chapter with a call for further attention by trust researchers about whether and how the level of the trusting relationship affects the nature and

measurement of trust. Ultimately, such attention may inform whether a singular model of trust can be applied at different levels and across public and private contexts, or whether the interactions between levels and situations yield such varied contexts, that a single model of trust is not feasible or appropriate for all settings.

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# On the Cross-Domain Scholarship of Trust in the Institutional Context

**Joseph A. Hamm, JooHo Lee, Rick Trinkner, Twila Wingrove, Steve Leben, and Christina Breuer**

From government to health care and policing to the judiciary, the message of trust scholarship is clear: trust matters. Trust is consistently argued to play a critical role in facilitating relationships from the interpersonal level to the societal (e.g., Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Murayama, Fujiwara, & Kawachi, 2012). In the institutional context specifically, trust is thought to be important because of its role in facilitating the effective function of the institution. In this context, targets<sup>1</sup> that engender trust are typically more able to generate the cooperation and compliance necessary to efficiently move toward their goals while those that are less able to

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<sup>1</sup>This chapter spends relatively little time discussing the differences in trust between when it is directed to an institution and when it is directed to an individual within that institution. The reason for this is that it is an issue that has received relatively little attention in the literatures that we review here. For a more thorough treatment of the potential implications of the kind of target, see Campos-Castillo et al. (2016) as well as Herian and Neal (2016).

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build trust tend to struggle more—extreme examples of which include the civil unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, which many have suggested was predicated on a lack of trust in police (Holder, 2014) and the hard fought but only incremental successes in the early efforts to contain the Ebola outbreak in West Africa where a distrust in medicine played a major role in the virus' initial rapid spread (Bourgault & Bruce, 2014).

This recognition has provided the impetus for a wide variety of institutional efforts to increase trust. In the USA, these efforts include high profile efforts like President Obama's Open Government Initiative (Executive Office of the President & Office of Management and Budget, 2009), the Department of Justice's National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice (Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, 2014), and the National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System (National Center for State Courts, 2000). Efforts like these typically seek to draw from the wide body of scholarship addressing trust in order to leverage the best available science for understanding and motivating trust. A great deal of this trust-relevant work has been conducted within the domains of government and major business organizations but trust has also been investigated in non-profits, local businesses, educational institutions, and so on. Unfortunately, however, this scholarship has typically been conducted in silos, where each domain is studied in relative isolation from the others. This situation lead to Barber's (1983) oft-cited critique of this literature as a "conceptual morass of constructs and definitions" (p. 1).

In the decades since this criticism, a great deal of scholarship has sought to develop a cross-boundary social science of trust and considerable progress has been made. One of the most influential of these efforts investigated the cross-disciplinary understandings of trust in the organizational domain and found that "despite the common concern regarding our different disciplinary lenses (i.e., 'blindness'), we observe considerable overlap and synthesis in contemporary scholarship on trust" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 402). Indeed, although trust is often not explicitly defined, even a cursory glance across these research silos often reveals noteworthy similarity in understandings of the construct. Across domains, trust is often conceptualized as a psychological state that exists within the trustor as directed toward a specific target. This psychological state often facilitates the trustor in working with (or at least not *against*) the target and is argued to be importantly distinct from its antecedents (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). Some have taken this a step further to argue that this psychological state specifically is a willingness to accept vulnerability in dealings with the target (e.g., Hetherington, 2005; Mayer et al., 1995; Möllering, 2013; Rousseau et al., 1998; Warren, 1999).

Despite this increasing consistency, however, trust is fundamentally tied to the context in which it occurs (Mayer et al., 1995). Even trust in the same individual may mean very different things when the context is changed from, for example, lending money to childcare (Frederiksen, 2013). Thus there is potential for a great deal of variability across the many domains in which trust has been investigated. This is problematic because it means that without specific investigation, it will be

unclear how much the understandings of trust overlap across domains and the extent to which they are importantly distinct. For example, although vulnerability is considered a central component of trust in an increasing number of domains, it is all but absent in some like the literature regarding the state courts which instead typically focuses on trust as synonymous with concepts like approval and satisfaction. Exploring these kinds of differences is critical because it has the potential to provide guidance for institutions seeking to leverage trust in achieving their goals. If trust in various domains is importantly different, it would be critical for an institution in one domain attend to these differences when applying research from another. If, on the other hand, trust is generally the same across domains, institutions are much more able to freely apply research from across the scholarship of trust.

The following chapter reviews trust in four domains where it is thought to be critical and in which considerable institutional effort is being expended in the name of building trust; namely, public administration, policing, state courts, and medicine. The domains are addressed in separate sections which review the mainstream understandings and, when available, definitions of trust; the major antecedents of trust<sup>2</sup>; and its major outcomes as they are currently understood in each domain. The chapter then turns to a discussion which integrates these ostensibly disparate literatures and highlights both important similarities and differences across domains. In toto, the chapter suggests that although there are likely important differences in the critical antecedents of trust across domains, trust itself seems to be fairly consistent.

## Trust in Public Administration

The first domain reviewed here is that of public administration. Although somewhat amorphously bounded, public administration broadly refers to the administration of government in general. Some researchers have followed this understanding by evaluating perceptions of “government,” but many researchers focus on more specific governmental entities. For example, some researchers focus on legislative entities like local councils in England (Downe, Cowell, Chen, & Morgan, 2013) and Southern Africa (Cho, 2012) and law makers and parliament in the Netherlands (Bovens & Wille, 2008) and other European countries (Van der Meer, 2010). Other groups of scholars have primarily examined executive bodies (e.g., Morgeson, VanAmburg, & Mithas, 2011; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011) at federal (Robinson, Liu, Stoutenborough, & Vedlitz, 2013), state (Brewer & Hayllar, 2005), and local levels (Kim & Lee, 2012). Thus in this domain, the target of trust varies in that it can be an aggregated or individual legislative, executive, or general governmental agency.

Trustors in this domain are usually the general public but some research investigates specific groups of people who are served by a particular agency or who have participated in a particular public administration process. Additionally, some studies

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<sup>2</sup>Note that although the majority of this scholarship is conducted cross-sectionally (thus precluding tests of causal effects), the general expectation is that these constructs drive trust.

measure trust from administrators' perspectives, such as government officials' perceptions of citizens (e.g., Wang & Wan Wart, 2007; Yang, 2006). Across targets and trustors, trust has been a core concern in public administration, and public sector leaders have been especially concerned about its decline over the last several decades (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2009).

### *Conceptualizations*

As mentioned earlier, the mainstream understandings of trust vary somewhat across disciplines and domains and public administration is no exception. Although much of this scholarship does not provide formal definitions of trust, there are a few in this domain. Key words in these definitions include confidence, faith, willingness, belief, evaluation, expectation, and a psychological state. Some researchers treat these constructs as roughly interchangeable but others identify distinctions among them. For example, La Porte and Metlay (1996) distinguish confidence from trust by arguing that trust is "the belief that those with whom you interact will take your interests into account, even in situations where you are not in a position to recognize, evaluate, and/or thwart a potentially negative course of action by 'those trusted'" (p. 342). Contrastingly, they argue that confidence exists when government acts to gain or build others' trust in it (see also Morgeson & Petrescu, 2011). Other scholars conflate these constructs by arguing, for example, that trust is the confidence and faith that public administration is performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public (Vigoda-Gadot, 2007; Wang & Wan Wart, 2007), specifically that the intentions and actions of public administration are ethical, fair, and competent. Some scholars have attempted to broadly capture citizen trust in government using these normative expectations that public administration is "doing the right things" (Wang & Wan Wart, 2007) and "operates in the best interests of society and its constituents" (Kim, 2010; Kim & Lee, 2012). Yet another stream of trust research in public administration incorporates the notion of vulnerability by defining trust as a psychological state that is willing to take a risk by accepting vulnerability (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen, Porumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011; Yang, 2006), even in situations where the trustor cannot recognize, monitor, or control the target, and/or thwart a potentially negative course of action by the target (Kim, 2005; La Porte & Metlay, 1996).

### *Antecedents*

Scholars have documented diverse sources of trust in public administration which can be classified into five broad categories: performance, institutional design, and factors of the public officials, environment, and trustor. Probably the best studied of these categories is the linkage between performance and trust where performance is



broadly considered the target's previous output as assessed by the trustor, based primarily on his or her perception. A brief review of recent scholarly articles suggests that organizational effectiveness (Kim, 2010; Mizrahi, Vigoda-Gadot, & Van Ryzin, 2010), satisfactory public services/service quality (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005), policy consistence (Brewer & Hayllar, 2005), transparency/corruption (Gronlund & Setala, 2012; Van der Meer, 2010), responsiveness and accessibility (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006), and economic development/growth/stability (Bovens & Wille, 2008) are some of the important specific evaluations within this broader performance category. In general, trust in public administration is expected to increase when public administration performs better, but some scholars report mixed findings. Some work has suggested that these increases may be somewhat specific as suggested by Tolbert and Mossberger (2006) who found that performance (operationalized in their study as responsiveness) positively affects citizen's trust in local government only, not state and federal government.

In addition to the direct link between performance and trust, some scholars have attempted to investigate the moderators and mediators of the effect. For example, Yang and Holzer (2006) suggest that mixed findings in the literature regarding the performance-trust linkage may stem from the inappropriate measure of performance. They therefore offered performance measurement as a moderator in the relationship between performance and trust such that the effect depends on the extent to which performance is appropriately measured. Regarding potential mediators, Morgeson et al. (2011) provide evidence that satisfaction with public services mediates the effects of performance on trust in federal agencies. However, Grimmelikhuijsen (2012) found that even if citizens gain knowledge about negative performance outcomes through transparent government Web sites, the knowledge had no negative effect on their trust in government. This may be because while negative performance might reduce satisfaction, transparency might increase satisfaction. In a similar vein, Kim and Lee (2012) found that citizens' satisfaction with online participation programs provided by a city government is positively related to their perception of citizen participation values (e.g., education and empowerment), assessment of transparency, and trust in government.

Although performance is certainly the primary antecedent in the public administration literature, other factors have also been the subject of noteworthy research. Regarding institutional design, some researchers have found that trust in government tends to be promoted under certain institutional designs such as those that include citizen participation mechanisms (Mizrahi, Vigoda-Gadot, & Cohen, 2009), a parliamentary structure (Van der Meer, 2010), and electoral systems (Cho, 2012; Van der Meer, 2010). In terms of public official factors, some studies suggest that their ethical behavior/integrity, competence, and benevolence positively shape the public's trust in government (Downe et al., 2013; Green, 2012; Kim, 2005). Other studies have found that environmental factors such as political stability, generalized social trust, and trust in government generally (Gronlund & Setala, 2012) play important roles in affecting trust in public administration. Lastly, trustor factors have been examined to better understand their role in trust in government (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005). In addition to demographics (e.g., age, education,

occupation), a recent study (Robinson et al., 2013) found that individuals' religiosity, party affiliation, and political ideology shape their belief that the Department of Homeland Security effectively deals with national security problems.

## *Consequences*

Scholars have also attended to the consequences of trust in public administration for both citizens and government. From the citizens' perspective, most of this work examines the relationship between trust and cooperation and compliance with public administration (Im, Cho, Porumbescu, & Park, 2014). For example, Montgomery, Jordens, and Little (2008) argue that in extreme situations like natural disasters and terrorist attacks, citizens' perceptions of the competence, integrity, and benevolence of public administration agencies somewhat reduce the perceived vulnerability to harm from the situation and thus lead to increased cooperation. Yang (2006) also found that public officials' trust in citizens facilitates citizen participation, and Vigoda-Gadot (2007) found that trust in public administration had a positive effect on political efficacy but found no effect on political participation. Cooper, Knotts, and Brennan (2008) found that a planning agency in a city government enjoyed bureaucratic discretion from support for zoning when the public had greater trust in city government. Welch, Hinnant, and Moon (2005) examined the mutual relationship between citizens' satisfaction with online government services and their trust in government and found that trust was positively associated with satisfaction with services. In addition to the direct linkage between trust in government and satisfaction, some research has found that trust in municipalities serves as a moderator, affecting the relationship between citizens' perception of the corruption and transparency of municipalities and their satisfaction with municipality services—specifically by reducing the relationship between corruption and satisfaction, while increasing the relationship between transparency and satisfaction (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011).

## **Trust in the Police**

A second domain in which trust is argued to be important is that of policing. The term "police" can refer to a wide range of different institutions, from the local, city, or county level to the state, federal (e.g., FBI), and even international level (e.g., Interpol). These institutions have been investigated across these levels (see Tyler, 2006a; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Jackson, Bradford, Stanko, & Hohl, 2013 for review) in both the USA and other locations like Africa (Tankebe, 2008), Australia (Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013), Asia (Wu & Sun, 2009), Central America (Malone, 2010), Europe (Jackson et al., 2013), and South America (Haas & Fleitas, 2014). Across institutions, citizens invariably give up some of their freedoms in any

society that has a formal police force and, generally speaking, citizens are willing to give up these freedoms as long as they trust the police. When trust in policing is eroded, however, people often resist the imposition of police authority and may refuse to cooperate or even comply with the police. Examples of this can be seen in a number of recent high profile cases, such as those involving Erik Garner, Michael Brown, and Kelly Thomas. In each instance, the erosion of public trust made the police and citizenry less able to work together to resolve conflict. In this regard, trust is a vital commodity for policing.

### *Conceptualizations*

As in other domains, there has historically been a great deal of variety in trust conceptualizations in the policing literature. More recently, however, the field has begun to coalesce around two related, yet distinct, conceptualizations. The first, and most common, is to examine trust within the framework of legitimacy (Tyler, 2006a). Legitimacy refers to whether an authority is viewed as appropriate and rightfully in a position of power (Tyler, 2006b). Within this framework, trust is viewed as a component of legitimacy in so far that it is a practical expression of whether individuals judge the police to be legitimate (Jackson et al., 2013). When people trust the police, they are said to be communicating their belief that the police are appropriate authorities and, by extension, should be deferred to and obeyed (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Thus the focus here is on using trust to understand legitimacy, rather than on trust itself.

The other conceptualization is suggested by researchers who have recognized a need to separate trust from legitimacy (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Jackson et al., 2013) and have started the challenging task of delineating these constructs theoretically (Tyler & Jackson, 2013). Here, a distinction is made between legitimacy and trust judgments in terms of both target and content. Legitimacy is focused on the role of policing in society and concerned with judgments about whether the institution of policing has the moral or normative authority to wield power over the population. Trust, on the other hand, is focused on actual police officers and concerned with judgments about their competence and intentions when interacting with the public. From this perspective, when individuals trust the police, they believe that officers are effective and efficient in performing their duties, understand and recognize the needs of the community, and behave with benevolent and caring intentions. Thus, while legitimacy taps into the role of policing within society, trust reflects people's judgments about what individual officers will do when they are in that role. As Hawdon (2008, p. 186) put it: "The role is legitimate... the individual is trusted." Although this direction seems promising, it is important to recognize that this distinction should not be made too sharply (see Tyler & Jackson, 2013). Legitimacy and trust are likely inextricably linked and almost invariably influence each other, such that judgments of trust in specific officers will be largely influenced by judgments about the legitimacy of policing and vice versa.

## *Antecedents*

Regardless of how it is conceptualized, there is remarkable consistency concerning what fosters trust in the police. Traditional views have asserted that people's trust in the police is dependent on perceptions of their performance (i.e., whether they are seen as effective crime fighters; Herbert, 2001; Kelling & Coles, 1998). This makes intuitive sense. If trust reflects a judgment about the ability of police to do their job, then it is likely that such judgments would be rooted in whether the police are effective at reducing crime. If people believe crime is being controlled in their neighborhood, they are likely to trust the police; if they think crime is rampant, they are unlikely to trust the police. Notably, however, this proposition has received only limited support. When effectiveness is predictive of trust in the police, it is usually a weak relationship at best (Dammert & Malone, 2003; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Tyler, 2005; Walklate, 1998).

Instead, trust in the police is typically driven by how police officers behave when interacting with the community. Of central importance is whether the public believes the police are acting fairly, or procedurally just, in their treatment of citizens and their decision making (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b, 2011). When police officers treat the public with dignity and respect, show concern for their needs, behave in honest and ethical ways, give them an opportunity to voice their concerns, and make unbiased neutral decisions, the public is much more likely to trust them and there is now an extensive literature showing that trust in the police is strongly influenced by judgments of procedural justice (e.g., Tyler & Huo, 2002). In addition, when directly compared, procedural justice is consistently a better predictor of public trust than perceptions of performance (Jackson et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2009). For example, in a study of Chicago residents, Tyler (2006a) showed that public trust in the police was only weakly related to perceptions of effectiveness. Instead, the public's trust was largely based on whether the police gave them voice, made unbiased decisions, showed concern for their welfare, and treated them with respect.

Trust in the police is also influenced by neighborhood-level factors. It has long been known that attitudes toward the law, including trust, cluster around neighborhoods, with some communities having mostly positive views and other communities having mostly negative views (Shaw & McKay, 1942). In large part, this clustering is driven by the structural and social characteristics of the neighborhoods themselves. In terms of the former, people often distrust the police and their intentions when they live in areas of concentrated disadvantage that are characterized by institutional neglect and economic, social, and political isolation from larger society (Anderson, 1999; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011) and this distrust is exacerbated by the use of aggressive police tactics in these areas (Tyler & Huo, 2002). However, the social characteristics of the neighborhood are just as, if not more, important for predicting trust in the police (Jackson et al., 2013). Of special importance is the

community's sense of shared values defining appropriate behavior, the willingness to uphold those values, and their enforcement among neighborhood residents. This collective efficacy shapes the ability of the community to exert informal social control (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). When neighborhoods are characterized by high levels of collective efficacy, they are more likely to trust the police (Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998). As Jackson et al. (2013) argued in their extensive analysis of policing in London, individuals often base their evaluations of formal social control mechanisms (e.g., the police) on their perception of the effectiveness of informal social control mechanisms in stopping crime.

## *Consequences*

The most important role of the police is to provide a means of formal social control in society while helping to cultivate an informal means of social control within its communities. Trust is vitally important to this task. Traditionally, the role of trust in producing compliance with the police has received the most attention. In large part, this is because the institution of policing in general has emphasized a command and control professional model whereby the primary goal is to develop policies and practices that motivate obedience within the population (Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Here, trust is viewed as a cornerstone of motivating compliance such that when individuals trust the police they feel it is their duty to defer to them. Thus, the public is more likely to obey the law and accept legal decisions when they trust the police (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b) and the considerable body of scholarship supporting the positive link between trust in the police and compliance is indeed compelling (for reviews see Jackson et al., 2013; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

More recently policing has moved away from strict command and control models with the growing recognition that crime cannot be controlled without the help of the community (Skogan et al., 1999). As a result, police have become interested in motivating voluntary cooperation within the public. Effective crime control depends on police and citizens working together in order to produce cooperative formal and informal mechanisms of social control within the community (Tyler & Jackson, 2014) and trust plays a vital role in such police–citizen joint efforts (Tyler, 2011). When people trust the police, they believe the police are concerned with their welfare and will act in ways that benefit the community. As a result, people are more willing to cooperate, for example, by reporting crime and criminals to the police, providing information to help police find suspects, joining neighborhood watch groups, and participating in legal proceedings (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Thus cooperation often requires citizens to voluntarily and proactively work with police officers and this may implicate a sense of vulnerability because, in many cases, cooperation with the police requires that an issue be taken out of the hands of the individual and subjected to the discretion of law enforcement (Tyler & Jackson, 2013).

## Trust in the State Courts

A third important domain of trust scholarship is that of the American state courts. Lacking control over the “purse or the sword” (Hamilton, 1788), the American courts are unusually weak governmental institutions in that they must depend on the other branches of government for funding and enforcement, but they also rely heavily on the positive perceptions of the public (Mondak & Smithey, 1997). As Justice O’Connor (1999) remarked, “Sometimes in the pressure of doing what judges have to do and running a tight ship in the courtroom and deciding tough issues, we might forget that... it is, after all, the public we serve and that we do care how the courts are perceived generally” (p. 10). Thus, these positive perceptions are important as performance indicators but some have taken this even further, arguing that trust is essential to the effective functioning of these and all democratic institutions (Dougherty, Lindquist, & Bradbury, 2006; Leben, 1999).

A considerable body of literature has sought to address the issue of public trust in the American judiciary and, to date, the majority of this scholarship has focused on the United States Supreme Court (USSC; Rottman & Tomkins, 1999). Despite the importance of this literature, however, it addresses only the “tip of a very large judicial iceberg” (Wenzel, Bowler, & Lanoue, 2003, p. 191) as most of the work done by the American judiciary is done in the state courts. Research regarding the USSC serves as an excellent starting point for understanding trust in the state courts, but scholars have frequently suggested that there are important differences (Olson & Huth, 1998; Wenzel et al., 2003). Chief among these distinctions is the relative knowledge and experience that the average American has with the institutions. Although the USSC is often prominently featured in the news, Americans typically have very limited knowledge about the inner workings of this court (see Kritzer, 2001). Admittedly, factual knowledge about the state courts may not be much higher, but the public is certainly far more likely to have direct contact with them. In a 2009 survey, the National Center for State Courts found that 55 % of the nationally representative sample had some kind of personal contact with the courts as a defendant, witness, victim, juror, etc. (National Center for State Courts, 2009). The direct effect of this increased experience is somewhat debated. In general, research seems to suggest that the experience typically has a neutral or somewhat positive effect on perceptions of the state courts (Rottman, 1998) but this stands in direct contravention of the arguments of some researchers who suggest that it is precisely because of the Supreme Court’s relative separation from the American public that it typically enjoys more positive perceptions than the state courts (Benesh & Howell, 2001).

### *Conceptualizations*

As in other domains, formal definitions of trust are scarce in scholarship in the state courts context. As a rare example, Dougherty and colleagues present a definition that they borrow from the broader political context of trust which suggests that trust

is a “fiduciary concept involving whether government has fulfilled its responsibility to the people to operate according to their normative expectations” (2006, p. 178). The authors go on to present analyses that they argue provide evidence that the construct is importantly distinguishable from confidence which is more concerned with the future performance of the courts. Distinctions like these, however, are in the minority in this scholarship (Hamm et al., 2013). Instead, the majority of the relevant literature treats trust as roughly synonymous with a number of other constructs including confidence, support, satisfaction, approval, and legitimacy. Trust in the state courts then mirrors trust in a number of other contexts in that it is somewhat imprecisely defined, but tends to focus generally on positive evaluations of the target.

The measurement of trust in this domain typically reflects this conceptual imprecision but some clarity can be achieved by evaluating the measures through the lens of a classic distinction in trust in government research. Specifically, Easton (1975) argues that specific trust, as an evaluation of “what political authorities do and how they do it” (p. 437), is importantly different from diffuse trust which is argued to be a more global, potentially affective, reaction to government (Wenzel et al., 2003). Trust measures in this literature tend to follow this distinction with some using more diffuse measures like “What is your level of confidence in the courts in your community?” (Benesh, 2006, p. 701) while others focus more on specific considerations like “most judges in my community treat people with respect” (Hamm et al., 2013, p. 17; but see Cann & Yates, 2007, who refer to these more specific considerations as diffuse support). Importantly, although some state courts research has sought to directly compare diffuse and specific measures (e.g., Hamm et al., 2011; Wenzel et al., 2003), the implications of focusing on one conceptualization of trust over the other remain as unclear in this context as they are in the broader governmental scholarship (see Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974).

## *Antecedents*

Considerable research has investigated the antecedents of trust in the state courts. Although also complicated by the conceptual confusion that plagues the understanding of trust itself, it is clear that trust in the state courts is importantly influenced by, at least, issues of fairness, court performance, and factors of the trustor. Fairness is arguably the most important of these antecedents as it often has the strongest effect in models predicting trust in state courts (e.g., Benesh & Howell, 2001; Olson & Huth, 1998). The overarching rationale for the importance of fairness lies in the courts’ roles as impartial decision makers but the specific conceptualizations of the construct of fairness vary significantly throughout the literature. Probably the best studied conceptualization of fairness is procedural fairness (also procedural justice or process fairness) which is the notion that the procedures used by the decision maker are fair (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 2006c). As in the policing literature, research with the state courts routinely finds positive independent effects for these

considerations on trust (e.g., Benesh, 2006; Benesh & Howell, 2001; Olson & Huth, 1998). Another fairness-related consideration that has been addressed in the state courts literature regards judicial selection. The general expectation is that election campaigns, and especially partisan campaigns, undermine the perception of judges as impartial decision makers and suggest that their biases will play an inappropriate role in judicial decision making (Peterson, Hare, & Wrighton, 2012). While some research does suggest a relationship between judicial selection and trust (e.g., Benesh, 2006; Cann & Yates, 2007; Gibson, 2012), there is an almost equally convincing body of scholarship that fails to find such an effect (e.g., Kelleher & Wolak, 2007; Peterson et al., 2012) leaving the question of the effect of judicial selection on trust open.

The second collection of antecedents of trust in state courts regards the performance of the courts themselves. As in the public administration and policing literatures, the general expectation is that institutions of government are trusted less when their performance is poorer (Citrin, 1974). Indeed, research has consistently identified important effects for relevant concerns like how well cases are managed (e.g., Dougherty et al., 2006) and timeliness (e.g., Benesh & Howell, 2001) such that courts are more trusted when they perform better.

The final important group of antecedents of trust in state courts regards factors of the trustor. Demographic variables such as age (Benesh & Howell, 2001; Kelleher & Wolak, 2007) and race (Rottman & Tomkins, 1999) have been routinely shown to influence trust such that older, white individuals tend to have higher trust. Attitudinal variables like trust in others generally (Hamm et al., 2011) and trust in other governmental institutions (Hamm et al., 2013; Olson & Huth, 1998; Wenzel et al., 2003) also tend to positively predict trust in state courts.

## *Consequences*

The major outcomes of trust in the state courts track well with its two important relationships: The institution's relationship to those with whom it has direct contact and its relationship with the public generally. As mentioned above, a noteworthy percentage of Americans have had some kind of direct contact with the courts as defendants, victims, or jurors. In these situations trust has frequently been shown to play a critical role in acquiescence behaviors like compliance with court decisions and even showing up at all (Bornstein, Tomkins, Neeley, Herian, & Hamm, 2012; Tyler, 1997). Despite the considerable number of Americans who do have direct contact with the courts however, approximately 45 % of Americans do not (National Center for State Courts, 2009). Nonetheless, the courts, as institutions of a democratic government, are not unaffected by the perceptions of the public in general (Dougherty et al., 2006). This concern is often cited in discussions about the USSC but the state courts are often just as visible as many of their cases are at least as popularized as those of the Supreme Court (e.g., O. J. Simpson and Darren Wilson; Rottman & Tomkins, 1999). Therefore, the second critical relationship for



the American state courts is their relationship to the public generally. This relationship is arguably as important as the first because, like all institutions of democratic government, the ability of the courts to function effectively is often directly tied to the perceptions of the public (Warren, 1999). In these relationships, the primary outcome of trust is usually the support the courts are able to elicit (Kelleher & Wolak, 2007).

## **Trust in Medicine**

Unlike the other three domains reviewed here, medicine is not primarily governmental. As such, one might expect that theoretical conceptualizations and empirical research might reveal different understandings of the nature and role of trust in this context. However, as will become clear, many of the same themes emerge. One observation, however, does clearly distinguish trust research in this domain from the research previously described in this chapter and that is that research on trust in medicine is considerably less developed. Indeed, it is only recently that this research has begun moving toward theoretical development. Instead, the vast majority of medical trust researchers have focused their efforts on creating a body of knowledge about the causes, consequences, and definitions of physician trust, rather than trust in medicine more generally. Of what research there is on trust in medicine as an institution, most researchers in this area have aimed to document levels of trust (or mistrust) in different aspects of the medical establishment. This is an important endeavor to be sure, but this kind of research does not do much to move the field forward theoretically.

### *Conceptualizations*

Few researchers in this domain report a conceptual definition of trust in their reports. Instead, the vast majority of researchers adopt single item measures without offering a formal definition of trust (e.g., “I trust hospitals”; Boulware, Cooper, Ratner, LaVeist, & Powe, 2003, p. 359; see also Jovell et al., 2007; Schlesinger, 2002). When explicit definitions are used in this domain, the most predominantly used one is that proposed by Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712); “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Hall, Camacho, Dugan, & Balkrishnan, 2002; Zheng, Hall, Dugan, Kidd, & Levine, 2002).

Qualitative researchers have also somewhat contributed to the development of understandings of trust in this domain by allowing participant responses to drive the conceptualization (e.g., Goold & Klipp, 2002; Hillman et al., 2013; Mechanic & Meyer, 2000; Thorburn, Kue, Keon, & Lo, 2012). One of the major themes that

arise in these studies is the role of vulnerability. Almost by definition, interactions with the health care system happen when a person is ill, so vulnerability is often an integral component of trust in this context. Individuals subject themselves to the expertise of their health care providers, literally allowing invasions of their body with the expectation of improved well-being. Consistent with this suggestion, Hall, Dugan, Zheng, and Mishra's (2001) theoretical work referred to vulnerability and trust as "inseparable" and other scholars have echoed the important place of vulnerability in trust (Brown & Calnan, 2012; Goold, Fessler, & Moyer, 2006). This emphasis on vulnerability is also underlined by researchers who conceptualize trust in the medical institution in terms of managing risk and uncertainty (e.g., Brown & Calnan, 2012; Hillman et al., 2013).

Instead of developing explicit conceptualizations of trust, by and large, most theoretical developments in the medical domain have been aimed at identifying "components" of trust<sup>3</sup> and these components are largely discussed as inherent to the definition of trust in this context. For example, Hall et al. (2001, 2002) propose that trust consists of separate components including fidelity, beneficence, competence, honesty, and confidentiality (Balkrishnan, Dugan, Camacho, & Hall, 2003). In addition to these components, Goold et al. (2006) proposed that trust also consists of fairness, reliability, and vulnerability. Finally, Taylor-Gooby (2006) emphasized an affective component of trust and that has been largely ignored in the current research.

## *Antecedents*

As described above, there is some dissonance between trust research in other domains and trust research in medicine, where certain factors that have been typically been identified as definitional in the medicine research (e.g., competence) are largely described as predictive in the other domains. Despite this difference, there is still considerable overlap across these literatures. Much like, but to a greater degree than the other domains, the relationship between factors of the individual (i.e., trustor) and trust in medicine has been the subject of considerable work. These characteristics include demographics, health indicators, and access to health care. As in other domains, some patterns emerge, but few have been replicated consistently (Hall et al., 2001). In reality, the medical context lacks a deep enough body of research to truly conclude strong connections. That being said, the most consistent pattern that has been found regards race such that Black respondents consistently report less trust in medicine than White respondents (Boulware et al., 2003; LaVeist, Nickerson, & Bowie, 2000). Interestingly, Pescosolido, Tuch, and Martin (2001)

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<sup>3</sup>It is worth noting that while these researchers propose multiple components of trust, their empirical work rarely finds support for a multiple-factor construct. For example, Hall et al. (2002) found that a single-factor structure emerged in their data. Goold et al. (2006) found a two-factor structure, with all the components except vulnerability loading onto the first factor.

found that Black participants endorsed fewer positive general attitudes toward physicians than White participants, but that both groups endorsed negative attitudes equivalently. It should be noted, however, that not all research has supported the connection between race and trust in this context (e.g., Goold et al., 2006).

A few other trustor factors have also been found to be correlated with trust. For example, some researchers have found that older people indicate less trust in medicine (Balkrishnan et al., 2003; LaVeist et al., 2000; but see Pescosolido et al., 2001, who found the opposite pattern). Similarly, income has been found to be negatively correlated with trust in medicine (Pescosolido et al., 2001; but see Balkrishnan et al., 2003, who found no relationship). Finally, individuals with less access to health care or poor health seem to have less trust in the system (Goold et al., 2006; Pescosolido et al., 2001).

While additional research connecting participant characteristics and attitudes to trust is certainly needed, the field might benefit even more from shifting the focus to institutional antecedents. As the discussion of earlier domains suggests, evaluating institutional practices that enhance trust has been especially beneficial and some researchers in the medical context have begun to move in this direction (e.g., Rhodes & Strain, 2000). For example, Buchanan (2000) draws on the legitimacy literature from other contexts (e.g., Tyler, 2006b) and argues that managed care organizations must earn “merit trust” by adopting policies that promote procedural justice, allow for and respond to criticism from physicians, and recognize physicians’ unique commitment to patient well-being. Theoretically, employing these practices would facilitate trust building at a variety of levels, increasing physicians’ trust in managed care, as well as patients’ trust in their physicians, their managed care organizations, and medicine more generally.

## *Consequences*

The consequences of trust in medicine have been even less studied. By and large, the rhetoric of the trust literature suggests that higher trust in medicine should lead to greater compliance with medical directives, including consent to procedures and taking medications as prescribed (e.g., Boulware et al., 2003; Brown & Calnan, 2012; Buchanan, 2000; Hall et al., 2001, 2002). While there are a number of empirical studies testing the relationship between trust in doctors and compliance, there are very few studies testing this relationship for trust in medicine (but see Chakraborty, 2013; Thorburn et al., 2012). Moving beyond compliance, there is some evidence of other related positive outcomes of trust in medicine and negative outcomes of mistrust. For example, LaVeist et al. (2000) found that mistrust in medicine was negatively correlated with health care satisfaction, even after controlling for demographic variables (see also Balkrishnan et al., 2003). Similarly, researchers have found that trust in insurers was correlated with greater provider stability in the form of a lower desire to change carriers and fewer reported disputes

(Goold et al., 2006; Zheng et al., 2001). Finally, Calnan, Montaner, and Horne (2005) found support for their postulation that trust in care providers generalizes to support for new health care technologies.

## Discussion

The preceding sections outline the existing literature regarding trust in public administration, police, state courts, and medicine. As outlined in Table 1, the chapter focused specifically on the mainstream conceptualizations, antecedents, and consequences of trust in each domain.

### *Conceptualizations*

Across domains, existing understandings of trust tend to center around two major themes, specifically, evaluations of the future (e.g., confidence, faith, expectation) and evaluations of the target (e.g., fiduciary interest, competence, reliability). Although not necessarily discussed in this way in the various literatures, when considered in light of the definition proposed in the introduction—that trust is a willingness to accept vulnerability in dealings with another—these themes make considerable sense. If trust is an acceptance of vulnerability in dealing with another, the concerns most relevant to that acceptance should be expectations about the future and the characteristics of the person/institution that are most likely to influence the outcomes of the interactions. Importantly, conceptualizing trust as a willingness to accept vulnerability does suggest a noteworthy criticism of the existing conceptualizations of trust in these and many other domains; specifically, that they often fail to distinguish trust from its antecedents. Many of the key words in Table 1 are constructs that, although often included in conceptualizations of trust, may, in fact, be better considered antecedents, or even outcomes, of trust. Indeed, the two themes of conceptualizations identified above (evaluations of the future and the target) both likely better explain what leads to trust than what trust itself is. Even in a colloquial sense, trust itself is not an evaluation of the other or the future but instead is something that arises from those evaluations.

In the two domains reviewed here that have directly addressed at least the possibility of the centrality of vulnerability (public administration and medicine) the major issues seem to regard the institution's role in protecting the trustor's welfare either by engaging in programming that is beneficial to the trustor or through the institution's direct effect on the trustor's health. The literatures regarding the police and state courts, however, have been less explicit about the role of vulnerability (and even less so in the domain of the state courts than the police), but it remains an important latent theme nonetheless. In terms of police, trust is a major component of legitimate police authority. This "right to rule" is only important so far as it

**Table 1** Summary of conceptualizations, antecedents, and consequences of trust across domains

Domain	Conceptualization key words	Important antecedents	Major consequences
Public administration	Confidence, faith, evaluation, expectation, interests, vulnerability, fiduciary interest	Performance <sup>a</sup> , institutional design, public official factors, environmental factors, trustor factors	Cooperation, compliance, satisfaction
Police	Legitimacy, interpersonal trust, confidence, effectiveness, efficiency, motivations, character	Effectiveness, procedural justice <sup>a</sup> , neighborhood level factors	Compliance, cooperation
State Courts	Fiduciary interest, responsibilities, confidence, support, approval, legitimacy, satisfaction	Fairness <sup>a</sup> , performance, trustor factors	Cooperation, compliance
Medicine	Confidence, vulnerability, fidelity, competence, honesty, confidentiality	Trustor factors <sup>a</sup> , merit trust	Compliance, satisfaction, support for new technology

<sup>a</sup>Indicates the major antecedent in the literature

carries some level vulnerability; if there is no vulnerability, it is largely inconsequential. As mentioned above, when people acknowledge the right of the police to exert their authority, they are giving up certain freedoms, as well as accepting some vulnerability to harm that may result from that acknowledgement. Empowering police authority carries with it the potential for that power to be abused and this abuse certainly carries potential for direct harm to the trustor. Importantly, however, even beyond these extreme (but potentially not infrequent) abuses of power, vulnerability exists within the legitimate boundaries of police power in that voluntary cooperation can lead to harm from legal (e.g., sanctions from the legal system) or nonlegal sources (e.g., retribution from others). Regarding the courts, although trust is usually thought of as an issue of satisfaction with the courts as institutions of government, vulnerability is again relevant. This vulnerability is especially apparent for individual defendants in court, and many of the notions of trust in the police play out in the court context (e.g., Tyler & Huo, 2002), but vulnerability is not irrelevant for the far majority of individuals who will never appear in court as defendants. As suggested by the state courts literature’s focus on perceptions of the courts as “good” institutions of government, the relevant vulnerability for these individuals is likely to the courts failing to effectively or efficiently do their jobs as administrators of the law which may harm more amorphous notions of what these important institutions of government should be.

## *Antecedents*

Assuming that vulnerability actually is central to trust, it stands to reason that the major antecedents of trust would be those constructs that increase the acceptability of being vulnerable or that reduce<sup>4</sup> the perception of vulnerability itself. The preceding sections lend some credence to this argument. Across domains, antecedents tend to center around concerns of performance, fairness, and factors of both the target and trustor. Regarding performance, three of the four domains identified some variation of perceived institutional performance as a critical concern (performance and effectiveness in Table 1). Performance evaluations influence vulnerability in that institutions with a successful track record of operating “well” in the past are likely to continue to do so in the future. For example, local governments that have worked to benefit their constituencies in the past can reasonably be expected to continue to do so in the future.

The second major theme in the identified antecedents is that of fairness (procedural justice, fairness, and merit trust) which is also represented in three of the four domains (policing, state courts, and medicine). The majority of the fairness literature suggests that these concerns carry important signals of the trustor’s value and may signal that even if the outcome of dealing with an institution is not the preferred one, the decision itself was a “good” one (Tyler, 1989). These perceptions likely improve the acceptability of being vulnerable by suggesting that dealings with the institution will occur on a level playing field. Consider, for example, civil cases in the state courts. These situations are typically zero-sum games such that one side must win and one side must lose. Perceptions of fairness may suggest that the trustor’s case is more likely to be successful, but it is even more likely that it would address the trustor’s vulnerability to being disregarded in the process. In a procedurally fair court, the trustor will know that they will have their say.

The final theme comprises factors of the trustor and the target and is represented in some form in all four domains (public official factors, neighborhood factors, and trustor factors). These characteristics also impact vulnerability but target factors are likely somewhat different from neighborhood and trustor factors. Target factors likely allow the trustor to feel that they can predict the behavior of the target and therefore the likelihood of the exploitation of that vulnerability, while trustor factors likely operate more directly on either the subjective experience of vulnerability (as in the case of neighborhood factors that may create a social norm of acute perceived vulnerability) or on the perceived level of vulnerability itself (as in the case of a minority trustors who perceive themselves to be at increased risk to policies that disproportionately impact them).

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<sup>4</sup>If trust is a willingness to accept vulnerability, there must be some level of vulnerability. Constructs that are able to fully eliminate the perceived vulnerability therefore cannot be not antecedents of “trust,” so defined.

## *Consequences*

The consequences of trust across the four domains are also notably consistent. In all four, the most commonly discussed outcomes are cooperation and compliance. Given this notion of trust as a willingness to accept vulnerability, the consistency of these outcomes is also to be expected. Vulnerability to some kind of negative outcome is often a major driver of a refusal to cooperate or comply with others in general. As mentioned in the introduction, two major contemporary crises of trust surround the civil unrest stemming from the events in Ferguson, Missouri, and the early failure to contain the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. In both situations, the critical failure to cooperate or comply arose in large part from a vulnerability that the public was unwilling to accept. In the case of the civil unrest, it seems to be a vulnerability to harm from inappropriate police behavior while, in West Africa, it seems to have been a vulnerability to harm from an institution that the trustors did not understand (namely western medicine). Trust then, by either decreasing the trustor's perceived vulnerability or by increasing its acceptability, provides a mechanism by which individuals can move past both major vulnerabilities like these and the relatively more minor vulnerabilities that are likely much more common in daily life (e.g., that of the public to inefficient institutions of government).

## *Implications*

There are two important implications of this chapter for institutional efforts to increase trust. The first is its suggestion of the centrality of vulnerability in trust across domains. For some domains, especially that of organizational trust, this is not a new recognition. Indeed, three of the four domains reviewed here have already begun to at least address this possibility. Nonetheless, the notion that vulnerability is central to trust is not yet widely accepted. If vulnerability is, in fact, the central consideration of trust, this recognition would suggest that the most efficient trust-building efforts would be those that focus on the most salient vulnerabilities. If, for example, the most salient vulnerability for a particular group of medical patients was to malpractice, efforts to increase trust for them are likely to be most effective when they focus on the doctor's conscientiousness and training. If, on the other hand, the major vulnerability is to decisions of a medical insurance provider that only cares about profit, efforts that focus on competence, even of the medical insurance companies, are unlikely to be especially effective. Instead, a focus on benevolence or even fairness in decision making would be preferable. There remains considerable work to be done testing the centrality of vulnerability to the construct, but if, as suggested by the majority of trust's cross-domain scholarship, vulnerability is central to it, trust-building efforts that address the salient vulnerabilities are likely to be most effective.

The second major implication is the recognition that although the antecedents that drive trust are fairly consistent across domains, the research does suggest that the most important antecedents will vary as a function of, at least, the domain. Across domains, concerns of performance, fairness, and characteristics of the trustor and the target matter, but the most important one changes. In the public administration context, perceived performance seems to be key, but in police and state courts contexts, performance concerns clearly take a back seat to issues of fairness. There is not, as yet, a sufficient body of research investigating reasons for this variation to confidently identify a rationale but it may be that the situations, or critical vulnerabilities within the situations, are fundamentally different and so activate different considerations. For example, much of the public is typically more directly impacted by local government decisions than they are by the decisions of the police or courts. This increased distance from the police and courts may facilitate a reliance on procedural concerns as a proxy for more precise evaluations (Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, & PytlikZillig, 2012). Importantly, however, it is also possible that the increased probability of personal interaction with the police and courts (as compared to local government) would increase the importance of fairness which some argue to be a fundamental concern in all human interactions (Tyler, 1989), and there are any number of other explanations that could be proffered as well. Regardless of the mechanism of the variation, it is clear that when applying the scholarship of trust, care should be taken to identify and address the most independently predictive antecedents in each specific domain.

## *Conclusion*

Scholarship has addressed trust in a number of domains. The message has consistently been that trust matters and this has led to a number of institutional efforts to increase trust. These efforts, however, have been stymied by a lack of clear understanding of the critical differences and similarities in trust across domains. The current chapter addressed this deficiency by examining the current understandings of trust in four institutional domains; specifically, by reviewing its conceptualizations, antecedents, and consequences. This examination shows that trust across domains is similar in many ways, but also importantly distinct. Across domains, trust can be understood as willingness to accept vulnerability. This willingness facilitates the relationship of the trustor to the target and is driven by antecedents that decrease, but do not eliminate, the perceived vulnerability of the trustor or that increase the acceptability of being vulnerable. Importantly, however, the major antecedents of trust do seem to vary across domains. Efforts to increase trust are therefore likely to be most successful when they (1) explicitly address the salient vulnerabilities and (2) focus on the antecedents most critical in the specific domain.

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# Institutional Trust Across Cultures: Its Definitions, Conceptualizations, and Antecedents Across Eastern and Western European Nations

Lindsey M. Cole and Ellen S. Cohn

Trust in institutions can be conceptualized in a variety of ways. Some view trust as a measure of confidence (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), while others argue confidence and trust are separate constructs (Hamm et al., 2011; Peng, 2014; Zmerli, Newton, & Montero, 2007). Still others have entirely different concepts of trust ranging from reduction of risk (Luhmann, 1979) to a voluntary state of vulnerability (Hoffman, 2002; Luhmann, 1979; Möllering, 2006), to a component of a larger concept like perceived legitimacy resulting from perceptions of fair treatment (Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Regardless of the context in which the definition of trust is couched, it is clear that trust plays an important role in the interactions that individuals and groups have with institutions like the law (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Gibson, 1989; Gibson, Caldeira, & Baird, 1998; Hamm et al., 2011; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Jackson, 2014) and government (Munoz, Torcal, & Bonet, 2011; Peng, 2014; Wong, Wan, & Hsiao, 2011). What is less clear is how these definitions, conceptualizations, and interactions with institutions vary across different cultures and how these variations impact the development and understanding of trust.

The purpose of this chapter is fourfold: first we will examine the philosophical issues surrounding cross-cultural conceptualizations of institutional trust by comparing intra/cross-cultural and interdisciplinary divergence in the definitions and conceptualization of institutional trust. Second, we will discuss cross-national findings from empirical studies to highlight important factors in institutional trust across different cultures. Third, we will examine data collected previously in a cross-national study conducted shortly after the democratic movement in Europe to compare Western European and Eastern European countries to understand the predictors

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of institutional trust—in this case, their trust in the highest court in their country. In the present analyses, we examine the role of previously identified factors important in explaining institutional trust, such as the importance of procedurally and distributively just interactions with institutions and the perception of corruption as an important problem. Finally, we will close with suggestions for future directions in cross-national research in institutional trust.

## Definitions and Conceptualizations

Across academic and research disciplines, there are contending definitions and conceptualizations of trust at a philosophical level, as well as arguments regarding how trust should be measured empirically. The lack of a clear operationalization for institutional trust has left the literature muddled with contending definitions. Some definitions involve concepts of risk, vulnerability, confidence, perceived legitimacy, or some combination of concepts. Economists often conceptualize trust as calculative (Rousseau et al., 1998; Williamson, 1993), involving a state of voluntary vulnerability (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) and risk reduction (Luhmann, 1979). In other words, when one individual trusts another individual, he/she makes him/herself vulnerable and expects that the other individual will not take advantage of that state of vulnerability. In doing so, one essentially wagers a certain amount of risk on the other individual; the greater the state of vulnerability, the greater the perceived risk that is wagered. The more trust that is fostered, however, the more the perceptual risk is reduced as trust elevates concerns over betrayal of that vulnerability (Keating & Ruzicka, 2014; Luhmann, 1979). According to this framework, the same is true both at the interpersonal level and at the institutional level. Where individuals may place themselves in positions of vulnerability interpersonally by engaging in behaviors like sharing sensitive information, lending money, or opening their homes to others, they may do so also with institutions by engaging in behaviors like showing support for an institution or cooperating with institutional authorities.

Some other scholars define trust as a measure of confidence (see Rousseau et al., 1998); the more one trusts another, the more *confidence* that individual has in that other individual or institution. The distinction between trust and confidence, however, is also contentious. Some researchers and disciplines use trust and confidence interchangeably, suggesting that they are essentially the same construct (Rousseau et al., 1998), while other researchers argue that there are distinctions between trust and confidence (Keating & Ruzicka, 2014; Zmerli et al., 2007). For example, Rousseau et al. (1998) found in their review of the existing trust literature at the time that many scholars used overlapping definitions of trust citing “confidence” in some form in their descriptions of the construct. In contrast, other researchers, like Zmerli et al. (2007), argue that there are distinctions between trust and confidence, although they are intricately related. They state that “trust” is to be reserved for interpersonal situations; however, “confidence” should be used when examining attitudes towards



institutions. Their argument for such a distinction stems from the nature of the type of relationship between the individual and the trustee. An interpersonal situation is characterized by one-on-one interactions in which the trustor believes that the trustee will act in his/her interest (Seligman, 1997; Zmerli et al., 2007). In a situation with institutions, however, direct interactions do not typically occur, except perhaps with representatives of the institution. A more general evaluation that institutions will act in a fair and impartial manner towards its constituents drives the development of “confidence” rather than trust (Zmerli et al., 2007), as there is no tangible body in which to trust.

There are further variations among scholars in these distinctions as well, making the argument surrounding the differentiation of “trust” and “confidence” even more convoluted. Both Rousseau et al. (1998) and Currall and Inkpen (2006) point out that there is a third component to the trust–confidence relation: reliance and positive expectations. One must rely on another individual or an institution and have positive expectations, or confidence, in that individual/institution, that he/she/it will not betray that trust. They also contend that “risk” is not part of the definition of “trust” but merely a precursor for trust to occur. The introduction of risk in a situation between individuals or an individual and institution creates the opportunity for trust to develop (Currall & Inkpen, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). Therefore, risk is not a contending definition of trust, but a necessary component, at least initially.

Legal researchers, particularly procedural justice and legitimacy scholars, conceptualize trust in a slightly different fashion, although on some occasions they conflate descriptions of “trust” with “confidence” (Jackson & Bradford, 2009). Procedural justice is the perception of fair treatment in terms of process by institutional authorities (Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman, 1997; Tyler, 2006). Some scholars have defined perceived legitimacy as the degree to which one trusts and feels an obligation to obey an authority (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Conversely, some political science scholars define perceived legitimacy as support of an institution or loyalty towards the institution (Gibson, 1989; Gibson et al., 1998; Gibson & Caldeira, 2009). Recently, some researchers have included “confidence” as part of their conceptualization of perceived legitimacy (Jackson & Bradford, 2009). In some cases “confidence” is measured as a separate/independent construct to the “trust” and “obligation to obey” components in the conceptualization of perceived legitimacy (Tyler & Jackson, 2014). In other cases, “confidence” is combined and/or used interchangeably with “trust” as a construct in other measurement models of perceived legitimacy (Tankebe, 2010). Unlike many researchers studying trust in political or economic institutions, those studying procedural justice and legitimacy, primarily from a criminological, sociological, or psychological background, rarely ever measure trust by asking “how much trust one has” directly. In fact, the terms “trust” and “confidence” appear in only a few if any of the multiple survey items that comprise measures of each construct (Fagan & Piquero, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tankebe, 2010). Furthermore, not all legitimacy researchers agree that trust is a component of perceived legitimacy. Some argue that “trust” and perceived “legitimacy” are separate, yet related, constructs (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012).

These are just illustrative examples of the continuing debates in conceptualization definitions among trust researchers; however, there are many definitions of trust even at a basic colloquial level.

### ***Beyond Scholarly Differences: Cultural Variation in Trust Concepts***

Difficulty in tightening the definition and concept of trust is not an “ivory tower” semantics issue. Even within one language, such as English, there can be several contending definitions of trust. The definition within the Oxford English Dictionary (Pearsall, McPherson, & Holden, 2015) contains many elements consistent with some researchers’ definitions of trust, including references to “confidence” and “reliance.” These words have Greek and Latin origins for what is today’s concept of “trust” (see Morgner, 2013 for a full review). The Ancient Greek word *pistis* meaning “faith” or “trust” and the Latin words *fides* and *fiducia* meaning “trust” and “reliance on” influenced descendant European languages, although many of these have since translated into derivatives closer to *fidelity* or *confidence* than directly to *trust*.

Additionally, the heavy Christian influence that dominated the majority of Europe at the time impacted the philosophical concept of faith and trust (Morgner, 2013). Because of that common thread, many of the European—particularly Latin-based—languages have similar conceptualizations and definitions for the word “trust,” although the words, whether they are closer to confidence, trust, or fidelity, themselves may differ. Despite this commonality, there are not always additional words or synonyms, like confidence, present in those languages to further elucidate nuanced meanings in the definition for trust. The presence of additional words to distinguish the nuanced difference between the concept of “trust” and “confidence,” for example, varies quite widely for all languages around the world.

Every language has a word or set of words that represent the concept of “trust.” However, not all words in all languages have the exact same connotations as the English language word for trust. In the companion volume for the 62nd Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Bornstein and Tomkins (2015) describe this very issue and the concerns it may raise from an empirical standpoint. In their account of a discussion of trust definitions across languages during the Symposium, the authors comment on the difficulty in conceptualizing trust from a cross-cultural and multi-linguistic perspective. Bornstein and Tomkins briefly touch upon the important implications that linguistic variations carry, including altering definitions and blurring the lines between actor and object (see Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015, for an overview on this topic from the Symposium). However, this issue extends far beyond the few examples discussed among the researchers at the Symposium.

There are many other instances in language in which definitions of trust are equated or related to other similar constructs, in addition to the examples presented in the companion volume. For example, in Chinese and Japanese, where a character

system is used to represent specific words and concepts, the character often translated as *trust* also means *confidence* (see also Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015). Therefore, there is not necessarily a direct means of distinguishing the difference between “trust” and “confidence” in meaning, however nuanced it may be. In Japanese specifically, the word or character for trust and confidence is derived from *shin*, which can also be used interchangeably with our concept of “to believe,” depending on the context in how it is used. In other words, one might say *shinjiru*, meaning the equivalent of “I place trust in you,” but it may also have the same meaning as “I believe you,” depending on the context. In another instance, that same word in the Japanese language is often translated into the same meaning in English as “I believe *in* you,” further distinguishing and confounding the linguistic usage from its European counterparts.

A similar word, *shinrai*, is used to convey a sense of trust, confidence, and/or reliance in Japanese. This definition and usage is consistent with some European language conceptualizations of trust; however, it does not leave flexibility for distinction between “trust,” “confidence,” and “reliance.” For example, Zmerli et al. (2007) argue for distinguishing between interpersonal trust and confidence in institutions, and Hamm et al. (2011) separate the constructs of confidence and trust in courts, which may prove difficult at best in a situation in which one cannot distinguish between trust and confidence at a basic linguistic level. Furthermore, even if issues of measurement within a single language speaking sample could be overcome, cross-national comparison becomes a further compounded problem, as equivalency of concepts and terminology would arise.

In fact, in many languages, including many of the Romantic European and Eastern European languages, the words for “trust” and “confidence” are also exactly the same. For example, in French and Spanish there is only a single word closely structured to “confidence” to conceptualize both confidence and trust. The French word for trust and confidence is *confiance* while in Spanish it is *confianza*. Conversely, in Italian the word for both trust and confidence is *fiducia*, which is more closely aligned with “fidelity.” This variation is particularly interesting given the development and roots of the Romantic languages, especially that of Spanish and Italian, with their extremely close structure and similar vocabulary. Even in other European languages there is often only one word to express the concepts for both trust and confidence. For example, in Bulgarian it is *doverie*, in Polish it is *zaufanie*, and in Hungarian it is *bizalom*. In all of these languages, are no synonyms for “trust” and “confidence” that confound their meaning, as is the case in English. The single word is used to denote both concepts and the context in which it is used conveys the intended meaning. Therefore, the argument over the conceptual differences between “trust” in an institution and “confidence” in an institution may be irrelevant in these particular situations.

Although these differences are semantic and seemingly nuanced, each can express important information that may alter the meaning and interpretation being conveyed. For example, in the case of Japanese, “to trust” someone may carry a very different meaning than “to believe in” someone would. If one were to ask American citizens if they “trust” their government, one might get a very different response

than if one were to ask if they “believe” their government or even if they “believe in” their government. Although the linguistic differences examined here are few, there are many semantic and linguistic differences that exist across other languages and cultures that could, and likely do, get lost in translation. This issue may be particularly problematic when examining languages and cross-national samples that have inconsistent constructs for the definition of trust. For instance, if one were to compare samples that have a single word to describe both constructs for trust and confidence with samples that have multiple constructs for trust/confidence, results might be particularly difficult to draw clear conclusions. Therefore, in the process of conducting cross-cultural research, it is important to consider some of the lessons social scientists have learned regarding language and measurement.

For instance, even nuanced semantic changes can alter interpretations and perceptions (Cook & Gronke, 2005; Gibson, Caldeira, & Spence, 2003; Hamm et al., 2011), ultimately affecting the way individuals react to the questions they are asked. Inoguchi (2005) notes that researchers may not be sensitive to the relative vibrant and complex culturally diverse populations outside Europe and the USA due to the development of survey research, particularly in this area. For example, the underlying origins of the language and cultural conceptualizations for some are couched in different philosophical principles than Western thought. The Confucian roots of some East Asian cultures, China and Japan included, have influenced the conceptualization of “trust” in these cultures, which must be taken into consideration when defining and measuring trust/confidence as a construct (Inoguchi, Mikami, & Fujii, 2007), particularly in cross-national studies. The terminology and questions associated with the measurement of trust may be culturally skewed towards predominantly Christian, democratic, and free market capitalist-oriented nations. Thus, the differences in the meaning and conceptualization of trust at a definitional level could impact interpretations of empirical results when studying the effects of trust in institutions cross-culturally if care and consideration are not taken. Importantly, there is a great deal that can be learned from cross-discipline and cross-national collaboration in the design of measurement and methodology as well as the actual implementation of these large, cross-national studies of institutional trust.

## **Cross-National Research on Trust in Institutions**

The majority of research concerning trust in institutions, especially studies comparing cross-national samples, has primarily focused on Europe and the USA. This is an area that continues to be understudied, largely due to the resources needed to collect data from nationally representative samples across many different nations. Europe has seen the most success likely due to the implementation of annual mass survey collections like the European Social Survey (Munoz et al., 2011; Tyler & Jackson, 2014), the EuroBarometer (Arnold, Sapir, & Zapryanova, 2012; Gibson et al., 1998), and the World Values Survey (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2010; Peng, 2014), where measures of constructs like institutional trust can be incorporated into

surveys. Of the studies that have been conducted, many have focused on issues surrounding trust in national institutions like the judicial, political, and financial systems. Some studies have incorporated transnational institutions, like the European Union (EU), in their course of study as well (Arnold et al., 2012; Munoz et al., 2011).

Like many areas of trust research, the measurement and terminology used across studies have been inconsistent, making it difficult to draw direct conclusions from the body of work conducted as a whole. The majority of the research conducted examining trust in political institutions crossculturally/nationally have used the term “confidence” (Arnold et al., 2012; Munoz et al., 2011; Peng, 2014), as was outlined by Zmerli et al. (2007) as the most appropriate measure of “trust” at the institutional level. However, some studies did use only a measure of “trust” and not confidence in institutions (Tan & Tambyah, 2011) while others used some combination of the two (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2010; Wong et al., 2011). Some researchers interested in trust in judicial and legal institutions have measured institutional trust by diffuse support (Gibson, 1989; Gibson et al., 1998; Gibson & Caldeira, 2009) or perceptions of legitimacy or of procedural fairness of institutional authorities. Procedural justice and legitimacy researchers often conceptualize “trust” and “confidence” separately (Tankebe, 2010), arguing that these constructs indirectly measure institutional legitimacy (Hough, Jackson, & Bradford, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Jackson, 2014).

The fact that there are such diverse conceptualizations of trust in institutions across disciplines and even researchers within disciplines makes it difficult to draw conclusions across studies in a single culture; however, it is even more convoluted given the complexities of language and understanding of these constructs in cross-cultural examination. Therefore, the following comparisons of previous empirical research must be considered through the lens of both the empiricist and the linguist. Jackson et al. (2011) highlight such a case in their cross-national study of procedural justice and perceived legitimacy using the European Social Survey where they found differences in interpretations of survey questions between the UK respondents and Bulgarian respondents. Specifically, wording and cultural variation in interpretation created a different response set for each sample, resulting in the need for survey revisions to correct for cultural differences as they arose during the course of the study. However, not all researchers account for such differences, and variations in the operationalization and interpretation of constructs cannot be controlled for across studies.

Results across studies have suggested some common threads in important constructs related to fostering and maintaining institutional trust; however, some differences have been noted as well. Researchers have found that the perception of fairness and fair treatment imposed by the institution and its authorities affect the degree to which individuals will trust that institution and/or feel that the institution is legitimate (Hough et al., 2013; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). For example, Hough et al. (2013) found that the degree of trust in the effectiveness, procedural fairness, and distributive fairness of the police were significantly related to perceptions of legitimacy of police authority and

predictive of offending behavior in a large cross-national study. Individuals who trusted in the effectiveness, the procedural fairness (would show the individual fair treatment), and the distributive fairness (would offer the individual a desirable outcome) of the police were more likely to view the police as legitimate authorities and less likely to engage in offending behavior. The strength and statistical significance of these predictors and mediators of their associations with the outcome measure were not consistent across all national samples, however. In contrast, other researchers have argued that perceptions of fair treatment are an antecedent to trust in and perceived legitimacy of legal authorities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Gibson et al. (1998) measured institutional trust as diffuse support in their work on perceived legitimacy of the national high courts. Regardless of the specific interplay between these factors, it is clear across the empirical literature that perceptions of fairness in general are significantly related to trust in legal authorities. However, the majority of researchers are yet to disentangle the exact distinctions in the relation between procedural justice and perceived legitimacy factors cross-nationally (Hough et al., 2013).

Understanding the specific ways in which procedural justice and distributive justice factors differ in their relation to institutional trust cross-nationally could prove useful in developing culturally specific methods for fostering institutional trust intra-nationally. Procedural justice is related to perceptions of fair treatment by institutional authorities (Paternoster et al., 1997; Tyler, 2006), as previously discussed; however distributive justice is the perception of the fairness of the outcome when interacting with institutional authorities (Cohn & White, 1997; Kramer & Tyler, 1995). Previous researchers have suggested that cross-national differences exist in certain factors such as procedural justice and distributive justice in predicting perceptions of justice with institutional authorities, particularly with European nations (Cohn & White, 1997).

In a study of European nations shortly following the democratization movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Cohn and White (1997) found that individuals' perceived importance of procedural justice was a stronger predictor of other justice perceptions in Western European nations, while the importance of distributive justice was a stronger predictor in Eastern European nations that had recently transitioned from communist to democratic states. Regime type has historically been a significant factor that influences the effect known predictors have on institutional trust in European nations (Mishler & Rose, 1997). This may be in part a result of the differences in justice models between historically former communist nations and historically democratic nations (Packer, 1973; Sung, 2006).

There is a distinction between two competing models of justice administration, the crime control model and the due process model (Packer, 1973; Sung, 2006). In the crime control model, the focus is on individual responsibility, which emphasizes protection of law-abiding citizens' rights and efficient apprehension and punishment of criminals. In contrast, the due process model focuses on human rights and emphasizes protection of the rights of the accused and limits on judicial controls.

Some argue that the former authoritarian communist Eastern European countries have a crime control model, while the liberal democracies of Western European

countries have a due process model (Packer, 1973; Sung, 2006). The former communist Eastern European countries had authoritarian regimes, which emphasize crime control, police authority, punitive sanctions, and high rates of conviction and imprisonment. The Western European countries have limits on the scope of police authority. There are also judicial controls that prevent indiscriminate repression of suspected offenders and lead to low rates of conviction and imprisonment. The model of justice administration can influence the way in which citizens view legal institutions. Justice systems concerned with crime control and deterrence models tend to have less support and trust of citizens compared to models concerned with citizens' rights and fairness (Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Other researchers have discovered differences in institutional trust cross-nationally related to perceptions of institutional corruption (Arnold et al., 2012; Munoz et al., 2011). Generally, institutions that are perceived to be corrupt are trusted less than institutions that are not perceived as corrupt (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Kääriäinen, 2007; Munoz et al., 2011). However, there are specific instances in which this has been found not to be the case, or at least, to have been a more convoluted relation (Munoz et al., 2011; Tankebe, 2010). Tankebe (2010) found in a study of police corruption and institutional trust in the police in Ghana that personal experiences of corruption were unrelated to perceptions of the trustworthiness of the police. It was only vicarious experiences of corruption with the police that predicted how much one trusted the police as an institution. In contrast, Kääriäinen (2007) found a strong relation between personal experiences of police corruption and trust in the police in a study of 16 European countries. Those who had experienced police corruption were less likely to trust the police than those who had not experienced police corruption. The perceived importance of corruption in institutional trust across cultures, nations, and political environments may vary greatly depending on the cultural contexts and possibly the linguistic presentation (i.e., the presentation of the "experience of corruption" measure in this case).

In another set of cross-national studies of institutional corruption and trust in Europe, both Munoz et al. (2011) and Arnold et al. (2012) found that perceptions of corruption not only influenced the perception of trust in the specific institution involved but also resulted in the displacement of trust in other institutions. In other words, in lieu of an appropriate institution in which to place trust, like a functioning political institution free of corruption, one might place his or her trust in a surrogate institution, such as the EU. Both studies illuminate the need to consider the impact of larger governing institutions in the ever globalizing contemporary economic and political environment. Larger governing bodies are becoming more common globally; however, the variation in confidence in these superordinate institutions seems to be affected by the cultural climate of local governing institutions (Arnold et al., 2012; Munoz et al., 2011). Regional, cultural, and individual differences impact the way in which institutions can develop trust and confidence among their constituents. Therefore, it is important to identify and understand these differences across individuals, nations, and cultures to create better means of fostering confidence and trust in institutions at all levels.

## Comparison of Eastern European and Western European Nations

The current state of the field has left many areas of contention and ambiguity where cross-national interpretations of institutional trust are concerned. As noted earlier in the chapter, the array of definitions, conceptualizations, and measurement of trust at the intra- and interdisciplinary level are already convoluted. Once linguistic and cross-cultural variations in the understanding of trust are added to the existing complex conversation, it reaches a new level of empirical and philosophical issues. The purpose of the current study was to further understand trust cross-culturally by examining constructs previously identified as important in institutional trust, specifically related to legal institutions. In the current research, we cross-culturally compare Eastern European and Western European perceptions of the legitimacy of an institution, operationalized here as “diffuse support” (Gibson et al., 1998) for the highest national court.

### *Current Research and Hypotheses*

The nations included in the following analyses have only a single word to conceptualize both concepts of “trust” and “confidence” in their respective native languages. This helps to control for some of the cross-linguistic conceptual issues discussed earlier. In order to examine cross-cultural differences in how importance of procedural and distributive justice and perception of corruption as an important problem predict institutional trust, we operationalized and measured institutional trust by measuring “diffuse support” (Gibson et al., 1998). Previous research has suggested that perceptions of procedural justice and distributive justice are positively related to trust and/or confidence in institutions (Cohn & White, 1997; Hough et al., 2013; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Furthermore, the perception of institutional corruption has been shown to be negatively related to institutional trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Kääriäinen, 2007; Munoz et al., 2011; Tankebe, 2010). Therefore, we predicted that the importance of procedural justice, the importance of distributive justice, and the perception of corruption as an important problem would predict diffuse support for the national courts.

Previous researchers have found institutional trust and the factors related to trust to differ across Western European and Eastern European nations (Mishler & Rose, 1997). In order to examine potential cultural differences between the national samples, the countries were grouped into Eastern European and Western European nations. Western European culture tends to emphasize due process; Eastern European cultures on the other hand tend to be more crime control oriented (Packer, 1973; Sung, 2006). Crime control models of justice have been found to foster mistrust in legal authorities by previous researchers (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Therefore, we hypothesized the importance of procedural justice to be more important in relation



to trust in the Western European countries, while the importance of distributive justice would be more important in relation to trust in the Eastern European Countries (Cohn & White, 1997).

More specifically, because procedural justice is more important to the due process model in Western European countries than the crime control model in Eastern European countries, we would predict an interaction between East/West and the importance of procedural justice. We hypothesized that in Western Europe the importance of procedural justice would predict diffuse support, while in crime control Eastern Europe, there may be no relation. Because distributive justice is more relevant to the crime control model in Eastern European countries, we predicted an interaction between East/West and the importance of distributive justice. We hypothesized that perceived importance of distributive justice would predict diffuse support in Eastern European countries but not Western European countries.

Along with the crime control model of Eastern Europe is an acceptance of corruption (Sung, 2006). Corruption is less accepted in the due process model of Western Europe than in the crime control model of Eastern Europe (Cohn & White, 1997). Because of this issue, we predicted an interaction of East/West by the importance of corruption. We hypothesized that the perception of corruption as an important problem would negatively predict diffuse support for the highest court in the Western European countries but not in the Eastern European countries.

## *Method*

**Respondents and Procedure.** The data used in this study came from the Legal Values Study conducted by Cohn, Gibson, Levine, McCord, Sanders, and White (Cohn & White, 1997; Gibson et al., 1998). Data was collected from national random samples of respondents 18 years and older from the following countries: Bulgaria ( $n=831$ ), Poland ( $n=824$ ), Hungary ( $n=786$ ), Spain ( $n=775$ ), and France ( $n=762$ ). Face-to-face interviews were conducted with native speakers in Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Poland, and Spain in the spring of 1995.

In order to keep linguistic variation as consistent as possible, respondents from the USA and Russia—where surveys were also administered—omitted from the analyses because both English and Russian have two separate words in their vocabulary to describe “trust” and “confidence.” As discussed previously, the countries included only have one word. This allowed us to compare two Western European countries (France and Spain) and three Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland). Slightly more women than men participated (52.1 % in Bulgaria, 50.5 % in France, 53.9 % in Hungary, 59.4 % in Poland, and 55.1 % in Spain). The largest percentage of respondents were Roman Catholic in Poland (96.1 %), Spain (80.8 %), France (69.9 %), and Hungary (49.1 %) and Eastern Orthodox (51.4 %) in Bulgaria.

**Measures.** The means and standard deviations for predictor and outcome variables are presented by country in Table 1 and by East/West in Table 2. Overall means and standard deviations are presented below.

**Diffuse Support for Highest National Court.** Diffuse support for the highest court in the country was measured using three items with responses on a scale from 1 (*disagree strongly*) to 5 (*agree strongly*). The questions include the following (Gibson et al., 1998): “the highest court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole,” “the right of the highest court of your country to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced” (reverse coded), and “if the highest court started making decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the highest court altogether” (reverse coded). The items were averaged to create a composite measure of diffuse support for the highest national court ( $M=3.18$ ,  $SD=.77$ ,  $Cronbach's\ \alpha=.50$ ).

**Importance of Procedural Justice.** Respondents were asked to imagine that they had an encounter with someone in a government office. Then rated “the importance of the following” four items on a scale from 1 (*not very important*) to 5 (*very important*) and the items were averaged to create a composite score representing their perception of the importance of procedural justice. The questions included the following: “to have the person at the office listen to the respondent’s story,” “to have the person explain his/her decision,” “to have the person treat the respondent with respect,” and “to have the person treat the respondent the same as he/she treats other people” ( $M=4.61$ ,  $SD=.63$ ,  $Cronbach's\ \alpha=.79$ ).

**Importance of Distributive Justice.** Respondents were asked using a single item how important it is to get what they want in an encounter with someone in a government office on a scale from 1 (*not very important*) to 5 (*very important*) ( $M=4.63$ ,  $SD=.81$ ).

**Corruption as Important Problem.** Respondents were asked using a single item how important corruption is as a problem on a scale from 1 (*not very important*) to 5 (*very important*) ( $M=2.58$ ,  $SD=.61$ ).

**Table 1** Means and standard deviations of predictor and outcome variables by countries and whole sample

Variables	Spain	France	Hungary	Poland	Bulgaria	Whole sample
Diffuse support	3.12 (0.66)	3.17 (0.79)	3.26 (0.84)	3.45 (0.81)	2.96 (0.76)	3.18 (0.77)
Procedural justice	4.71 (0.60)	4.54 (0.61)	4.81 (0.40)	4.55 (0.59)	4.61 (0.67)	4.61 (0.63)
Distributive justice	4.66 (0.75)	4.45 (0.89)	4.91 (0.39)	4.65 (0.78)	4.60 (0.87)	4.63 (0.81)
Corruption	2.86 (0.38)	2.61 (0.55)	2.30 (0.74)	2.54 (0.62)	2.61 (0.59)	2.58 (0.61)

Standard deviations presented inside parentheses

“The importance of” was omitted from procedural justice and distributive justice

“...as an important problem” was omitted from corruption for the purpose of the table

**Table 2** Means and standard deviations of predictor and outcome variables by Eastern and Western European nations

Variables	East	West
Diffuse support	3.19 (0.80)	3.14 (0.73)
Procedural justice	4.61 (0.64)	4.62 (0.61)
Distributive justice	4.67 (0.79)	4.56 (0.83)
Corruption	2.49 (0.65)	2.74 (0.49)

Standard deviations presented inside parentheses  
 The Eastern Europe sample included Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland  
 The Western Europe sample included France and Spain

### Results and Discussion

**Analytic Strategy.** Correlations between all the variables for the Eastern and the Western European countries are presented in Table 3. Next, a hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis was conducted to test whether region (Eastern vs. Western Europe) impacted the relation between importance of procedural justice, the importance of distributive justice, and perception of corruption as an important problem in predicting diffuse support for the highest national courts. Region of Europe was dummy coded (0=*Eastern Europe*, 1=*Western Europe*). Interactions were then calculated between the dummy coded Eastern/Western Europe variable and the other predictor variables of interest: importance of procedural justice, importance of distributive justice, and corruption as an important problem.

Main effects were entered on the first step with demographic variables of age, sex (0=*female*, 1=*male*), and wealth as control variables. Interactions between Eastern/Western European nations and the importance of procedural justice, the importance of distributive justice, and perception of corruption as an important problem were entered on the second step of the regression. The coding for the Eastern/Western Europe variable was then rotated and the analysis was run again to interpret the interaction effect for both the Eastern and Western European samples.

**Main Analyses.** From the first step of the analysis, it was evident that there was a significant main effect of the importance of procedural justice and corruption as an important problem in predicting diffuse support in the highest court (see Table 4). In general, individuals who thought procedural fairness was important showed more support for the highest court in their own countries than those who did not find procedural fairness to be important. However, individuals who viewed corruption as an important problem tended to support their highest court less than those who did not view it as an important problem. Results also suggested that Eastern Europeans had greater support for the highest court in their country than Western Europeans did.

When the interactions between Eastern/Western European nations and the predictors were examined in the second step of the analysis, only one difference

between regions emerged. There was a significant interaction between Eastern/Western Europe and corruption as an important problem in predicting diffuse support of the highest court. For Eastern European respondents there was no significant relation between perceiving corruption as an important problem and diffuse support in the highest court (see Table 4). To examine the nature of the interaction for Western European respondents, the dummy coding for the Eastern/Western Europe variable was rotated (1 = *Eastern Europe*, 0 = *Western Europe*). Respondents from Western European countries who viewed corruption as an important problem showed less support for the highest court in their country than respondents who did not view corruption as an important problem ( $B = -.15$ ,  $SE = .04$ ),  $t(3057) = -3.64$ ,  $p < .001$ . Therefore, it appeared that the perception of corruption as an important problem was only an important issue for Western Europeans in relation to predicting support for the highest court in the country (see Fig. 1).

Overall, our hypotheses were only partially supported. We hypothesized that perceived importance of procedural justice and perceived importance of distributive justice would be positive predictors of support for the highest court in the country. Only the importance of procedural justice was found to be significantly positively related to support for the court; perceived importance of distributive justice was not a significant predictor of support. Perceptions of corruption as an important problem was hypothesized to be negatively related to support for the highest court. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that corruption as an important problem would be more linked with diffuse support for the highest court for Western European respondents than for Eastern European respondents. This prediction was supported by the findings. Perceptions of corruption as an important problem was related to support for the highest court in the country for Western European respondents but not for Eastern European respondents. There were not any differences in the relations between the importance of procedural justice and support for the court, or the importance of distribution justice and support for the court between Eastern European and Western European respondents, contrary to expectations.

One potential explanation for the differences in findings between the East and West samples is the crime control versus due process models (Packer, 1968; Sung, 2006). As mentioned above, the authoritarian former communist Eastern European countries support a crime control model labeled as “police states” where the authorities give

**Table 3** Correlations between the predictor and outcome variables for the Eastern European and Western European respondents

Variables	Diffuse support	Procedural justice	Distributive justice	Corruption
Diffuse support	–	.07***	.04	–.01
Procedural justice	.00	–	.55***	.08***
Distributive justice	–.06*	.53***	–	.05*
Corruption	–.11***	.13***	.07**	–

The correlations above the diagonal are for the countries in the East (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland)  
The correlations below the diagonal are for the countries in the West (France, Spain)

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$

**Table 4** Hierarchical regression analysis predicting diffuse support for the highest court in the country

	Main effect			Interaction		
	Estimate	SE	<i>t</i>	Estimate	SE	<i>t</i>
Intercept	3.22	0.02	135.77***	3.22	0.02	135.94***
Age	0.00	0.00	1.79	0.00	0.00	1.67
Gender	0.06	0.04	1.98*	0.05	0.03	1.87
Wealth	0.03	0.01	5.34***	0.03	0.01	5.59***
Procedural justice	0.08	0.03	2.92**	0.11	0.04	2.80**
Distributive justice	-0.04	0.03	-1.89	-0.01	0.03	-0.19
Corruption	-0.08	0.02	-2.97**	-0.03	0.03	-0.94
East/West	-0.11	0.03	3.73***	-0.10	0.03	-3.33**
East/West × procedural justice				-0.05	0.06	-0.86
East/West × distributive justice				-0.06	0.04	-1.53
East/West × corruption				-0.12	0.05	-2.31*
	$F(7, 3060) = 5.46^{***}$			$F(10, 3057) = 7.51^{***}$		
	$R^2 = .02$			$R^2 = .02$		

Estimates are unstandardized, based on mean-centered raw scores

East/West is coded as 0 = *East*, 1 = *West*

Gender is coded as 0 = *female*, 1 = *male*


\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$

punitive sanctions and high rates of imprisonment to protect law-abiding citizens. The liberal democracy Western European countries support a due process model with legal restrictions on authorities, a high rate of case attrition, and low rates of imprisonment to protect the rights of suspects.

## General Discussion

There are areas in institutional trust research that remain underexplored and unresolved, one of which is cross-cultural challenges and differences in the empirical study of trust. In this chapter, we discussed existing challenges in cross-cultural research of institutional trust, including issues defining trust beyond the interdisciplinary contentions and the difficulty in drawing clear conclusions from the existing cross-national empirical research on institutional trust. First we discussed the contention in the existing interdisciplinary debate over the definition of trust and how this issue is further exacerbated by linguistic and cultural differences in cross-national research. Our study examining diffuse support in the highest national court in Eastern and Western European countries attempted to take into consideration some of the concerns regarding linguistic differences and measurement variation across the two national samples. In order to create as little variation as possible in

**Fig. 1** Perceiving corruption as an important problem as a predictor of diffuse support for the highest court as a function of Eastern/Western Europe



the vocabulary used to represent the concept of “trust,” only countries whose native language had a single word to denote both concepts of “trust” and “confidence” were included in the study.

Next we highlighted some of the existing empirical work conducted examining institutional trust cross-culturally. Previous researchers have suggested that perceptions of fairness, such as procedural justice (Hough et al., 2013; Paternoster et al., 1997; Tyler, 2006) and distributive justice (Kramer & Tyler, 1995), are important predictors of whether individuals will trust institutions. Furthermore, we also discussed how corruption in institutions influences institutional trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Arnold et al., 2012; Kääriäinen, 2007; Munoz et al., 2011). The current study examined the perceived importance of these factors as predictors of trust in the highest court by way of diffuse support (Gibson et al., 1998).

The results of our study suggest that there is some cultural variation in the relation between predictors and trust. Perceived importance of procedurally just interactions with authorities was positively related to support for the highest national court across the sample, regardless of region. However, the perception of corruption as an important problem was related to support in the courts only for Western European respondents. Overall, respondents who felt it was important to have procedurally fair experiences with authorities supported the highest national court more than respondents who did not find procedurally fair experiences to be important. Moreover, Western European respondents who saw corruption as an important problem tended to support the highest national court less. Perceptions of corruption as an important problem had no influence on support for the highest national court for Eastern Europeans. A cultural and legal emphasis on due process might explain why the importance of corruption was only an issue in the Western European countries. As crime control is the historical focus in the Eastern European countries, this may explain why perception that corruption is an important problem is not significantly related to diffuse support for the court in these countries.

There were some limitations to the current study. The data were collected in 1995 right after the end of communism in 1989. If data from 2015 were analyzed, one wonders if one would duplicate the findings or find differences. Some researchers have found that former communist European nations have many of the same differences in trust, even after years of democratic governance (Arnold et al., 2012). In some cases, a few of the Eastern European countries (e.g., Bulgaria) have gone back to communist leadership which may affect trust differently today as well.

One wonders why there was no East/West interaction with procedural justice or East/West interaction with distributive justice on diffuse support. There may be measurement issues. Diffuse support was measured with only three items; importance of distributive justice was measured with only one item. There may also be conceptual issues. The importance of procedural justice and distributive justice may be near-universal values that are not specific to the Eastern or Western European countries. Limited conclusions can be drawn in regards to culture differences as our analyses were confined to only Europe. If we expanded to Africa, South America, and Asia, we may find interactions of perceived importance of procedural justice and importance of distributive justice with region in predicting institutional trust.

Results from our study illuminate two central messages future researchers need to consider moving forward. The first message is that the distinction between due process in the West versus crime control in the East may have an important overall impact on institutional trust, but may not moderate the impact of procedural or distributive justice on institutional trust. The second message that our study highlights is that there are still identifiable differences in predictors of trust cross-culturally. In this particular case, the relation between perceptions of corruption as an important problem and support in the highest national court was dependent on region. The next step is to develop a way to address aforementioned linguistic considerations when studying cultures that are not as consistent in their trust-related vocabulary as the nations/languages we chose for our current study.

Fewer studies on institutional trust have been conducted outside Europe and North America (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2010; Peng, 2014; Wong et al., 2011), especially those comparing trust/confidence between Western and Non-Western cultures. The largest scale studies have utilized the AsiaBarometer Survey (Inoguchi et al., 2007; Peng, 2014; Tan & Tambyah, 2011; Wong et al., 2011) (i.e., the East Asian equivalent of the EuroBarometer Survey) or the World Values Survey (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2010). Many of these studies have focused on Asian countries, which allow for a greater breadth of political comparisons than Europe. The world is becoming a larger, globalized economy equipped with multilevel institutional infrastructures that supersede nation states. The need to understand how citizens interact and perceive institutions at all levels has become increasingly important as these supranational institutions become more prominent in the modern era.

Researchers have been able to demonstrate that some general principles of institutional trust transcend cultural variations, like perceptions of institutional performance (Peng, 2014; Tan & Tambyah, 2011; Wong et al., 2011), providing a template from which to work in fostering institutional trust at an international level. However, general attitudes towards the institution are measured broadly in these studies and

what is yet to be achieved is an understanding of how to cultivate these positively oriented perceptions towards the institutions in each culture. The way in which performance, for example, is evaluated, may be different across different cultures depending on what is valued in those cultures. Confucian-based cultures place different values on societal needs and structures than do Christian/Western-based cultures (Inoguchi et al., 2007), which may influence the way in which trust is achieved. By merely measuring existing attitudes regarding current levels of performance, one does not obtain information about what could be done to change citizens' attitudes.

Furthermore, the issue of translations becomes more convoluted once continents are transcended. European languages are structurally different, yet have similar origins, as previously discussed in the definitions section of the chapter. Languages that are distant in relation or have distinct origins would be even less comparable than the five presented here. Researchers who attempt to study trust across cultures with diverse backgrounds and origins will have to take care and consider in how trust is defined, interpreted, and understood in each culture, in order to draw clear results.

## *Conclusion*

Our conclusion is that the state of the field, with a lack of clear operational definitions of trust across disciplines, places cross-cultural examination of institutional trust in an empirical and philosophical dilemma. Although there are many similarities and interrelated concepts of trust, it will require researchers to consider the linguistic and cultural concepts of trust when conducting cross-national comparisons. The next step that is required is more examination of institutional trust and its related constructs outside of regional cross-national studies (i.e., intra-European, intra-Asian studies). Of the existing research that has been conducted cross-nationally, few studies have transcended continental barriers (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2010; Peng, 2014). Furthermore, a consensus on an operationalization/definition of trust needs to be reached before any conclusive evidence can truly be drawn from such a study. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the existing literature with the conflation of definitions, compounded by the issue of translation and cultural conceptualization of trust. Despite the difficulties that cross-national research imposes, cultural relevance and understanding will become increasingly important in the years to come as these larger global institutions govern more aspects of daily life, making it imperative to understand the complex relationship of trust in institutions.

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# The “Dark Side” of Institutional Trust

Tess M.S. Neal, Ellie Shockley, and Oliver Schilke

This chapter focuses on an issue that is often overlooked in the broad field of trust scholarship. The issue is that discussions about and studies of trust typically focus on the positive aspects of trust—how trust improves relationships, encourages good behavior, improves business outcomes, and so forth (Gargiulo & Ertug, 2006). This “optimistic bias” is particularly evident in work focused on trust in institutions, where concepts such as procedural justice, shared values, and moral responsibility have gained prominence.<sup>1</sup> Consider, for example, the content included in the 62nd Annual Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, *Cooperation and Compliance with Authority: The Role of Institutional Trust*, its accompanying volume (Bornstein & Tomkins, 2015), and the associated National Science Foundation *Workshop on Institutional Trust and Confidence* (the basis of the current volume). Clearly, the “bright side” of trust in institutional contexts is highly appreciated.

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<sup>1</sup>See PytlikZillig and Kimbrough (2016), for a detailed discussion of the definition of trust and institutional trust. For the purposes of the current chapter, we use their definition, which (paraphrased) is as follows: institutional trust involves an interdependent trustor (e.g., citizen) and trustee (e.g., government branch, agency, institution) in a context that contains risk for the trustor. Trust is experienced by the trustor as voluntary and involves evaluations and/or expectations that the trustor has of the trustee.

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However, trust can also have undesired consequences under some circumstances, suggesting that trust in institutions is not universally good. For example, MacCoun (2005) asserted that the body of work on procedural justice—ways in which public institutions such as police and the courts can behave to improve public cooperation and compliance—has troubling implications for leaving people susceptible to manipulation and exploitation. Likewise, Zahra, Yavuz, and Ucbasaran (2006) discussed the dysfunctional effects of trust on new business-creation incentives, such as overreliance on trust in interpersonal relationships leading to poor business decisions. Further, Skinner, Dietz, and Weibel (2014) discussed how trust can be problematic in organizational settings, such as by incurring unwelcome obligations to reciprocate.

Villena, Revilla, and Choi (2011) found evidence for “dark side” as well as a “bright side” of social capital<sup>2</sup> for buyer–supplier relationships in management contexts. Specifically, their results showed an inverted curvilinear relationship between social capital and performance, such that too little *and* too much social capital hurt performance. Thus, building trust and social capital is a good thing—up to a point. Like the children’s story “The Three Bears” in which the protagonist Goldilocks determines that various things between two extremes are “just right,” there may be an optimal level of trust for people to have in institutions. Although problems associated with too-low institutional trust are commonly discussed (e.g., Newton, 2001; Warren, 1999), there may also be detrimental consequences to consider for institutional trust that is uncalibrated in the “too high” direction.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the potentially negative implications of too-high trust in the context of institutions and organizations. Specifically, trust is not beneficial for trustees when a trusted institution actually behaves in untrustworthy ways. Our conceptual overview is organized through an analysis of processes contributing to the negative implications of trust, including external processes, internal processes, and their intersection. The unjustified high public trust might be due to *actions taken by the institution* (i.e., external-to-the-individual, or trustee-related, processes) to boost individuals’ trust in it, such as public relations campaigns or efforts to increase public participation and perceived voice or control without a genuine reflection of the institutions’ trustworthiness. Conversely, unjustified high trust might be due to *intraindividual processes* (i.e., trustor-related processes)—features of the trustor that encourage them to place greater-than-warranted trust in the institution, such as a heightened motivation to believe that one’s public institutions deserve to be trusted without evidence that an increase in such trust is rational.

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<sup>2</sup>Trust is often considered a central dimension of social capital as trust facilitates leveraging the value of network relationships (Kemper, Schilke, & Brettel, 2013).

## “External” and “Internal” Processes

A person’s trust in an institution can involve both “external” and “internal” processes. That is, the institution can take actions to encourage the person’s trust (external process), or a person can experience or engage in intrapsychic processes that adjust their level of institutional trust (internal process). The boost in institutional trust resulting from these mechanisms may be considered beneficial as trust in institutions often has desirable consequences for individuals and institutions alike (e.g., Newton, 2001; Warren, 1999). However, when trust is uncalibrated to the context and people trust an institution too much, negative consequences may emerge. For instance, when people’s trust is high, they are less likely to think critically, less likely to question assumptions, and are more susceptible to the “halo effect” and stereotyping (e.g., Mayo, 2014; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013).

### *External Processes*

Institutions may be motivated to increase public trust in order to benefit from the positive consequences of public trust. For example, institutions enjoy less monitoring and vigilant attention to their activities when public trust is high, as well as higher commitment and lower conflict compared to institutions with low public trust (Gargiulo & Ertug, 2006). Institutions with high public trust are also more likely to elicit increased cooperation and compliance—surely benefits institutions seek (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998; Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2003).

Given such benefits, it is probably no surprise that institutions do seek to enhance public trust. Take, for example, the Obama Administration’s Open Government Initiative, an undertaking designed explicitly to “ensure the public trust” (Obama, 2009, para. 1). Or the National Center for State Courts (2000) action plan to “build public trust and confidence” in the courts (p. 6). A search for *enhancing public trust* on Google’s Web search engine reveals a half billion results. Many of these results discuss the importance of and strategies for increasing the public’s trust with regard to institutions as varied as the healthcare system, agriculture, banks, the food safety regulatory system, police, nonprofits, and the accounting profession.

Institutions can earn the public’s trust by demonstrating substantively trustworthy behavior—for example, by competently doing their job, treating people fairly and with respect, and being open about their operations. When people’s trust in institutions is based on demonstrable evidence of trustworthiness, the public trust may be well calibrated to the actual trustworthiness of the institution. But institutions also can encourage public trust through non-substantive means. For example, they can provide heuristic cues of trustworthiness—implicit cues that quickly and automatically generate trust (e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). When a person’s trust in an institution is based on heuristic credibility cues

rather than substantive information, the level of trust may or may not be calibrated to the actual trustworthiness of the institution.

Examples of the effectiveness of heuristic cues include Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson's (2014) demonstration that exposure to the symbols of judicial authority (justices in black robes, a temple-like building, a gavel) compared to abstract symbols that somewhat mimicked the judicial symbols in shape and form (black lines, image of white marble, wooden surface) bolstered institutional support, perceptions of legitimacy, and acquiescence to court rulings with which people disagreed. Similarly, Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski, and Gross (2007) found that Israelis' exposure to their flag—a symbol for many of nationality, centrism, and cooperation—increased bipartisan support for key political issues, voting intentions, and actual voting behavior in a national election. Relatedly, subtle exposure to the United States' flag—which is associated more with the Republican than Democratic Party in Americans' minds—appears to increase support for Republican candidates (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011). Also studying the role of heuristic processes, Sah, Moore, and MacCoun (2013) showed that people used an advisor's confidence as a heuristic cue to judge his or her credibility and trustworthiness; more confident advisors were perceived as more credible. Furthermore, when substantive information about the advisors' errors was available but hard or expensive to access, people made less of an effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors than they did for unconfident advisors. These results reveal ways in which people's trust in institutions could be susceptible to external manipulation.

### *Internal Processes*

Various internal cognitive, affective, and motivational processes also influence people's institutional trust. Such processes appear to involve generalizable properties of human psychology and they also involve individual differences in trustors, in that their reasoning and assimilation of information may be biased by their preexisting preferences or attitudes (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). For instance, MacCoun and Paletz (2009) showed that citizens were more skeptical of the findings of a hypothetical scientific study when the findings contradicted their prior beliefs about the topic.

Cultural cognition theory sheds further light on intraindividual characteristics that impact people's trust in institutions, as it postulates that heuristic mechanisms or "mental shortcuts" people use to make rapid judgments interact with cultural values (e.g., Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil, & Slovic, 2010). That is, due to the cultural "glasses" through which people view the world, people pay attention to, attribute value to, remember, and evaluate information differently. Such cultural views include preferences about how society should be organized (such as egalitarian vs. hierarchist, individualist vs. communitarian preferences). The cultural cognition framework demonstrates how the same information, when processed through the same heuristic processes (such as credibility cues, availability and representa-

tiveness, status-quo bias, loss aversion, emotion, and so forth), can generate different judgments in people with opposing worldviews. Thus, people may be motivated to trust certain institutions or institutional representatives that fit their cultural worldviews and rely on the “internal” mechanisms of cultural cognition to find reasons to support their desire to trust the institutions.

People can also benefit psychologically from feeling they can trust public institutions. A robust body of literature demonstrates that people are motivated to palliate perceived threats to safety, security, and a sense of meaning and understanding (see Shockley & Shepherd, 2016, for considerable detail on this topic). These psychological motivations may lead people to increase their trust in institutions, independent of the actions of the institutions, in order to restore a comfortable psychological state. Thus, motivational processes internal to the trustor can generate unearned institutional trust. This is a process called *compensatory institutional trust* (see Shockley & Shepherd, 2016). In a recent study, Schilke, Reimann, and Cook (2015) showed that such motivated cognition is particularly pronounced and leads to heightened trust when the trustor has relatively low (as opposed to high) structural power, with stark power-differences being characteristic of the public’s trust in institutional authorities. This finding suggests that excessive trust may be especially common when the trusting individual is highly dependent on a powerful institution.

## The “Darkest Side”: When “External” and “Internal” Processes Intersect

External and internal processes also might intersect in ways that reveal implications for the “darkest side” of institutional trust. Specifically, when institutions know about the internal susceptibilities and vulnerabilities of trustors, and when they are in a position to leverage mechanisms through which high trust can be generated, institutions might take advantage of that knowledge to orchestrate and *manipulate* an increase in trust to motivate compliance and reap other benefits of high public trust.

Let’s explore how this might occur, returning to some of the illustrations provided above. Gibson et al. (2014) found that exposure to the trappings of judicial authority increases perceptions of legitimacy and acquiescence to disagreeable rulings. Although the Supreme Court’s opinions often reflect public opinion (Friedman, 2009; Mishler & Sheehan, 1993), the Justices may at times make decisions based on their individual ideologies (Collins & Cooper, 2014). If the Justices decide a case in such a way as to make new public policy that is not supported by most of the public (especially if the legal interpretation and justification are not terribly compelling), and if they know that demonstrating symbols of their authority make people more accepting of the Court’s power and legitimacy, the justice(s) might purposely highlight the physical and symbolic trappings of their judicial authority when communi-

cating their decision in order to boost perceptions of legitimacy and temper public protest.

As a second example, suppose a candidate from the Republican Party is trailing in projected election polls and knows the literature suggesting that exposing United States citizens to the American flag affects their voting behavior and increases support for Republican candidates (Carter et al., 2011). The candidate could, in an attempt to boost the chance of winning the election, alter her/his campaign materials and advertisements to include more images of the national flag. This candidate would be capitalizing on exposure to the flag and “internal” heuristic processing mechanisms through the strategic use of symbols (i.e., images of the flag) to make conservative values salient and accessible and thus more likely to influence people’s judgments and perceptions (e.g., Salancik & Conway, 1975).

As a couple of final examples, institutional elites might be aware that people are motivated to trust in and defer to the decisions of the institution especially when tasks or issues are complex and difficult for people to understand (Shepherd & Kay, 2012). The institution might leverage this knowledge to purposely make issues seem very complex, such as using highly complicated language or even “legalese” so that the public disengages from participating and frees the institution to decide how to handle the issue on its own. Or perhaps knowing that displays of confidence increase trust and reduce people’s motivation to look for disconfirming evidence (e.g., Sah et al., 2013), institutions might intentionally act confident, even when they are not, in order to “mask” potential problems within the institution. Finally, communicating and emphasizing how dependent the public is on an institution may lead people to engage in greater motivated reasoning and, in turn, to place excessive trust on the institution (Schilke et al., 2015). These examples might reflect (perhaps common) manifestations of the “darkest side” of institutional trust. Figure 1 summarizes the external, internal, and intersecting processes driving too-high trust that are discussed in this chapter.

## **Context-Specific Applications of the “Dark Side” of Institutional Trust**

In this section, we offer context-specific examples of external, internal, and intersecting processes of the dark side of institutional trust. We do so by drawing upon research on organizations and legal, governmental, and political systems.

### ***Organizations***

Scholarly research on the role of trust in organizational contexts has proliferated substantially in recent years (Cook & Schilke, 2010; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). Many organizational systems are characterized by high levels of uncertainty, and it






Fig. 1 Framework of external, internal, and intersecting processes driving too-high trust

is under high uncertainty when trust becomes an important issue (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Organizations are trusted by various stakeholder groups (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011)—most notably employees, customers, suppliers, alliance partners, and investors. These trustors rely on a variety of cues in determining the trustworthiness of an organization (Schilke & Cook, 2015). While making trust judgments, external and internal processes as well as their intersection can be responsible for too much trust being placed in organizations.

*External Processes.* There are several examples of organizations that produced excessive levels of trust through selective communication, but the Enron Corporation—the now-bankrupt major American energy company—is probably the most prominent one. As Currall and Epstein’s (2003) case study makes clear, Enron strategically manufactured an image of a super-trustworthy firm. While aggressively communicating academic credentials and philanthropic activities of their top management team, along with the innovativeness of their business model and the track record of their ever-increasing stock price, Enron withheld information on many of its business practices so that outsiders did not have full information on the firm’s operations (Mardjono, 2005; Sridharan, Caines, McMillan, & Summers, 2002). This lack of disclosure and transparency successfully masked the company’s actual performance and held trust high.

Another prominent situation in which organizations disclose positive signals while holding back negative information is during mergers and acquisitions. This practice is called “window dressing.” Although investors tend to be aware of window dressing activities being the norm rather the exception, it can nonetheless lead

to significant problems in that the buying firm places too much trust in the economic health of the target firm. One such situation was when the AT&T Corporation, a major American telecommunications company, acquired the NCR Corporation, an American computer hardware, software, and electronics company. AT&T's value-destroying acquisition of NCR in the early 1990s is frequently attributed to AT&T falling victim to significant intransparencies (Lys & Vincent, 1995).

*Internal Processes.* The Enron case mentioned earlier can also be used to illustrate a key internal process of the dark side of trust: people's susceptibility to social influence when making trust judgments (Currall & Epstein, 2003). Especially on Wall Street, investment firm analysts fell victim to normative perceptions when assessing Enron. If so many other analysts issue a "buy" recommendation, what could possibly be wrong with Enron? Given that Enron seemed to be everybody's darling, it became increasingly difficult for individual analysts to make the case against Enron's trustworthiness.

Another internal process responsible for excessive levels of trust in organizations is related to status quo bias, or a preference for and acceptance of the current state of affairs (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Especially in long-term relationships with an organization, people may develop a tendency to scrutinize their trust perceptions of that organization to a far lesser extent (Grayson & Ambler, 1999). In other words, people may over time become lazy and place unwarranted trust in the organization. This claim is supported by recent research in decision neuroscience that finds cognitive resources devoted to trust judgments to decline with increasing relationship length, with trust being maintained even under circumstances when trust is clearly violated (Schilke, Reimann, & Cook, 2013). This might be explained by the lack of clarity in a trust violation. Even if a breach of trust by an organization is suspected, it is often very difficult to prove (Anderson & Jap, 2005). For example, are delivery problems really the fault of the organization or are those problems beyond that organization's control? The difficulties and significant effort involved in identifying and proving untrustworthy behavior of an organization may lead trustors to neglect or even deny any problems.

*Intersecting Processes.* A Ponzi scheme—a fraudulent investment operation in which the investments of later investors are used to pay "returns" to earlier investors—exemplifies a manifestation of the darkest side of trust where external and internal processes intersect. Organizations involved in Ponzi schemes strategically manipulate how people make sense of the situation and assign trust. Bernard Madoff's \$65 billion Ponzi scheme stands out not just in terms of its magnitude but also in terms of its sophistication of trust manipulation (Kramer, 2009). Madoff was a master at managing social connections; once he had his foot in the door with one investor in a particular community, he made sure that this investor's contacts were made aware of the investment opportunity so that social influence processes could kick in. Another internal process that Ponzi scheme operators frequently leverage is unrealistic optimism. It is well known that people often overestimate the likelihood of positive things happening to them (e.g., Weinstein, 1980), even if deep down they are fully aware that certain things seem too good to be true. Ponzi schemes cater to this illusion by secretly using investments of late investors for paying earlier invest-

tors instead of legitimate investment returns. In so doing, the schemes’ operators solicit trust and encourage higher risk-taking through the illusion that investing is genuinely lucrative.

### ***Legal, Governmental, and Political Systems***

Here we focus on examples of external, internal, and interactive processes that lend themselves toward the “dark side” of too-high trust in legal, governmental, and political institutions.

*External Processes.* Shockley and Fairdosi (2015) present the problem of democracy failing to deliver on its promises. In theory, democracy functions as a system in which citizens’ equal participation in the legislative process is normatively prescribed. This view of democracy relies upon the ability of these citizens to gain an informed understanding about policies (Dahl, 1998). Direct democracy, contrasted with representative democracy in which citizens self-govern indirectly through elected representatives, involves a transfer of power away from elites and toward citizens. It has long been theorized that this highly participatory style of democracy would, if implemented, lead to the citizenry being more engaged, informed, and efficacious (Barnett, 1915; Bryce, 1910; Cree, 1892; Garner, 1907; Haynes, 1907; Key & Crouch, 1939; Munro, 1912; Sullivan, 1892).

Shockley and Fairdosi (2015) detail research revealing disappointingly low levels of participation of American citizens in direct democracy compared with candidate elections (Cronin, 1989; Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Everson, 1981). These consequences may result from the complex language that characterizes ballot initiatives and policy descriptions (Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Magleby, 1984). Indeed, issues put to a popular vote are often written as complicated legislative proposals with technical language. Even official descriptions of upcoming ballot initiatives can be excessively complexly worded (LaPalombara, 1950; Magleby, 1984). Furthermore, longer ballots are thought to encourage abstention (Cronin, 1989; Darcy & Schneider, 1989; Dubin & Kalsow, 1994; Dubois & Feeney, 1998; Magleby, 1984).

Inaccessible language can be deliberately used in proposed statutes, charter or constitutional amendments, and local ordinances as well as in their descriptions mailed to citizens. A choice to use complex language in this way might be made in order to increase abstention should that serve elites’ agendas. To the extent that participatory democracy is prescribed within a governmental and political context, this is a dark side of institutional trust undermining participation. Specifically, we theorize that ballot initiative complexity increases institutional trust among a citizenry that may not trust itself to self-govern.

*Internal Processes.* What role do internal processes play in generating too-high trust in legal, governmental, and political systems? One such process is the intraindividual experience associated with encountering a complex policy or social issue. This experience may lead to confusion and, in turn, compensatory institutional trust

(Shockley & Shepherd, 2016). Indeed, in terms of the aforementioned context of direct democracy, American citizens report high levels of confusion (Bowler & Donovan, 1998; Cronin, 1989; Dubois & Feeney, 1998).

Supporting such a notion, Shepherd and Kay (2012) found that exposure to a sociopolitical issue described in complex language induces confusion regarding the issue. In turn, this confusion appears to lead individuals to perceive low personal control, feel dependent upon a relevant institution, have *greater* trust in the institution to manage the issue, and avoid further information about the issue. Furthermore, avoidance of information renders individuals less capable of effectively participating in democratic decision making regarding the issue in the future, and may impact participation in social movements and challenges to the status quo more generally. When people read about a policy in confusing language, they may feel insufficiently competent to understand and participate effectively in politics (Bowler & Donovan, 2002; Smith & Tolbert, 2004) and may resolve this low sense of personal control by trusting that institutional elites have a handle on policy issues. Via internal processes, citizens who do not trust themselves appear motivated to trust in institutions instead, functionally outsourcing political engagement to trusted institutions and their elites. Indeed, Shockley and Fairdosi (2015) found support for these notions. In their experimental research, participants who were randomly assigned to read about an ostensible ballot initiative in complex (rather than simple) language reported a lower likelihood of voting on the policy as well as higher trust in the agencies involved in crafting the legislation.

Another internal process impacting institutional trust is the way in which the “pageantry” of symbols of judicial authority—including gavels and robes—encourages citizens to accept judicial decisions (Gibson et al., 2014, p. 838). The internal portion of this process is enabled by cognitive and affective associations (Lodge & Taber, 2000) between judicial symbols and legitimacy among individuals who associate judicial symbols with the positive characteristic of legitimacy. Mental activation of individuals’ cognitive and affective (psychological) associations between the courts and legitimacy and of the legitimacy-acquiescence link (i.e., that perceived legitimacy facilitates the acceptance of judicial decisions with which ones disagrees; Tyler, 2006) via judicial symbols may lead individuals to be more accepting of judicial decisions and more obedient.

*Intersecting Processes.* Importantly, internal processes that generate greater institutional trust or perceived legitimacy can be capitalized upon by institutions. Institutional elites may not only capitalize upon processes that generate greater institutional trust among citizens—such as compensatory trust or the legitimacy and acquiescence-boosting effects of judicial symbols—but may also catalyze or enhance these processes through orchestrated manipulations of the processes internal to citizens. For instance, the Supreme Court could manipulate the public’s attitudes in a way that enhances a positive association between exposure to judicial symbols and acquiescence to the Court’s decisions. We will illustrate with such an example.

Gibson et al. (2014) found that experimentally manipulated exposure to judicial symbols only boosted acquiescence to a decision of the Supreme Court of the

United States among individuals relatively supportive of the Court. This finding is consistent with the aforementioned framework of Lodge and Taber (2000) because it is among these individuals with positive attitudes toward the Court that judicial symbols are associated with the positive characteristic of legitimacy. Among such citizens, mental activation of the cognitive and affective association between the courts and legitimacy should increase the likelihood of accepting the Court’s decisions. Within this framework, it is also the case that individuals who are generally less supportive of the Court should experience a reduced likelihood of acquiescence to the Court’s decisions when exposed to judicial symbols due to the negative valence of their associations. This is essentially what Gibson et al. also found. What, then, are the implications for the intersection of internal and external processes of the dark sides of trust?

Imagine that the Supreme Court generates higher support among the citizenry and then capitalizes upon the fact that individuals high in support for the Court are more likely to accept its decisions when exposed to judicial symbols. This ultimately should maximize rates of acquiescence following exposure to the pageantry of judicial authority, such as the symbolism of judges’ robes. Thus, this would reflect a dark side of trust at the intersection of the types of internal and external processes we have discussed. How might the Court generate higher support among citizens in order to achieve especially high rates of acquiescence? Judges framing decisions as principled—as opposed to political—leads to increases in citizens’ perceptions of judicial legitimacy (Gibson & Caldeira, 2011). Thus, portraying judicial decisions as principled—even if they are to some extent political—might boost support for the Court in such a way that exposure to judicial symbols results in even greater acquiescence among citizens to the Court’s decisions.

## Future Directions and Conclusions

There is no shortage of potential future directions regarding the dark sides of institutional trust. The theoretical and empirical literatures suggest that both context-specific lines of inquiry and research into cross-cutting issues related to the dark side of institutional trust will be generative. To what degree do institutions intentionally and manipulatively boost perceptions of trust in order to benefit from high public trust? Gargiulo and Ertug (2006) suggest institutions may be motivated to increase public trust in order to reduce monitoring and vigilance about their activities, increase public commitment, and reduce conflict regarding their missions and activities. Might the goal of increasing public compliance and cooperation with institutional preferences also motivate institutions to boost public trust? What are the ethical implications of studying how institutions can improve public trust?

A better understanding of the reach of trust generated from intraindividual motivational, cognitive, and attitudinal processes is also essential for appreciating the dark side of trust in institutional contexts. For instance, do judicial symbols like robes impact trust in nonjudicial—but institutionally relevant—entities? Can judi-

cial symbols impact trust toward law enforcement because of the cognitive connections between courts and the police? With regard to the motivation to trust institutions when feeling low in comprehension of sociopolitical issues, might we see boosts in trust of superordinate institutions? For instance, can direct democracy ballot initiatives at the state level (i.e., in one of the United States) that are characterized by incomprehensible language not only motivate greater trust in state legislators but also the state government more generally, other branches of state government, or even components of the federal government? Relatedly, could exposure to complex or incomprehensible policies motivate greater trust in candidates with specific traits during candidate elections? Perhaps a low sense of understanding sociopolitical issues may motivate greater trust in candidates with an autocratic leadership style. After all, feeling that one lacks the understanding necessary to effectively participate in policy decisions may lead one to see candidates with autocratic rather than more democratic leadership styles as more competent and thus trustworthy.

Thus, we end this chapter with a call for more empirical research on the issue of how too much trust in institutions can be problematic. We also encourage scholars studying trust and related constructs, as well as institutions interested in increasing their perceived trust to think about the ethical nuances of increasing trust. As per the Goldilocks principle, there may just be an optimal “middle ground” for institutional trust, toward which understanding would be a worthwhile goal.

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# Compensatory Institutional Trust: A “Dark Side” of Trust

Ellie Shockley and Steven Shepherd

Scholars of institutional trust often emphasize the importance of trust research given that trust is integral to the functioning of democracy (Newton, 2001; Warren, 1999), economic development and trade (Fukuyama, 1995), and societal functioning in general (Putnam, 1995). However, evidence suggests there is a “dark side” to trust (Neal, Shockley, & Schilke, 2016). In the current chapter, we discuss a specific facet of the dark side of individuals’ trust in institutions. We review theory and evidence suggesting that individuals’ trust in institutions can be generated in order to satisfy existential and epistemic (psychological) needs. In other words, when experiencing threats to safety, security, or a sense of meaning and understanding, individuals will sometimes trust institutions more than they otherwise would, and without any demonstration of greater trustworthiness on the part of institutions. A motivated increase in institutional trust or the perception that institutions are trustworthy may palliate existential and epistemic threats, making them less unpleasant without addressing the source of such threats. We refer to this process as *compensatory institutional trust*.

We detail some theoretical perspectives that speak to compensatory institutional trust, namely, terror management theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2008; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004), theory on system-justifying beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012; Lerner, 1980), compensatory control theory (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009), and the meaning maintenance model (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). We emphasize these perspectives’ relations to compensatory institutional trust as resulting from epistemic and existential motives. In doing so, we review illustrative examples of empirical evidence of

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compensatory institutional trust-relevant processes, including some scholarship that may connect with our framework of compensatory institutional trust despite not belonging to one of the aforementioned theoretical traditions. Altogether, we aim to illuminate the utility of the compensatory institutional trust framework by shedding light on psychological processes that may underlie findings in the trust literature. Ultimately, we make a call to scholars of institutional trust to consider the relevance of compensatory trust processes to their work and suggest that future scholarship not neglect this dark side of trust.


## The Psychological Bases of Compensatory Institutional Trust

First, it is important to clarify what we mean by institutions so that the concept of compensatory institutional trust is clear. We include in this concept diverse organizations, including foundations, societies, firms and industry, schools, governments and all of their branches and agencies, the media, charities, and so on. Further, for our purposes, the targets of compensatory institutional trust can be not only organizations but also the individuals of which they are composed.<sup>1</sup>

We emphasize in our framework the roles of existential and epistemic threats in driving compensatory institutional trust. Epistemic motives are the drives for information, knowledge, and the perception of meaning (Kruglanski, 1989). Humans are motivated to gain information about their environment and to integrate said information to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity and to see orderly and predictable causal relationships between events. Existential motives are the drives for safety, security, and the avoidance of mortality (Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Individuals vary in the strength of these motives; for instance, individuals vary in their tolerance of ambiguity (Fibert & Ressler, 1998) and in their needs for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). However, epistemic and existential motives are theorized as experienced by all humans and thus individuals are generally susceptible to psychological threat when feeling low in understanding, unable to perceive meaningful connections between events, acutely aware of their mortality, etc. To the extent that an institution appears to provide the sort of information, meaning, and sense of safety sought by epistemically or existentially threatened individuals, they may engage in motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) directed toward perceiving greater trustworthiness of said institution. Thus, compensatory institutional trust involves a “hydraulic” process (Heine et al., 2006)—also referred to as a “fluid compensation” (Steele, 1988), “threat-compensation” (Proulx, 2012), or “violation-compensation” (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012) process—in which trust in an institution compensates for feelings of psychological threat. See Fig. 1 for an illustration.

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<sup>1</sup> We remain agnostic with regard to theoretical differentiation between trust in institutions and trust in the individuals within institutions because that is not within the scope of this chapter. For further discussion of this issue, see Campos-Castillo et al. (2016) as well as Herian and Neal (2016).



**Fig. 1** Individuals are susceptible to psychological threat when faced with low sense of safety, security, certainty, control, meaning, and so on. To the extent that an institution appears to offer information, meaning, sense of safety, etc. sought by a threatened individual, s/he may engage in motivated reasoning toward greater trust in said institution. Thus, compensatory institutional trust involves a “hydraulic” process in which trust increases due to psychological threat

Following, we review some theoretical frameworks that predict and seek to explain when compensatory institutional trust may arise as a result of existential and epistemic psychological threats. Namely, we discuss research on terror management, system-justifying beliefs, compensatory control, and meaning maintenance.

### ***Terror Management Theory***

Terror management theory postulates that the knowledge of the inevitability of one’s mortality represents a profound threat to a sense of life as valuable and meaningful. Humans can ease the terror associated with salience of their mortality through cultural systems related to claims of literal immortality (i.e., an afterlife) or symbolic immortality (e.g., cultural group identity, Greenberg et al., 1990) that allow individuals to participate in a system that will live on after personal death, ultimately providing a sense of meaning and value for life (Greenberg et al., 1986; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Indeed, a meta-analysis of 31 experiments (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013) that tested terror management theory hypotheses indicated that experimentally induced awareness of one’s mortality increases adherence to one’s worldview (such as greater support for a candidate who shares one’s political orientation).

In one relevant example within the literature, Landau and colleagues (2004) employ terror management theory to argue that the salience of one’s mortality should amplify the trust and confidence one has in charismatic political leaders. Such leaders offer symbolic immortality because they forward a cultural and socio-political system that is assumed to continue beyond one’s lifetime. This assuages the threat associated with one’s mortality. Thus, they essentially propose a process in

which an existential threat leads to compensation in the form of institutional trust. Leaders with the greatest appeal are those who make citizens feel safe, secure, and part of a sustained social system.

Landau et al. (2004) tested their hypotheses with experiments. They found that reminding United States research participants of their own mortality increased their support for George W. Bush, President of the USA at the time, and for the counter-terrorism policies of his presidency that followed the 9/11 terrorism events on American soil in 2001. Further, subtle exposure to stimuli related to the 9/11 terrorism events generated morality salience, predicting support for President Bush.

### ***System-Justifying Beliefs***

An important motive is to see one's world as just and fair; that is, that good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people (Lerner, 1980). According to Lerner, individuals are motivated to believe they live in a just world so that they are able to go about their daily lives with trust and confidence in their future's outcomes. Due to this desire, a great deal of trust may be placed in institutions, such as the political and legal system, that help to maintain these perceptions of a just world.

Given the importance of these social systems in creating perceptions of a fair and just society and a sense of order (Kay et al., 2008), and given our dependence on these systems and the difficulty of leaving them (Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011), people are generally motivated to defend these systems and see them as legitimate (e.g., Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Part of legitimizing authority and social systems more broadly is accepting and obeying the rules of these authorities (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Lind, 1992), trusting the competence and functioning of these systems, and trusting that these systems will determine appropriate outcomes for the self.

Perceiving one's social system as difficult to leave leads to beliefs that justify the system's status quo. For instance, Laurin et al. (2010) found that experimentally decreasing individuals' perception that they have freedom of movement nationally—inducing them to construe emigration from their nation as difficult to attain—led them to perceive gender inequality in their country as less unfair. Further, experimentally decreasing students' sense of freedom of movement from their university to another university led them to report *less* interest in and support for a group focused on criticizing their university. In short, perceived system dependence or inescapability motivates individuals to trust existing social arrangements and see them as what ought to be.

Further evidence suggests that perceived dependence on authorities and systems predicts trust in authorities in the context of education, politics, and the legal system. For instance, van der Toorn et al. (2011) found that students who brought a school-related conflict to an academic authority for mediation reported greater trust and confidence in said individual when students perceived the individual as having great

authority over their resolution decisions. This was true when controlling for whether or not the students felt the procedures were fair and whether or not they felt the outcome of the mediation was favorable. Thus, perceived dependence predicted institutional trust.

van der Toorn et al. (2011) also found that urban Californians experiencing a water shortage perceived greater legitimacy of a water regulatory agency when they perceived the water shortage as having a large impact upon their household. This also was true even when controlling for whether the Californians felt the water regulatory procedures were fair and whether they perceived past water conservation decisions’ outcomes as favorable to their household. Again, van der Toorn et al. argue that perceived dependence was associated with institutional trust—specifically perceived legitimacy in this case.

As a last example of van der Toorn et al.’s (2011) evidence of the dependence–trust link, these authors found that New Yorkers who perceived a high neighborhood crime rate also perceived greater legitimacy of the New York Police Department (NYPD) and reported a greater obligation to obey the NYPD. This was true even when controlling for whether the New Yorkers felt they had a voice in police decision making and whether they perceived the police as effective and helpful. Thus, dependence on police protection due to perceiving high crime rates was associated with perceiving legitimacy of the NYPD.

Individual differences in subscribing to system-justifying ideologies more generally also shed light on compensatory trust. Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988), for instance, is defined in part by willingly submitting to established authorities perceived as legitimate, in essence trusting and not questioning the decisions of those authorities. Individual differences more generally that relate to compensatory trust in the status quo’s institutions and broader system include resistance to social change; trust in religious authorities and economic elites; favorable attitudes toward corporations, politicians, the police, and the military (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008); and valuing social stability and tradition (Bilsky & Schwarz, 1994; Schwartz, 1994).

## ***Compensatory Control Theory***

Considerable evidence strongly suggests that people are driven to perceive the world as orderly and nonrandom (e.g., Kay et al., 2008; Kruglanski, 1989; Landau et al., 2004; Lerner, 1980; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). This motivated perception goes above and beyond merely physical relations, as our species’ ecologies are exceptionally cultural and relational (Heine et al., 2006). A sense of personal control over one’s outcomes is one means through which one can perceive outcomes as nonrandom. However, perceptions of personal control can vary across situations and individuals (Burger, 1989; Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000; Pepitone & Saffiotti, 1997; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984), which can lead people to compensate by seeking order and structure that is imposed and external to the self.

Compensatory control theory (Kay et al., 2008, 2009) posits that when one perceives low personal control over outcomes, one can compensate by perceiving greater control of outcomes from external sources, such as religious institutions and government. Thus, the need for order and control in the world can serve as an antecedent to motivated institutional trust. For example, in their cross-national analysis, Kay et al. (2008) found that among individuals who perceived their government as benevolent, those who perceived that people do not have much control over their outcomes tended to report a greater preference for the government to take responsibility for individuals' outcomes. Evidence also suggests that experimentally inducing a feeling of lack of control (for example, asking people to recall a time when they lacked control) leads to similar results. Specifically, individuals lacking in perceived control report greater support for a political candidate whose platform satiates a need for order and control by addressing economic turmoil, bringing order and stability to people's lives, and alleviating concerns about future uncertainty (Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011). Threats to personal control also increase believing in the inevitability of human progress and trusting in science to solve various problems facing humanity, such as environmental issues (Rutjens, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2010). Thus, individuals can compensate for a low sense of personal control by trusting scientific institutions.

Lacking agency and feeling dependent on external authorities to deal with an issue can be problematic. What if the authority is not looking out for one's best interests? What if the authority is not capable of managing this issue? To believe that an entity one is dependent upon is untrustworthy (e.g., perceiving a lack of benevolence and competence) would be psychologically threatening. As such, feeling unknowledgeable about a given domain or issue may lead people to bolster their trust in an institution (Shepherd & Kay, 2012). This trust could be maintained by willfully ignoring information that could undermine it, such as information suggesting that the issue is too severe for a government to fully manage it. Evidence of this was found across multiple domains, including energy and economic issues (Shepherd & Kay, 2012). In a series of studies, Shepherd and Kay found that framing a social issue in complex (vs. simple, easy-to-understand) terms led individuals to believe they were more dependent on their government, to perceive they had less personal agency, to report greater trust in government entities, and to avoid learning new information about the social issue. Extending this work, Shockley and Fairdosi (2015) found that the use of complex (vs. simple) language in the description of an ostensible state-level initiative led to greater trust in government agencies and a lower likelihood of voting on the issue.

### ***Meaning Maintenance Model***

Finally, an acknowledgement of the meaning maintenance model (Heine et al., 2006) and its relevance to compensatory institutional trust is crucial. This framework aims to comprehensively explain "hydraulic" compensatory processes, such as illustrated

in Fig. 1, involved in the empirical work discussed so far. In fact, this final framework aims to integrate the preceding theories (as well as others) to demonstrate the fluidity of psychological compensation. In other words, contemporary institutional trust is a product of a broader phenomenon where people are motivated to compensate for cognitive conflicts and expectancy violations (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012).

For instance, in one relevant experiment (Proulx & Heine, 2008), participants were present when an experimenter administering the study was covertly switched with a somewhat similar-looking, identically dressed experimenter. The first experimenter stepped back behind a filing cabinet and then was replaced by the second experimenter. The change, being improbable and absurd and difficult to confirm, did not lead participants to explicitly realize the experimenter had changed. However, compared to a control condition, this implicit violation of basic expectations about the world (i.e., humans do not usually transform in this way) led participants to report they would more harshly (hypothetically) punish someone who violated the law. Specifically, participants in the experimental condition suggested a higher bail for a described sex worker—someone who did not obey the law, given that prostitution was illegal in this context. Thus, participants appeared to compensate for a threat to their presumed apolitical, fundamental belief that we live in an orderly, sensible, and predictable world by perceiving a greater obligation for citizens to obey the law. Why might this be? Perceiving a defensible legal and criminal justice system should, in theory, lead to restoration of palliating beliefs that the world is a fair and orderly place in which to live.

### ***Alternative Frameworks***

Compensatory trust may explain some findings in trust literatures that generally do not explicitly evoke an intrapsychic hydraulic process (Heine et al., 2006) such as fluid compensation (Steele, 1988) or threat and violation compensation (Proulx, 2012; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). For instance, in their chapter on institutional trust across cultures, Cole and Cohn (2016) bring our attention to some of the literature on perceived corruption and institutional trust. They highlight that Muñoz, Torcal, and Bonet (2011) found that citizens’ perceptions of corruption within a *national* institution predicted a seemingly compensatory “displacement” of trust in the *multinational* European Parliament. Thus, Muñoz and colleagues argue that living within an EU nation characterized by mistrusted national institutions generates trust in EU-wide institutions.

Perhaps a drive to see the world as an orderly, predictable place drives these findings. Individuals in corrupt or otherwise poorly performing countries may not be able to see their national institutions as a source of safety and uncertainty reduction. This may in turn motivate perceptions that EU-wide institutions are trustworthy and deserving of one’s confidence. Ultimately, believing so may provide some relief from existential or epistemic threats associated with living with highly corrupt or otherwise poorly performing institutions.



## Concluding Thoughts

We have outlined one particular component of the dark side of institutional trust. Essentially, epistemic and existential psychological threats can lead individuals to have greater trust in institutions without institutions having changed in ways that tend to generate more trust and perceptions of legitimacy (e.g., without any strengthening of actual procedural justice). We do not claim that the theoretical perspectives highlighted here represent an exhaustive review of accounts of compensatory institutional trust, as there are undoubtedly additional theoretical frameworks and empirical findings that speak to this dark side of trust. Indeed, it is the ubiquitous nature of compensatory psychological processes that led to the development of the meaning maintenance model (Heine et al., 2006).

Nevertheless, the scholarship we have discussed strongly suggests that the broader trust literature can benefit from new scholarship that is more balanced with regard to light and dark sides of institutional trust. Namely, acknowledging the potential role of compensatory institutional trust in explaining trust-related phenomena may lead to highly generative developments in the trust literature. We encourage our scholarly readers to consider their own programs of research in this light. When might compensatory trust be operating? How might the processes highlighted in this chapter illuminate phenomena of interest in your own research? We greatly look forward to any such developments in your scholarship.

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# Trust in the Twenty-First Century

Tom R. Tyler

The issue of trust has emerged as an important focus in studies of authority in the early years of the twenty-first century. This increased attention reflects both the problems of a past era of instrumentalism and the shifting nature of the concerns that are important in society and will be even more important in the future. The publication of this broad ranging volume on trust is timely because it focuses on trust and it will make an important contribution to this growing literature by approaching it from a multidisciplinary perspective.

## The Limits of the Instrumental Model

The first factor of importance in understanding the increasing attention to trust as a social science concept is increasing evidence of the limits of instrumentalism. During the last half of the twentieth century conceptions of authority have been dominated by models of governance and management based upon the rational choice model of the person. That model suggests that people's choices and behaviors are governed by their evaluations of the potential material costs and benefits that they would derive from making particular decisions and/or acting in particular ways.

This model has had a widespread impact upon society but that impact is nowhere more in evidence than in the area of law and regulation. Based upon this model of human psychology efforts to regulate behavior have focused on creating the fear of sanctions for wrongdoing. Recent research on regulation has both suggested that deterrence sometimes shapes behavior and at the same time has cast doubt on the

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strength of the deterrence model as a general model for social control. Research had done so by showing that certainty of punishment has at best a small role in shaping behavior, that severity of punishment has virtually no role in determining future actions, and that experiencing punishment is also a minimal contributor to subsequent criminal actions (Blumstein, Cohen, & Nagin, 1978; Bottoms & Von Hirsch, 2010; Lipsey & Cullen, 2007; MacCoun, 1993; McCord, Widom, & Crowell, 2001; Nagin, 1998; Nagin & Pepper, 2012; Paternoster, 2006; Piquero, Paternoster, Pogarsky, & Loughran, 2011; Pratt, Cullen, Blevens, Daigle, & Madensen, 2008; Weisberg, 2005; Wright, Caspi, Moffitt, & Paternoster, 2004). At the same time the limits of instrumental models using incentives have also been documented (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006).

The evidence of the limits of basing regulation on providing rewards or threatening/delivering punishments has led to a search for alternatives. One traditional alternative basis for maintaining social order is the value of legitimacy: the perceived obligation to obey. Research shows that legitimacy shapes rule following as much or more than sanctions (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). As a value rather than a calculation legitimacy is a general sense of responsibility to accept the directives of another and it is something that people take upon themselves and do without reference to environmental contingencies.

Like sanction-based models legitimacy-based models resting upon obligation define a reactive model of the person's relationship to authority. People feel that they should follow existing rules and authorities. Hence, people's focus is on doing what rules and authorities indicate should be done and no more. There is no framework for understanding why people might contribute more to a community, or do things that would help the community but which are not articulated by authorities or prescribed by rules. People can and do feel obligated to obey the law, but actions such as reporting crimes are viewed as more voluntary. Similarly, actions such as engaging in healthy behavior or seeing a doctor are not well motivated by obligation.

Obligation is important in terms of willing deference. An advantage of a consensual model of authority is that, unlike deterrence, the authorities do not need to be able to create a credible threat of punishment to secure rule following. People take the responsibility for following rules onto themselves. But it is linked to doing what is prescribed, and not taking personal responsibility for going beyond following rules to try to do what helps the group.

## **The Desirability of Cooperation**

It has been increasingly recognized across a range of social, political, and legal institutions that a desirable relationship for people to have with groups, organizations, communities, and society also involves active cooperation. It is not enough for people to simply follow rules, whatever motivates them to do so. It is also important that people do more than is strictly required, infusing their relationship to

a community or organization with a desire to determine what is needed for the group and then doing it. Such cooperation is less well motivated by obligation because it requires the person to go beyond the requirements of the role they are in (citizen, employee, etc.).

The willingness to go beyond rules is something that has first been seen as important in management settings. The nature of work is changing. In the past many jobs involved repetitive tasks that could be specified in advance, allowing work to be managed by close surveillance and a tight connection of work performed to incentives. At the same time this close monitoring allowed behavior in work settings to be monitored and controlled. As the USA moves into the twenty-first century it is increasingly a society in which work is defined by active voluntary efforts. Active employee cooperation leads to more effective work organizations.

This shift is reflected in the development of the concept of extra-role behavior. Extra-role behavior is work activity that employees engage in that is not part of their job description. They do it to help the organization and without expectation of reward. Closely related is the desire to motivate creativity and innovation in work. An employee who comes to work, does the specified job, and goes home is a desirable but not a sought after employee. A sought after employee engages in creative and novel efforts to achieve the goals of the work organization, devoting time and energy beyond that required to do the specified job. Such work is not effectively motivated by incentives (Amabile, 1996; De Dreu & Nauta, 2009; Latham & Pinder, 2005; Munchinsky, 2012; Schaufeli & Bakker, 2010; West & Anderson, 1996).

Of course this is not only true of work. In communities there is discussion about the need for public involvement. Within education the focus is on students becoming more involved in their classes and in learning. And, the law is concerned with people working with the police and courts to build and maintain social order. There has been a broad societal recognition that willing deference and active cooperation with authorities and institutions is central to their ability to effectively achieve societal objectives.

## **Trust as a Basis for Cooperation**

As societal concerns shift from compliance to cooperation, the instrumental model that has long dominated regulation seems increasingly inadequate as a motivational framework for explaining behavior. What can replace that framework? One candidate is models based upon trust. Trust leads people to be willing to take actions to cooperate with others under conditions in which taking those actions leaves people open to the possibility of exploitation by others. The lack of trust leads people not to be willing to take such actions, to the detriment of society.

Trust enables future action because it allows people to calibrate the risk of being vulnerable to others and to adjust their behavior to the level of vulnerability they feel comfortable accepting. This idea has been expressed in two ways. First, trust can be conceptualized in a calculative way. People estimate the likelihood that a

person will in fact perform an agreed upon action, with level of vulnerability linked to confidence in the likely actions of another (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Trust can also be seen as social in nature, with people making evaluations of the character and intentions of another (Tyler & Huo, 2002). This is motive-based trust. Motive-based trust is linked to judgments about whether or not a person will act in good faith, rather than to specific risk estimates of his/her likely future actions. In both cases, however, the key point is that trust enables future actions, actions which could not occur unless the person was willing to be vulnerable to the possibility that others would not act as expected or act in their best interests.

The distinction between instrumental and motive-based trust is linked to the degree of discretionary action people are willing to accept. Motive-based trust is important because it supports greater degrees of discretionary action. If an authority or institution is trusted to do what is right in a given setting then it is trusted to engage in actions to address a wide variety of actions within its sphere of influence. It does not receive support only when it acts in ways that are consistent with expectations. Rather, it has discretion to act broadly.

When people are dealing with rules, they focus on guidelines specified in advance. This works well in law, where there are clearly unacceptable actions that can be specified in advance. It is less effective in situations in which appropriate behavior evolves with the situation. Obligation, for example, is valuable if people feel they should do whatever the authority says. Acting morally, on the other hand, involves following prior rules. And the obligation to obey the law also limits authorities, who need a legal basis for their actions. Trust on the other hand is more open ended. We can trust someone to do what is necessary to make a project succeed or to solve a problem. This gives the authority maximum latitude to act, and our acceptance of their actions is contingent upon trusting that they are taking those actions to achieve a mutually agreed upon goal.

The role of a judge illustrates this trade-off. When there are sentencing guidelines judges follow preexisting rules. This ensures that they do not act out of prejudice. But it also means that they cannot be flexible based upon the unique history of a defendant. And, not everyone who commits the same crime has the same history and the same possibility of change in the future. So, having rules limits flexibility. Whether people are willing to let decision makers be flexible has depended upon whether they believe that they can trust judges to exercise authority in ways that are good for people in the community (Tyler, 2012).

Trust is often bundled with obligation to represent an abstract concept of legitimacy, but these two elements of legitimacy can be distinguished. Obligation reflects a reaction to authority; trust enables future action. Hence, trust is the social motivation most central to proactive cooperation. If people trust others they proactively engage in actions that involve vulnerability. Since this more active type of engagement is central to the concerns of social institutions, and since it is poorly motivated by instrumental variables, or by value-based obligation, it is the key social motivation of the twenty-first century.

The distinction between obligation and trust is elaborated in the chapter “Carving Up Concepts? Differentiating Between Trust and Legitimacy in Public Attitudes

Towards Legal Authority” by Jackson and Gau. These authors differentiate the perceived obligation to defer from trust and confidence in authorities and argue that both distinctly influence law-related behaviors. Tyler and Jackson (2014) provide data to support the distinction between obligation and trust. Their study examines the role of legitimacy in shaping compliance and cooperation. They suggest that compliance and cooperation both flow from legitimacy, but from different aspects of legitimacy. In a national sample of Americans they find support for this prediction through the finding that obligation to obey shapes compliance, but trust and confidence influence cooperation.

Trust is also important because it can be created quickly. It is not a long-term disposition. Like judgments about procedural justice or corruption, it is responsive to current conditions and recent experiences. Several chapters in the volume provide evidence of the separation of long-term dispositions from contemporaneous judgments. Hamm and Hoffman show that in a factor analysis long-term dispositional trust is distinct from measures of trust in existing authority and institutions. Uslaner talks about a moralistic trust that is separate from recent experience. And Cole and Cohn provide empirical evidence that contemporary conditions, in particular procedural justice, shape institutional trust. This gives trust-based relationships an ability to change quickly in response to situational factors, unlike values like legitimacy, which while changeable are generally long-term predispositions.

Overall, trust has qualities that are especially central to authority in our time. First, trust motivates people to proactively engage in organizations, communities, and society. Second, if authorities and institutions have it, they have discretion to take a variety of actions and to receive deference from those influenced by those actions. Third, it provides a way that authorities can rapidly motivate actions by creating trust. This combination of factors leads trust to be the core motivation that shapes the relationship between people and the social collectivities within which they live in a variety of settings.

The goal of this interdisciplinary volume is to capitalize upon this moment by developing a framework for the emerging study of trust. In particular, trust is approached from an interdisciplinary perspective. In an introductory chapter Neal, PytlikZillig, Shockley, and Bornstein point out that there is a history of interdisciplinary efforts to conceptualize and study trust. That history reflects the general recognition that trust is a key concept throughout the social sciences. The chapters in this volume seek to define trust; to explore its dynamics in social settings; and to evaluate it from a normative perspective (Is trust good or bad?). All of these questions flow from the general agreement that the key issue is whether trust encourages the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of others. And underlying this is the acknowledgment that favorable outcomes in group settings depend upon people’s willingness to trust at least some people in some settings.

What is trust? A series of papers over the years have pointed to the difficulty of clearly defining what trust means, as well as to the wide variety of ways it has been conceptualized (see also PytlikZillig & Kimbrough, 2016). Hamm, Lee, Trinkner, Wingrove, Leben, and Christina Breuer argue that there is widespread agreement that trust reflects the willingness to accept vulnerability in dealings with others. This



leads to research on the role of individual-level characteristics in shaping the willingness to trust. Campos-Castillo et al. show that both ascribed characteristics (gender, race, ethnicity) and interaction history shape the willingness to trust. These discussions fit well within the general literature on trust, where reviews of the literature suggest that trust reflects “the intention to accept vulnerability” (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007, p. 909) leading to a number of efforts to understand when people are willing to trust. Perhaps the best known of these is the Mayer et al. (1995) suggestion that the willingness to trust is based upon inferences concerning ability, benevolence, and integrity.

Jackson and Gau broaden the discussion of trust in two ways. First, they make the distinction between obligation and trust, noting that both reflect a consent-based model of authority, in contrast to the coercive model that has dominated criminal justice in recent years. But, trust is not a reactive motivation; trust encourages action based upon positive expectations about legal authorities (e.g., their honesty, doing what is right for the community). As our concerns move from compliance to cooperation, our understanding of the values needed to support discretionary authority shift from obligation, social norms, and moral values to trust.

However, Jackson and Gau also make a further point. Trust itself may be inadequate as a conceptualization for understanding proactive behavior. It may be important further that people generally believe that the authorities and institutions they deal with share a moral justification for their authority, that is, that they are normatively justified in their use of power. This moral justification comes from a perception of shared values about right and wrong (normative alignment). People are confident that legal authorities are doing what is right for the community. Jackson and Gau suggest that it is also important that authorities “act in ways that are consistent with the person’s sense of right and wrong” and that they stand up for important values.

This theme is echoed by Uslaner in his discussion of moralistic trust, which is based upon the “belief that most people share your fundamental moral values,” that the world is a benevolent place with good people living within it. Interestingly Uslaner views such trust as developing during socialization and being dispositional and hence not shaped by personal experience. Similarly, he does not find that trust is related to the nature of people’s social ties with others in the community. Finally, he argues that such trust is substantially distinct from institutional trust, in particular trust in government.

Jackson and Gau’s analysis situates trust within a larger framework of values, and in so doing distinguishes it from instrumental concerns. But, their framework further recognizes that trust is one of several values that promote engagement with institutions and authorities. These all reflect policing by consent, not coercion. Beyond policing Jackson and Gau’s conceptual analysis suggests that authority in the twenty-first century can be reconceptualized to include but not be limited to issues of trust.

The discussion of trust raises the distinction between background and psychological antecedents of trust. Definitions of trust generally view it as something that flows from inferences about the motivations and character of the person being

trusted (Tyler & Kramer, 1996). For example, Mayer et al. (1995) identify three such characteristics: ability, benevolence, and integrity. In addition, several authors in this volume note that issues such as ethnicity and gender, as well as familiarity, shape trust. What is needed is an integrated analysis that unites these two levels of concern. As an example, Tyler and Huo (2002) found that differences in race only influenced reactions to the decisions of authorities when they shaped whether people felt fairly/unfairly treated. There was not a direct influence of ethnicity on decision acceptance.

## Domains of Trust

It is also important to note a further distinction in efforts to define trust: the difference between personal and institutional trust. As many of the authors in this volume note, these two elements of trust are clearly distinct and different. People may trust the President, someone they have never met, and they may trust their manager, whom they deal with every day. But these two forms of trust must have distinct antecedents since familiarity leads to personal trust.

The effort to define domains of trust leads authors such as Hamm and Hoffman to ask how it is most appropriate to define such domains. Three approaches have been used. One is to define trust conceptually based upon theory. As an example, Beetham (1991) defines legitimacy by looking at political philosophy and defining when people ought to view an authority as legitimate. Similarly, it is possible to ask what characteristics ought to define trustworthiness. When should we place our trust in others, particularly people who hold positions of responsibility in society: judges, doctors, political leaders?

Other approaches are more empirical. The approach of Hamm and Hoffman relies upon identifying a wide variety of possible meanings, creating a questionnaire that reflects them, and factor analyzing answers. That approach leads them to suggest that care, competence, confidence, process fairness, and value similarity are all part of one common definition of trust. And, they are distinct from dispositional trust.

This empirical approach can clash with the theoretical when the various elements define different theoretical frameworks. In the case of trust, the Mayer definition of ability, benevolence, and integrity defines trust as including both instrumental (ability) and social (benevolence and integrity) elements. But, is trust instrumental or is it social? This is a question that can be addressed empirically. But it is obscured through a factor analysis approach. Tyler and Degoey (1996) directly compare competence and benevolence as trust-inspiring factors and argue that trust is primarily social.

Finally, it is possible to define elements of trust by looking at their ability to predict behavior. From the discussion above it is clear that at least I would argue trust is key because it predicts cooperation. So, it would be possible to ask whether different aspects of trust make a distinct contribution to this behavior. Tyler and

Jackson (2014) use this approach to define legitimacy. They look at the ability of obligation, trust, and normative alignment to make a distinct contribution to cooperation. Their analysis suggests that all three elements are important. Applying this approach to trust would involve looking at the distinct contributions made by each element of trust to some target behavior, and I would suggest that cooperation is that target behavior.

Similarly Tyler and Degoey (1996) show that trust is social by comparing the ability of perceived competence and perceived benevolence to predict the willingness to accept the decisions made by authorities in legal and managerial settings. Their analysis is similar to the broad scope of this volume because it considers legal and managerial authorities and finds similar results in both arenas.

## The Dark Side of Trust

Trust, like justice, can enable cooperation and make society better (Tyler, 2012). However, recent writing about system justification has also made it clear that people are motivated to find reasons to trust and cooperate with authority when there are reasons to believe that their own self-interest would dictate a more skeptical approach (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Similarly, on an individual level people in positions of power do not always act in the interests of those over whom they exercise authority and giving them discretion is not always a good idea (Grunefeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

This potential dark side of trust is identified by Neal, Shockley, and Schilke (2016). As Neal et al. note, their discussion of the dark side of trust stands in contrast to the generally positive way that trust is presented in this volume and in the literature more broadly. Their distinction between the ways that authorities work to create trust (external) and the person's need to feel trust (internal) is important. The idea of internal motivation fits well within the framework of justifying motivations that has become important in social psychology through the work of Jost and his group. And the clear gains to authorities from having trust are also noted.

Shockley and Shepherd develop the idea of unearned trust by suggesting that people can view authorities as trustworthy to meet their needs for safety and security and to create a sense of meaning (existential and epistemic needs). This theme unites terror management theories and models of system justification, both of which argue that people are motivated to see the world as orderly and just. Of particular interest is compensatory control theory, which suggests that when people feel low personal control they heighten their belief in the trustworthiness of external authorities such as governmental or religious leaders. This same argument underlies "the meaning maintenance model." These authors note a connection to the chapter "Institutional Trust Across Cultures: Its Definitions, Conceptualizations, and Antecedents Across Eastern and Western European Nations" by Cole and Cohn which demonstrates that when people feel distrust toward one set of institutions,

that paradoxically enhances the trust they feel for other institutions. In their case distrust in national government leads to heightened trust in the European Union.

This review chapter makes it clear that trust can be viewed as a justification process, as well as a process of rational connection to society, making the dark side of trust strikingly clear. What is needed is more research on the connection between justification on the institutional level and justification in personal relations. Is trust a general propensity, or should we think of these as distinct arenas? This question parallels one that is discussed widely in this volume: the relationship of personal and institutional trust.

Given evidence of a dark side how should we think about trust? We can draw insights from the history of discussions about legitimacy (Tyler, 2006a). During periods of social unrest, such as the period after World War II, societies were preoccupied with stability, and legitimacy was viewed as a good feature for societies to have. During periods of stability on the other hand, people often question the “legitimate” authorities, asking if they really benefit everyone in the community. Similarly, with trust, institutional trust is valuable when societies are seeking to cooperate to solve problems, but potentially problematic when the leaders who are asking for discretion are not motivated by the desire to do what is right for the people in their community. Ultimately distinguishing these two situations requires a model of the relationship between people and their leaders. This is something that political science seeks to address (see, e.g., the chapter by Uslander, 2016). Are leaders in reality working for the benefit of everyone, or do they serve particular special interests? Without an answer to this question it is hard to know how much people should trust their leaders and defer to their judgments.

Like institutional authority, personal authority varies in its motivation. And, a core issue for people in any interaction with another person, authority or not, is making an effort to use information about the person to infer the person’s character and motives. For example, trust in politicians flows from an assessment about whether they are acting out of concern for the people in their community. Since every politician, no matter what his/her true motivation, says that he/she is acting in the interests of the people, this involves an individual effort to discern beyond rhetoric to infer the reality of his/her motivations. Recent public opinion polls suggest that people often make that assessment and emerge skeptical about the motivations of politicians, leading to mistrust in them and the institutions they represent.

## Conclusions and Future Directions

The chapters in this volume suggest the clear possibility of understanding the important issue of active engagement through a focus on trust. But the nature of trust remains elusive and needs more clarification in future research. Is trust calculative, in the sense that people use their experience to calculate the likelihood that people will be cooperative in the future? If so, then it seems unable to support the possibility of taking risks. Taking risks implies moving beyond a probability

estimate of likely actions from others. If people are simply being calculative, then trust is an aspect of the instrumental calculations already noted in deterrence models, that is, a risk estimate. Future research needs to specify conditions under which people are willing to act beyond such calculative judgments.

What might form the basis for trust, if not calculation? Motive based trust is linked to inferences about the character and intentions of another. In so doing it draws upon a rich history of social psychology, beginning with Heider (1958), which recognizes that the core of efforts to understand the social world involves seeking to make inferences about the traits and character of other people. Such inferences are important because it is believed that future actions can be understood through understanding a person's character. Hence, it suggests a willingness to "take a risk" based upon a judgment about something more intangible than a risk judgment.

It is important for future studies of trust to determine when people are, in fact, willing to trust in the sense of going beyond calculative risk based upon social inferences about another person's underlying traits and motives. It is social trust that promises the most in terms of supporting efforts to use trust to further proactive engagement. Society builds up a framework of social bonds and identity connections, and one reason for doing so is to facilitate people's willingness to act beyond their calculative self-interest. Especially during times of scarcity and change, when it is least possible to assure others about the future, the willingness to cooperate is most needed. Hence, the key research question is when these social aspects of a group, community, or society can facilitate the willingness to trust (Tyler, 2011).

In particular, the connection of trust to discretion is central to trust as an important social motive. Obligation is a responsibility to accept preestablished rules. But do authorities simply follow and enforce preexisting rules? Trust suggests the possibility of a more flexible type of authority and in that suggestion lies its potential value and strength. But, why will people grant an authority the opportunity to depart from rules? What is it that they need to be willing to trust? As noted, studies suggest that people value character over competence, suggesting that they do not simply accept that some people are able to find a way to solve problems. Rather they trust that some people will try to do what is best for the group. But, when is such trust given and why?

Related to the question of motive-based trust is the issue of how to build trust. An instrumental model suggests that people base trust judgments on past behavior. However, a motive-based model suggests that they make inferences about character. Are such inferences also linked to behavior? Or are they also responsive to other more status relevant elements in a social situation? As an example, studies on procedural justice indicate that showing interpersonal respect, which reinforces identity and status, is a distinct factor shaping cooperation. In other words people do not only react to whether an authority is making decisions fairly, which shapes the ability to anticipate future outcomes. They also react to elements in the behavior of an authority that are linked to communicating information about their status in a group. Similarly studies in other areas show that status affirmation can have strong effects on people, encouraging them to engage in unrelated tasks (Walton, 2014).

The literature on trust needs to examine how to create trust and should distinguish performance from affirmation as sources of perceived trustworthiness. If another person treats us respectfully, do we trust him/her more?

Closely related to the nature of trust is the level of trust. Motive-based trust works well with individuals. But do institutions have motives? Is trust in institutions of necessity calculative, or can people treat corporations as people for the purpose of making inferences about their trustworthiness? It is striking that people focus on politicians as people, questioning whether they act for the benefit of everyone. So, the growing cynicism reflected in declining trust and confidence in government is a broad and long-term decline in the public's belief that the people running their major national institutions are honest people who are sincerely concerned about the welfare of the average citizen. But this personalizes the operation of institutions. Can we have a trust framework for institutions? This question impacts upon a variety of policy questions. As an example, corporations are institutions, yet the law treats them as "people" and talks about inferring bad intention in companies. Can people make person-like inferences about institutional entities? And, if not, how do they make institutional trust judgments?

Finally, it is clearly important to ask if people can have a critical perspective on trust. It is recognized that blind acceptance of authority can be bad. But, it is equally bad to trust without a critical appraisal of others. Sometimes distrust is best. For example, if government authorities truly are not acting out of concern for people in their community, it is important for people to see that so they can make changes. Further research needs to explore the conditions under which people lose trust and what leads to that loss of trust.

There is a lot to like about this volume. It focuses upon an emerging issue that is likely to dominate social science in the twenty-first century: the beliefs that facilitate effective social functioning in a modern society. Authority was easier to describe when the behavior sought was simply rule following, whether compliance with laws or adherence to workplace rules. It is more challenging in an era in which willing and active engagement in organizations and communities increasingly defines the desirable individual. In a world of intellectual labor creativity and excited engagement define good work, while informed and active participation defines a good citizen. These behaviors require trust, but what type of trust and how is it created and maintained? These issues dominate the chapters of this book and will similarly define social science discourse in the future.

Why? Because legal and political systems work more effectively when the people in them have trust and confidence in authorities and institutions. People are more willing to follow the law, to pay taxes, and to take on tasks like fighting during wars. During times of scarcity and crisis, when collective resources are stressed and greater sacrifices are required from members for a society to be able to prevail, trust is a key antecedent of the willingness of the public to endure hardships and make sacrifices.

But trust is not just about doing what is required. Trust also enables creative and innovative actions that help groups to perform more effectively and to develop. Irrespective of whether our focus is on groups, institutions, or society in general,

trust is an important antecedent of effectiveness because trust leads to high levels of engagement and motivation among group members. People feel connected to groups and do what is needed to help them succeed. This centrality of trust to effectiveness is a troubling finding when coupled with the already outlined evidence that mistrust and cynicism are growing. What is needed, perhaps, is an effort to understand the forces leading to this decline in trust and an even greater effort to examine how to reverse this disturbing trend.

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